Narrative:

My crew and I taxied out of the cargo ramp under company tower's control. The WX was overcast with a 100 ft ceiling and 1/4 mi visibility. Company tower instructed us to follow the B727 ahead of us and we did so. Repeated stops and starts (each time requiring the use and subsequent release of the parking brake) were necessary, as a long line of airplanes ahead of us slowly moved toward the departure runway. Because of the heavy fog we were only able to see the airplane directly in front of us. I suddenly realized that we were beyond company ramp, and the point where we normally switch frequencys to dayton ground control instead of tower. We immediately switched over to day ground and let the controller know we were on his frequency. The controller was understandably not pleased with our failure to switch to his frequency at the proper point. We proceeded to follow our sequence until we executed an uneventful departure. I believe the following factors contributed to our failure to switch frequencys: 1) the added distraction of taxiing in low visibility. 2) the repeated requirement of stopping, setting the parking brake, releasing the brake, and taxiing forward behind the line of airplanes in front of us. 3) the difficulty in perceiving how far we had taxied due to the low visibility. 4) the removal of visual clues normally associated with our frequency changeover point, again caused by low visibility. 5) a reduced sense of urgency accompanied by an increased sense of complacency caused by the extremely slow progress we were making toward our departure point. A similar event may be prevented in the future by: 1) having company tower tell crews to switch to ground. 2) coordinating handoffs from company tower to day ground so that ground can quickly realize that an airplane has not checked in after leaving company ramp.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727 WAS DIRECTED TO FOLLOW AN ACFT DEPARTING THE COMPANY'S CARGO RAMP AND DID NOT CONTACT GND CTL UNTIL NEAR THE RWY AT DAY.

Narrative: MY CREW AND I TAXIED OUT OF THE CARGO RAMP UNDER COMPANY TWR'S CTL. THE WX WAS OVCST WITH A 100 FT CEILING AND 1/4 MI VISIBILITY. COMPANY TWR INSTRUCTED US TO FOLLOW THE B727 AHEAD OF US AND WE DID SO. REPEATED STOPS AND STARTS (EACH TIME REQUIRING THE USE AND SUBSEQUENT RELEASE OF THE PARKING BRAKE) WERE NECESSARY, AS A LONG LINE OF AIRPLANES AHEAD OF US SLOWLY MOVED TOWARD THE DEP RWY. BECAUSE OF THE HVY FOG WE WERE ONLY ABLE TO SEE THE AIRPLANE DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF US. I SUDDENLY REALIZED THAT WE WERE BEYOND COMPANY RAMP, AND THE POINT WHERE WE NORMALLY SWITCH FREQS TO DAYTON GND CTL INSTEAD OF TWR. WE IMMEDIATELY SWITCHED OVER TO DAY GND AND LET THE CTLR KNOW WE WERE ON HIS FREQ. THE CTLR WAS UNDERSTANDABLY NOT PLEASED WITH OUR FAILURE TO SWITCH TO HIS FREQ AT THE PROPER POINT. WE PROCEEDED TO FOLLOW OUR SEQUENCE UNTIL WE EXECUTED AN UNEVENTFUL DEP. I BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO OUR FAILURE TO SWITCH FREQS: 1) THE ADDED DISTR OF TAXIING IN LOW VISIBILITY. 2) THE REPEATED REQUIREMENT OF STOPPING, SETTING THE PARKING BRAKE, RELEASING THE BRAKE, AND TAXIING FORWARD BEHIND THE LINE OF AIRPLANES IN FRONT OF US. 3) THE DIFFICULTY IN PERCEIVING HOW FAR WE HAD TAXIED DUE TO THE LOW VISIBILITY. 4) THE REMOVAL OF VISUAL CLUES NORMALLY ASSOCIATED WITH OUR FREQ CHANGEOVER POINT, AGAIN CAUSED BY LOW VISIBILITY. 5) A REDUCED SENSE OF URGENCY ACCOMPANIED BY AN INCREASED SENSE OF COMPLACENCY CAUSED BY THE EXTREMELY SLOW PROGRESS WE WERE MAKING TOWARD OUR DEP POINT. A SIMILAR EVENT MAY BE PREVENTED IN THE FUTURE BY: 1) HAVING COMPANY TWR TELL CREWS TO SWITCH TO GND. 2) COORDINATING HDOFS FROM COMPANY TWR TO DAY GND SO THAT GND CAN QUICKLY REALIZE THAT AN AIRPLANE HAS NOT CHKED IN AFTER LEAVING COMPANY RAMP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.