Narrative:

I, the instructor was giving a student an aircraft chkout for the purpose of rental when the incident occurred. I arrived at leesburg at XA45 and waited for the student to arrive. He arrived at approximately XB45. I checked his logbook and certificates, xeroxed copies of all, and explained the chkout procedures. I then reviewed his written test for the PA28R-200, verbally quizzed him on the v-spds, and had him sign the rental agreement. We then proceeded to the ramp and did a complete preflight inspection. I verified by visual inspection myself that all pertinent documents and certificates were on board, sufficient fuel, proper oil level, and landing gear system were in airworthy condition. After start-up, taxi, run-up, we departed runway 35 and headed northwest to do maneuvers. Satisfied with the maneuvers, I had the student find his way back to ZZZ. On the way back, I simulated an engine failure. He executed the emergency checklist satisfactorily except that he pitched for an airspeed of 90 mph instead of 105 mph (best glide for a PA28R-200). I then instructed the student to demonstrate proper traffic pattern entry, radio calls, and a soft field touch-and-go. At midfield downwind, he performed a gump check and proceeded with the landing. Entering the downwind leg on the second landing attempt, I told the student to demonstrate a short field landing. I was planning to simulate an engine out abeam the numbers in order to see if he could execute a simulated emergency landing. Abeam the numbers, I retarded the throttle before a gump check was performed. The purpose of this being done prior to the gump check is to have the aircraft in a minimum drag confign, resulting in more horizontal distance for the altitude lost. Once he realized what had happened, he placed the aircraft into a 55-60 degree bank with an airspeed around 85 mph. This flight condition was not acceptable because in a steep turn the stall speed increases with the angle of bank. His reaction to my simulation of an engine failure caused me to focus on correcting the aircraft attitude for a more suitable, safer, and stabilized approach rather than ensuring that the gump check was completed. After stabilizing the aircraft, I gave the controls back to him and told him again to regain the use of the throttle and demonstrate a short field landing. We were on a short final approach banking to the left to align with the runway centerline at an altitude slightly below GS. I was focusing on watching the bank angle, airspeed and altitude. He, I believe, was focusing on the same. We rolled out on the centerline exactly over the numbers at approximately 30 ft. Now the focus was on the flare at the moment of wings level. Upon contact, realizing what had occurred, I immediately unlatched the door, unfastened my seatbelt, killed the mixture, turned off the master switch, and waited for the aircraft to come to a stop. I then exited the aircraft, made sure he was alright and able to exit the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PIPER PA28-R200 ON AN INSTRUCTIONAL FLT LANDED WITH THE LNDG GEAR RETRACTED INCURRING DAMAGE TO THE ACFT FUSELAGE AND PROP.

Narrative: I, THE INSTRUCTOR WAS GIVING A STUDENT AN ACFT CHKOUT FOR THE PURPOSE OF RENTAL WHEN THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. I ARRIVED AT LEESBURG AT XA45 AND WAITED FOR THE STUDENT TO ARRIVE. HE ARRIVED AT APPROX XB45. I CHKED HIS LOGBOOK AND CERTIFICATES, XEROXED COPIES OF ALL, AND EXPLAINED THE CHKOUT PROCS. I THEN REVIEWED HIS WRITTEN TEST FOR THE PA28R-200, VERBALLY QUIZZED HIM ON THE V-SPDS, AND HAD HIM SIGN THE RENTAL AGREEMENT. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO THE RAMP AND DID A COMPLETE PREFLT INSPECTION. I VERIFIED BY VISUAL INSPECTION MYSELF THAT ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS AND CERTIFICATES WERE ON BOARD, SUFFICIENT FUEL, PROPER OIL LEVEL, AND LNDG GEAR SYS WERE IN AIRWORTHY CONDITION. AFTER START-UP, TAXI, RUN-UP, WE DEPARTED RWY 35 AND HEADED NW TO DO MANEUVERS. SATISFIED WITH THE MANEUVERS, I HAD THE STUDENT FIND HIS WAY BACK TO ZZZ. ON THE WAY BACK, I SIMULATED AN ENG FAILURE. HE EXECUTED THE EMER CHKLIST SATISFACTORILY EXCEPT THAT HE PITCHED FOR AN AIRSPD OF 90 MPH INSTEAD OF 105 MPH (BEST GLIDE FOR A PA28R-200). I THEN INSTRUCTED THE STUDENT TO DEMONSTRATE PROPER TFC PATTERN ENTRY, RADIO CALLS, AND A SOFT FIELD TOUCH-AND-GO. AT MIDFIELD DOWNWIND, HE PERFORMED A GUMP CHK AND PROCEEDED WITH THE LNDG. ENTERING THE DOWNWIND LEG ON THE SECOND LNDG ATTEMPT, I TOLD THE STUDENT TO DEMONSTRATE A SHORT FIELD LNDG. I WAS PLANNING TO SIMULATE AN ENG OUT ABEAM THE NUMBERS IN ORDER TO SEE IF HE COULD EXECUTE A SIMULATED EMER LNDG. ABEAM THE NUMBERS, I RETARDED THE THROTTLE BEFORE A GUMP CHK WAS PERFORMED. THE PURPOSE OF THIS BEING DONE PRIOR TO THE GUMP CHK IS TO HAVE THE ACFT IN A MINIMUM DRAG CONFIGN, RESULTING IN MORE HORIZ DISTANCE FOR THE ALT LOST. ONCE HE REALIZED WHAT HAD HAPPENED, HE PLACED THE ACFT INTO A 55-60 DEG BANK WITH AN AIRSPD AROUND 85 MPH. THIS FLT CONDITION WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IN A STEEP TURN THE STALL SPD INCREASES WITH THE ANGLE OF BANK. HIS REACTION TO MY SIMULATION OF AN ENG FAILURE CAUSED ME TO FOCUS ON CORRECTING THE ACFT ATTITUDE FOR A MORE SUITABLE, SAFER, AND STABILIZED APCH RATHER THAN ENSURING THAT THE GUMP CHK WAS COMPLETED. AFTER STABILIZING THE ACFT, I GAVE THE CTLS BACK TO HIM AND TOLD HIM AGAIN TO REGAIN THE USE OF THE THROTTLE AND DEMONSTRATE A SHORT FIELD LNDG. WE WERE ON A SHORT FINAL APCH BANKING TO THE L TO ALIGN WITH THE RWY CTRLINE AT AN ALT SLIGHTLY BELOW GS. I WAS FOCUSING ON WATCHING THE BANK ANGLE, AIRSPD AND ALT. HE, I BELIEVE, WAS FOCUSING ON THE SAME. WE ROLLED OUT ON THE CTRLINE EXACTLY OVER THE NUMBERS AT APPROX 30 FT. NOW THE FOCUS WAS ON THE FLARE AT THE MOMENT OF WINGS LEVEL. UPON CONTACT, REALIZING WHAT HAD OCCURRED, I IMMEDIATELY UNLATCHED THE DOOR, UNFASTENED MY SEATBELT, KILLED THE MIXTURE, TURNED OFF THE MASTER SWITCH, AND WAITED FOR THE ACFT TO COME TO A STOP. I THEN EXITED THE ACFT, MADE SURE HE WAS ALRIGHT AND ABLE TO EXIT THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.