Narrative:

This was a training flight where I, the PF, was getting checked out in a new aircraft (a mooney tls) by another CFI. While I was doing the flying, the PNF was handling all the electronics. We were both looking out for other traffic and making radio calls. Unable to get a response from unicom, we decided to land on runway 22. We were followed in by a DC3 shortly thereafter. The winds were about 5 KTS out of the southeast. On taxi back, there was a fair amount of chatter on the unicom and the PNF turned the volume down on the radio. We performed our before takeoff check and looked for traffic on final, base and downwind for runway 22. We did not turn the volume up on the radio (some takeoff check) nor did we announce our departure. While on the takeoff roll, the PNF suddenly grabbed the controls only to release them again allowing me to continue the takeoff, but pointed out a piper navajo on short final for runway 10. We were well past the intersection prior to his touchdown, but this was just a little too close. There were a number of factors leading up to this incident. First and foremost the concept of 'see and avoid' was not practiced. Unlike what I teach my students, we only checked the pattern we were using and did not accomplish a 360 degree turn to check the whole area. If we had done so we may have seen the traffic on final for the intersecting runway. In my opinion, the navajo made a straight-in approach, but I can't prove it because I wasn't looking, nor did we have the radio volume turned up. This was another factor. There is no excuse for not monitoring unicom or announcing our intentions. Probably the most important factor, I feel, was the delineation of who actually was PIC and who was to do what. Though I was 'sole manipulator of the controls,' I assumed the role of student and expected/relied on the other CFI to assume all responsibility. The roles should have been defined better. I feel, that when 2 CFI's are flying together the responsibilities have to be spelled out so that there is no assumption, second-guessing, missed items/procedures and missed traffic. This is probably more true for this flight crew situation than any other. It is truly scary when 2 CFI's fly together.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR CHKING OUT ANOTHER INSTRUCTOR IN A MOONEY TYPE ACFT OBSERVED A PIPER NAVAJO ON FINAL CLOSE TO TOUCHDOWN ON AN INTERSECTING RWY AND GRABBED THE CTLS TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION IF NEEDED. IT WAS NOT NEEDED SO THE CTLS WERE GIVEN BACK TO THE INSTRUCTOR BEING CHKED OUT FOR CONTINUED TKOF.

Narrative: THIS WAS A TRAINING FLT WHERE I, THE PF, WAS GETTING CHKED OUT IN A NEW ACFT (A MOONEY TLS) BY ANOTHER CFI. WHILE I WAS DOING THE FLYING, THE PNF WAS HANDLING ALL THE ELECTRONICS. WE WERE BOTH LOOKING OUT FOR OTHER TFC AND MAKING RADIO CALLS. UNABLE TO GET A RESPONSE FROM UNICOM, WE DECIDED TO LAND ON RWY 22. WE WERE FOLLOWED IN BY A DC3 SHORTLY THEREAFTER. THE WINDS WERE ABOUT 5 KTS OUT OF THE SE. ON TAXI BACK, THERE WAS A FAIR AMOUNT OF CHATTER ON THE UNICOM AND THE PNF TURNED THE VOLUME DOWN ON THE RADIO. WE PERFORMED OUR BEFORE TKOF CHK AND LOOKED FOR TFC ON FINAL, BASE AND DOWNWIND FOR RWY 22. WE DID NOT TURN THE VOLUME UP ON THE RADIO (SOME TKOF CHK) NOR DID WE ANNOUNCE OUR DEP. WHILE ON THE TKOF ROLL, THE PNF SUDDENLY GRABBED THE CTLS ONLY TO RELEASE THEM AGAIN ALLOWING ME TO CONTINUE THE TKOF, BUT POINTED OUT A PIPER NAVAJO ON SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 10. WE WERE WELL PAST THE INTXN PRIOR TO HIS TOUCHDOWN, BUT THIS WAS JUST A LITTLE TOO CLOSE. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF FACTORS LEADING UP TO THIS INCIDENT. FIRST AND FOREMOST THE CONCEPT OF 'SEE AND AVOID' WAS NOT PRACTICED. UNLIKE WHAT I TEACH MY STUDENTS, WE ONLY CHKED THE PATTERN WE WERE USING AND DID NOT ACCOMPLISH A 360 DEG TURN TO CHK THE WHOLE AREA. IF WE HAD DONE SO WE MAY HAVE SEEN THE TFC ON FINAL FOR THE INTERSECTING RWY. IN MY OPINION, THE NAVAJO MADE A STRAIGHT-IN APCH, BUT I CAN'T PROVE IT BECAUSE I WASN'T LOOKING, NOR DID WE HAVE THE RADIO VOLUME TURNED UP. THIS WAS ANOTHER FACTOR. THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR NOT MONITORING UNICOM OR ANNOUNCING OUR INTENTIONS. PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR, I FEEL, WAS THE DELINEATION OF WHO ACTUALLY WAS PIC AND WHO WAS TO DO WHAT. THOUGH I WAS 'SOLE MANIPULATOR OF THE CTLS,' I ASSUMED THE ROLE OF STUDENT AND EXPECTED/RELIED ON THE OTHER CFI TO ASSUME ALL RESPONSIBILITY. THE ROLES SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEFINED BETTER. I FEEL, THAT WHEN 2 CFI'S ARE FLYING TOGETHER THE RESPONSIBILITIES HAVE TO BE SPELLED OUT SO THAT THERE IS NO ASSUMPTION, SECOND-GUESSING, MISSED ITEMS/PROCS AND MISSED TFC. THIS IS PROBABLY MORE TRUE FOR THIS FLC SIT THAN ANY OTHER. IT IS TRULY SCARY WHEN 2 CFI'S FLY TOGETHER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.