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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 445542 |
Time | |
Date | 199908 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sfo.airport |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl single value : 2500 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Mixed |
Weather Elements | Fog other |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : o90.tracon |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | ils localizer & glide slope : 28r other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Route In Use | approach : instrument precision |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : o90.tracon |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Brasilia EMB-120 All Series |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Route In Use | approach : visual |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer pilot : commercial pilot : atp pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 15000 flight time type : 6000 |
ASRS Report | 445542 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine |
Events | |
Anomaly | inflight encounter : vfr in imc inflight encounter : weather non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure non adherence : clearance non adherence : company policies |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | faa : assigned or threatened penalties |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance FAA Environmental Factor Weather Airport |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | procedure or policy : o90.tracon |
Narrative:
Routine flight from lax until entering holding at bsr. After holding about 40 mins we were vectored in sequence for an approach to sfo ILS runway 28R. WX was overcast north of the dumbarton bridge and the localizer to runway 28L was OTS. After many turns we were vectored onto the localizer and cleared for the ILS runway 28R. 5 mi outside of the FAF (bridge) we were told to start looking for an air carrier Y flight who was on a visual to runway 28L (localizer out). He was not visible at this time and I told ATC we did not see him. He soon came into sight high and to the left as he passed us up. We were told he had us in sight. Since there was a clear undercast between the airport and us, there was no way we would be able to keep him or the airport in sight. We were clearly flying an IFR approach descending into IMC conditions, which were about 300 ft thick from about 2100 ft to 1800 ft. The approach controller was noticeably annoyed that we would not call the other traffic in sight and release him of separation. We told him we could not keep air carrier Y in sight, and then he said we would have to go around. I relented reluctantly and called the traffic, as going around in my opinion would represent a bigger problem due to fuel and WX. I felt very compromised by being put in this situation by ATC. The following problems were very apparent to me: 1) I was on an IFR approach to an IMC airport. I should not have to go around because someone is trying to pull off a bogus visual approach. 2) if anyone should have been pulled out of the pattern it should have been the VFR aircraft. 3) although I was not in the air carrier Y cockpit I find it hard to believe that he could see the airport and was especially concerned the runway 28L localizer was OTS. 4) the need to shoot visuals is important but not so important that pilots and ATC should choose unsafe separation to 'push' pilots for arrs. 5) ATC is out of control and when they don't hear exactly what they want to, they invoke 'punitive controling' which is an unsafe operation. 6) I do not appreciate being put in a position by ATC or the air carrier Y that makes it necessary for me to have to decrease safety levels.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 CREW WAS GIVEN A GAR WHEN THEY REFUSED A VISUAL APCH IN IMC CONDITIONS.
Narrative: ROUTINE FLT FROM LAX UNTIL ENTERING HOLDING AT BSR. AFTER HOLDING ABOUT 40 MINS WE WERE VECTORED IN SEQUENCE FOR AN APCH TO SFO ILS RWY 28R. WX WAS OVCST N OF THE DUMBARTON BRIDGE AND THE LOC TO RWY 28L WAS OTS. AFTER MANY TURNS WE WERE VECTORED ONTO THE LOC AND CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 28R. 5 MI OUTSIDE OF THE FAF (BRIDGE) WE WERE TOLD TO START LOOKING FOR AN ACR Y FLT WHO WAS ON A VISUAL TO RWY 28L (LOC OUT). HE WAS NOT VISIBLE AT THIS TIME AND I TOLD ATC WE DID NOT SEE HIM. HE SOON CAME INTO SIGHT HIGH AND TO THE L AS HE PASSED US UP. WE WERE TOLD HE HAD US IN SIGHT. SINCE THERE WAS A CLR UNDERCAST BTWN THE ARPT AND US, THERE WAS NO WAY WE WOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP HIM OR THE ARPT IN SIGHT. WE WERE CLRLY FLYING AN IFR APCH DSNDING INTO IMC CONDITIONS, WHICH WERE ABOUT 300 FT THICK FROM ABOUT 2100 FT TO 1800 FT. THE APCH CTLR WAS NOTICEABLY ANNOYED THAT WE WOULD NOT CALL THE OTHER TFC IN SIGHT AND RELEASE HIM OF SEPARATION. WE TOLD HIM WE COULD NOT KEEP ACR Y IN SIGHT, AND THEN HE SAID WE WOULD HAVE TO GAR. I RELENTED RELUCTANTLY AND CALLED THE TFC, AS GOING AROUND IN MY OPINION WOULD REPRESENT A BIGGER PROB DUE TO FUEL AND WX. I FELT VERY COMPROMISED BY BEING PUT IN THIS SIT BY ATC. THE FOLLOWING PROBS WERE VERY APPARENT TO ME: 1) I WAS ON AN IFR APCH TO AN IMC ARPT. I SHOULD NOT HAVE TO GO AROUND BECAUSE SOMEONE IS TRYING TO PULL OFF A BOGUS VISUAL APCH. 2) IF ANYONE SHOULD HAVE BEEN PULLED OUT OF THE PATTERN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE VFR ACFT. 3) ALTHOUGH I WAS NOT IN THE ACR Y COCKPIT I FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT HE COULD SEE THE ARPT AND WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED THE RWY 28L LOC WAS OTS. 4) THE NEED TO SHOOT VISUALS IS IMPORTANT BUT NOT SO IMPORTANT THAT PLTS AND ATC SHOULD CHOOSE UNSAFE SEPARATION TO 'PUSH' PLTS FOR ARRS. 5) ATC IS OUT OF CTL AND WHEN THEY DON'T HEAR EXACTLY WHAT THEY WANT TO, THEY INVOKE 'PUNITIVE CTLING' WHICH IS AN UNSAFE OP. 6) I DO NOT APPRECIATE BEING PUT IN A POS BY ATC OR THE ACR Y THAT MAKES IT NECESSARY FOR ME TO HAVE TO DECREASE SAFETY LEVELS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.