Narrative:

We are often cleared to 'cross hyper at or below 9000 ft, cross robrt at 8000 ft,' or cleared to cross hyper at 9000 ft then subsequently re-cleared directly to robrt, to cross at 8000 ft. One day last week, I was flying when center cleared us to 'cross hyper at 9000 ft, cross robrt at 8000 ft.' that was what I heard, what I repeated to the captain, and what I heard the captain read back to the controller. Per company SOP, the captain dialed 9000 ft (or so I thought) into our altitude alerter, and we began the descent. In the midst of the approach briefing, the altitude alerter sounded. Expecting to see 10000 ft or 9900 ft on the altimeter, I was momentarily confused and thought the altimeter was reading 9900 ft, the 9800 ft, until I realized it read 8800 ft, and that the altitude alerter had been set to 8000 ft (the altitude of the second crossing restr), rather than 9000 ft, where it should have been set for the first crossing fix, hyper. As the airplane descended through 8500 ft, center queried our altitude, and I immediately looked back at the FMS, seeing that hyper was still 6 mi ahead of us. The captain told ATC that we were at 8500 ft and descending to cross robrt at 8000 ft, and the center controller replied that we had been cleared to cross hyper 'at' 9000 ft and then robrt at 8000 ft. On any other day, with any other captain, I would have immediately leveled off and queried ATC the moment the first doubt arose in my mind, but because of my 10 weeks of generally unpleasant experiences with this particular captain, and his extremely agitated emotional state during this particular month, I was reluctant to disobey his instruction to continue descending and I was reluctant to query ATC on the crossing restr. Additionally, I was distracted enough by the generally tense atmosphere in the cockpit that I did not want to correct the captain, or create a conflict with him, even though I knew he was mistaken, because I believed (based on many futile attempts to offer constructive criticism to this individual in the past) that it would only make the flight deck less safe when we flew together in the future. (Ironically, I first met this captain in CRM last yr, and was initially impressed by his ability to talk the CRM talk -- unfortunately he has not walked the CRM walk in our 10 weeks together, and every time I have tried to implement CRM procedures from the right seat I have been rebuffed or ignored.)

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BA32 FLC FAILS TO ADHERE TO XING RESTR APCHING IAD.

Narrative: WE ARE OFTEN CLRED TO 'CROSS HYPER AT OR BELOW 9000 FT, CROSS ROBRT AT 8000 FT,' OR CLRED TO CROSS HYPER AT 9000 FT THEN SUBSEQUENTLY RE-CLRED DIRECTLY TO ROBRT, TO CROSS AT 8000 FT. ONE DAY LAST WK, I WAS FLYING WHEN CTR CLRED US TO 'CROSS HYPER AT 9000 FT, CROSS ROBRT AT 8000 FT.' THAT WAS WHAT I HEARD, WHAT I REPEATED TO THE CAPT, AND WHAT I HEARD THE CAPT READ BACK TO THE CTLR. PER COMPANY SOP, THE CAPT DIALED 9000 FT (OR SO I THOUGHT) INTO OUR ALT ALERTER, AND WE BEGAN THE DSCNT. IN THE MIDST OF THE APCH BRIEFING, THE ALT ALERTER SOUNDED. EXPECTING TO SEE 10000 FT OR 9900 FT ON THE ALTIMETER, I WAS MOMENTARILY CONFUSED AND THOUGHT THE ALTIMETER WAS READING 9900 FT, THE 9800 FT, UNTIL I REALIZED IT READ 8800 FT, AND THAT THE ALT ALERTER HAD BEEN SET TO 8000 FT (THE ALT OF THE SECOND XING RESTR), RATHER THAN 9000 FT, WHERE IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET FOR THE FIRST XING FIX, HYPER. AS THE AIRPLANE DSNDED THROUGH 8500 FT, CTR QUERIED OUR ALT, AND I IMMEDIATELY LOOKED BACK AT THE FMS, SEEING THAT HYPER WAS STILL 6 MI AHEAD OF US. THE CAPT TOLD ATC THAT WE WERE AT 8500 FT AND DSNDING TO CROSS ROBRT AT 8000 FT, AND THE CTR CTLR REPLIED THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS HYPER 'AT' 9000 FT AND THEN ROBRT AT 8000 FT. ON ANY OTHER DAY, WITH ANY OTHER CAPT, I WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY LEVELED OFF AND QUERIED ATC THE MOMENT THE FIRST DOUBT AROSE IN MY MIND, BUT BECAUSE OF MY 10 WKS OF GENERALLY UNPLEASANT EXPERIENCES WITH THIS PARTICULAR CAPT, AND HIS EXTREMELY AGITATED EMOTIONAL STATE DURING THIS PARTICULAR MONTH, I WAS RELUCTANT TO DISOBEY HIS INSTRUCTION TO CONTINUE DSNDING AND I WAS RELUCTANT TO QUERY ATC ON THE XING RESTR. ADDITIONALLY, I WAS DISTRACTED ENOUGH BY THE GENERALLY TENSE ATMOSPHERE IN THE COCKPIT THAT I DID NOT WANT TO CORRECT THE CAPT, OR CREATE A CONFLICT WITH HIM, EVEN THOUGH I KNEW HE WAS MISTAKEN, BECAUSE I BELIEVED (BASED ON MANY FUTILE ATTEMPTS TO OFFER CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM TO THIS INDIVIDUAL IN THE PAST) THAT IT WOULD ONLY MAKE THE FLT DECK LESS SAFE WHEN WE FLEW TOGETHER IN THE FUTURE. (IRONICALLY, I FIRST MET THIS CAPT IN CRM LAST YR, AND WAS INITIALLY IMPRESSED BY HIS ABILITY TO TALK THE CRM TALK -- UNFORTUNATELY HE HAS NOT WALKED THE CRM WALK IN OUR 10 WKS TOGETHER, AND EVERY TIME I HAVE TRIED TO IMPLEMENT CRM PROCS FROM THE R SEAT I HAVE BEEN REBUFFED OR IGNORED.)

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.