Narrative:

We were cleared into position and hold on runway 16R in slc and then cleared to turn right to 280 degrees, cleared for takeoff. While in the turn to 280 degrees, approaching 1800 ft AGL, flap retraction in progress accelerating through 180 KTS we got a TCASII corrective RA. Aural warning 'descend, descend.' a quick glance at the vsi indicated a red target at 10 O'clock, very close, and commanding a descent of about 1500 FPM. As I simultaneously rolled out of bank, reduced pitch to stop climb and begin descent, I visually acquired the conflict aircraft in my 10 O'clock position, range about 800 ft and closing, very slightly higher and appeared to be wbound. I snatched the throttles back and visually maneuvered approximately 150 ft below the tail of a high wing, twin engine aircraft. My rollout heading was 240 degrees, which was maintained until clear of conflict. (Had a little flashback to military fighter rendezvous.) this incident encompassed some of the most complex and critical set of circumstances I can imagine. The conflict aircraft was cleared for takeoff on runway 16L with a right turn to 280 degrees on the slc runway 16L tower frequency. We were not advised on the runway 16R tower frequency and had no knowledge of this aircraft or its intended flight path across our course. We did not see the aircraft when we received takeoff clearance. (It should be noted that the light twin had no distinctive markings and the color appeared beige, which provided very little contrast for visual acquisition in a light brown haze.) our TCASII warnings are inhibited below 1000 ft AGL and I believe when TCASII became uninhibited it attempted a TA which almost immediately changed to an RA as we were turning, climbing, accelerating, retracting flaps and rapidly closing on the unseen aircraft in a near perfect rendezvous. The slc tower TA was received too late. I believe the copilot responded with something like, 'yeah, we almost hit him.' it was a bit too close for comfort. I believe the primary cause of this incident was that the pilots were left out of the loop in this ATC coordinated departure. Dual tower frequencys, failure to inform pilots of runway 16L traffic going wbound and tower controller apparently distraction by arrival traffic on runway 16R, resulted in 2 departures being sent into same airspace at the same time. Single frequency operations, unfortunately, are a thing of the past. In a situation like this, it must be mandatory to inform the pilots when going into position and hold that they are holding for traffic departing from runway xx and what direction it is going. A possible contributing factor was the lack of 'high visibility' paint or markings on the light twin. The coincidental geometry involved in this setup made visual awareness of the conflict difficult and could just as easily have been fatal. I am going to try to increase my attention to the airspace I am turning away from as well as scanning the space I am turning into. It is disturbing to think that this same scenario could have occurred under IFR conditions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 FLC ENCOUNTERED TWIN ACFT JUST AFTER TKOF SLC. APPARENTLY BOTH ACFT WERE ISSUED R TURN HDGS TO 280 DEGS OFF PARALLEL RWYS.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 16R IN SLC AND THEN CLRED TO TURN R TO 280 DEGS, CLRED FOR TKOF. WHILE IN THE TURN TO 280 DEGS, APCHING 1800 FT AGL, FLAP RETRACTION IN PROGRESS ACCELERATING THROUGH 180 KTS WE GOT A TCASII CORRECTIVE RA. AURAL WARNING 'DSND, DSND.' A QUICK GLANCE AT THE VSI INDICATED A RED TARGET AT 10 O'CLOCK, VERY CLOSE, AND COMMANDING A DSCNT OF ABOUT 1500 FPM. AS I SIMULTANEOUSLY ROLLED OUT OF BANK, REDUCED PITCH TO STOP CLB AND BEGIN DSCNT, I VISUALLY ACQUIRED THE CONFLICT ACFT IN MY 10 O'CLOCK POS, RANGE ABOUT 800 FT AND CLOSING, VERY SLIGHTLY HIGHER AND APPEARED TO BE WBOUND. I SNATCHED THE THROTTLES BACK AND VISUALLY MANEUVERED APPROX 150 FT BELOW THE TAIL OF A HIGH WING, TWIN ENG ACFT. MY ROLLOUT HDG WAS 240 DEGS, WHICH WAS MAINTAINED UNTIL CLR OF CONFLICT. (HAD A LITTLE FLASHBACK TO MIL FIGHTER RENDEZVOUS.) THIS INCIDENT ENCOMPASSED SOME OF THE MOST COMPLEX AND CRITICAL SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES I CAN IMAGINE. THE CONFLICT ACFT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 16L WITH A R TURN TO 280 DEGS ON THE SLC RWY 16L TWR FREQ. WE WERE NOT ADVISED ON THE RWY 16R TWR FREQ AND HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THIS ACFT OR ITS INTENDED FLT PATH ACROSS OUR COURSE. WE DID NOT SEE THE ACFT WHEN WE RECEIVED TKOF CLRNC. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE LIGHT TWIN HAD NO DISTINCTIVE MARKINGS AND THE COLOR APPEARED BEIGE, WHICH PROVIDED VERY LITTLE CONTRAST FOR VISUAL ACQUISITION IN A LIGHT BROWN HAZE.) OUR TCASII WARNINGS ARE INHIBITED BELOW 1000 FT AGL AND I BELIEVE WHEN TCASII BECAME UNINHIBITED IT ATTEMPTED A TA WHICH ALMOST IMMEDIATELY CHANGED TO AN RA AS WE WERE TURNING, CLBING, ACCELERATING, RETRACTING FLAPS AND RAPIDLY CLOSING ON THE UNSEEN ACFT IN A NEAR PERFECT RENDEZVOUS. THE SLC TWR TA WAS RECEIVED TOO LATE. I BELIEVE THE COPLT RESPONDED WITH SOMETHING LIKE, 'YEAH, WE ALMOST HIT HIM.' IT WAS A BIT TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT. I BELIEVE THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT WAS THAT THE PLTS WERE LEFT OUT OF THE LOOP IN THIS ATC COORDINATED DEP. DUAL TWR FREQS, FAILURE TO INFORM PLTS OF RWY 16L TFC GOING WBOUND AND TWR CTLR APPARENTLY DISTR BY ARR TFC ON RWY 16R, RESULTED IN 2 DEPS BEING SENT INTO SAME AIRSPACE AT THE SAME TIME. SINGLE FREQ OPS, UNFORTUNATELY, ARE A THING OF THE PAST. IN A SIT LIKE THIS, IT MUST BE MANDATORY TO INFORM THE PLTS WHEN GOING INTO POS AND HOLD THAT THEY ARE HOLDING FOR TFC DEPARTING FROM RWY XX AND WHAT DIRECTION IT IS GOING. A POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE LACK OF 'HIGH VISIBILITY' PAINT OR MARKINGS ON THE LIGHT TWIN. THE COINCIDENTAL GEOMETRY INVOLVED IN THIS SETUP MADE VISUAL AWARENESS OF THE CONFLICT DIFFICULT AND COULD JUST AS EASILY HAVE BEEN FATAL. I AM GOING TO TRY TO INCREASE MY ATTN TO THE AIRSPACE I AM TURNING AWAY FROM AS WELL AS SCANNING THE SPACE I AM TURNING INTO. IT IS DISTURBING TO THINK THAT THIS SAME SCENARIO COULD HAVE OCCURRED UNDER IFR CONDITIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.