Narrative:

Extended taxi time (2 hours 52 mins) due to ground stop to destination (lga) and thunderstorms at clt. Airport was closed for over 30 mins due thunderstorms, winds over 45 KTS, lightning strikes on airport, etc. Ramp area closed. During taxi to runway 36R, other aircraft reported debris (baggage cart, propane tank, obstruction barrel) on/near txwys/runways to ATC. ATC did not advise other aircraft. ATC continued taxi/departure/arrival operations. No runway inspection was made prior to recommencing operations on runways/txwys. What went right? Why? Company aircraft advised ATC of debris situation. What went wrong? Why? Airport did not conduct far part 139 required field inspection prior to reopening airport. ATC continued operations without determining if airport was clear of debris and undamaged. ATC did not advise aircraft that this was not done. What was learned? (Describe): crew fatigue! We can only work with that information which we are advised of. What would you do differently if faced with this or a similar situation again? Challenge ATC for the information and delay if necessary. What needs to be addressed to prevent a recurrence of this situation and improve safety? ATC/airport need to coordinate and communicate. ATC needs to advise air carrier crews of the situation. Airport needs to fulfill its duties to ensure airfield is safe prior to reopening.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATC DID NOT ASSURE ARPT WAS CLR OF OBSTRUCTIONS ON RWYS AND TXWYS WHEN THEY WERE RPTED BY ACFT AFTER A PASSING TSTM.

Narrative: EXTENDED TAXI TIME (2 HRS 52 MINS) DUE TO GND STOP TO DEST (LGA) AND TSTMS AT CLT. ARPT WAS CLOSED FOR OVER 30 MINS DUE TSTMS, WINDS OVER 45 KTS, LIGHTNING STRIKES ON ARPT, ETC. RAMP AREA CLOSED. DURING TAXI TO RWY 36R, OTHER ACFT RPTED DEBRIS (BAGGAGE CART, PROPANE TANK, OBSTRUCTION BARREL) ON/NEAR TXWYS/RWYS TO ATC. ATC DID NOT ADVISE OTHER ACFT. ATC CONTINUED TAXI/DEP/ARR OPS. NO RWY INSPECTION WAS MADE PRIOR TO RECOMMENCING OPS ON RWYS/TXWYS. WHAT WENT RIGHT? WHY? COMPANY ACFT ADVISED ATC OF DEBRIS SIT. WHAT WENT WRONG? WHY? ARPT DID NOT CONDUCT FAR PART 139 REQUIRED FIELD INSPECTION PRIOR TO REOPENING ARPT. ATC CONTINUED OPS WITHOUT DETERMINING IF ARPT WAS CLR OF DEBRIS AND UNDAMAGED. ATC DID NOT ADVISE ACFT THAT THIS WAS NOT DONE. WHAT WAS LEARNED? (DESCRIBE): CREW FATIGUE! WE CAN ONLY WORK WITH THAT INFO WHICH WE ARE ADVISED OF. WHAT WOULD YOU DO DIFFERENTLY IF FACED WITH THIS OR A SIMILAR SIT AGAIN? CHALLENGE ATC FOR THE INFO AND DELAY IF NECESSARY. WHAT NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THIS SIT AND IMPROVE SAFETY? ATC/ARPT NEED TO COORDINATE AND COMMUNICATE. ATC NEEDS TO ADVISE ACR CREWS OF THE SIT. ARPT NEEDS TO FULFILL ITS DUTIES TO ENSURE AIRFIELD IS SAFE PRIOR TO REOPENING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.