Narrative:

The other day some thunderstorms went through the area. We were all surprised in the cabin attendant when we noticed the tdwr (terminal doppler WX radar) screen indicate a microburst, yet there was no alarm on the ribbon display. Apparently some controllers or maintenance personnel are entering the 'edit' mode and changing the selections. In one case one ribbon display had no runway areas displayed whatsoever, while the other ribbon display had what 'appeared' to be the correct assignments. However, for runway 28L it had selected '28LA' and '28LA,' therefore the microburst in the runway 28L departure area didn't activate the alarm! This was addressed by support staff, yet this morning when I arrived, both ribbon displays had no runway areas selected -- hence, no alert would be generated. The tdwr needs to be more idiot proof. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated since his report the facility has put a sticker by the tdwr entry keyboard. The information on the sticker informs the controller work force the correct way to set up the tdwr equipment for the different runway configns. Since then, reporter indicated that his peers have a better understanding of the operation of the tdwr equipment. According to the reporter, the facility has a facility SOP that covers the operation of the tdwr also. Reporter believes that the easy accessibility to the edit mode could be a national problem as well. Reporter is proposing that the edit mode should be password protected. This would allow only maintenance personnel access to the unit for programming, but still allow controllers to make necessary runway confign changes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR STATES THAT BECAUSE OF THE EASY ACCESSIBILITY TO THE EDIT MODE ON THE TDWR EQUIP IN THE TWR, PERSONNEL HAVE INADVERTENTLY CHANGED THE PARAMETERS ON THE RWY CONFIGNS. THIS INHIBITS THE ALARM MODE THAT ALERTS THE CTLR OF A WX SIT THAT'S TAKING PLACE ON OR NEAR THE ARPT.

Narrative: THE OTHER DAY SOME TSTMS WENT THROUGH THE AREA. WE WERE ALL SURPRISED IN THE CAB WHEN WE NOTICED THE TDWR (TERMINAL DOPPLER WX RADAR) SCREEN INDICATE A MICROBURST, YET THERE WAS NO ALARM ON THE RIBBON DISPLAY. APPARENTLY SOME CTLRS OR MAINT PERSONNEL ARE ENTERING THE 'EDIT' MODE AND CHANGING THE SELECTIONS. IN ONE CASE ONE RIBBON DISPLAY HAD NO RWY AREAS DISPLAYED WHATSOEVER, WHILE THE OTHER RIBBON DISPLAY HAD WHAT 'APPEARED' TO BE THE CORRECT ASSIGNMENTS. HOWEVER, FOR RWY 28L IT HAD SELECTED '28LA' AND '28LA,' THEREFORE THE MICROBURST IN THE RWY 28L DEP AREA DIDN'T ACTIVATE THE ALARM! THIS WAS ADDRESSED BY SUPPORT STAFF, YET THIS MORNING WHEN I ARRIVED, BOTH RIBBON DISPLAYS HAD NO RWY AREAS SELECTED -- HENCE, NO ALERT WOULD BE GENERATED. THE TDWR NEEDS TO BE MORE IDIOT PROOF. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED SINCE HIS RPT THE FACILITY HAS PUT A STICKER BY THE TDWR ENTRY KEYBOARD. THE INFO ON THE STICKER INFORMS THE CTLR WORK FORCE THE CORRECT WAY TO SET UP THE TDWR EQUIP FOR THE DIFFERENT RWY CONFIGNS. SINCE THEN, RPTR INDICATED THAT HIS PEERS HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE OP OF THE TDWR EQUIP. ACCORDING TO THE RPTR, THE FACILITY HAS A FACILITY SOP THAT COVERS THE OP OF THE TDWR ALSO. RPTR BELIEVES THAT THE EASY ACCESSIBILITY TO THE EDIT MODE COULD BE A NATIONAL PROB AS WELL. RPTR IS PROPOSING THAT THE EDIT MODE SHOULD BE PASSWORD PROTECTED. THIS WOULD ALLOW ONLY MAINT PERSONNEL ACCESS TO THE UNIT FOR PROGRAMMING, BUT STILL ALLOW CTLRS TO MAKE NECESSARY RWY CONFIGN CHANGES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.