Narrative:

On sep/wed/99 at about XA35 with air carrier flight XXX we were on the required navigation precision portion of the descent into jnu. We had been cleared shortly after takeoff from anc to proceed to laire, yak, fakes, and then the mendn 2 arrival for the required navigation precision approach to runway 8. After passing fakes, we checked in the zan on 133.9 and requested lower at pilot's discretion. The controller's response was simply, 'where do you want to hold?' we asked if there was a traffic conflict and he said no, and he offered no reason as to our having to hold. All this was happening as we were past our top of descent and still at cruise altitude. When asked if we would have any delays if we were cleared the regular lda into jnu, he said there would be no delays, but again confirmed there would be delays if we wanted the required navigation precision. When asked why, he said he was 'too busy' to explain. The tone of his voice made it clear he was taking pleasure in delaying our flight if we continued with our request for the required navigation precision approach. We asked for the lda and he cleared us direct to cushi at or above 11000 ft, then the lda to runway 8. We were well above the optimum descent path by the time we were given this clearance, and I configured flaps and gear prior to cushi and had no problem getting to normal altitudes and approach speeds by dibol. This controller seriously jeopardized air safety by interjecting considerable distraction to the cockpit crew with his confrontational attitude about not wanting to support the required navigation precision approach into jnu. The landing was uneventful as both pilots consciously said to ourselves to 'let it go' until we safely get on the ground. The captain and air carrier have discussed this with zan supervisors and the controller in question is being given a quality assurance review.' history: at great expense and effort, air carrier is the first airline qualified to fly required navigation precision approachs and departures in some very challenging WX and terrain. These required navigation precision procedures provide a significant increase in safety versus the non precision approachs that are being replaced by the required navigation precision procedures. A problem at zan is that some controllers feel they should be paid more for learning the added waypoints and procedures for clearing a flight on an required navigation precision approach. These controllers will not clear aircraft to fly a required navigation precision approach. Such unprofessional conduct can seriously affect our safety and ability to fly an approach to our southeast alaska airports when the WX is particularly treacherous. We've spent millions on equipment and training and now an unprofessional controller is allowed to negate it all. Until this incident, I had only heard of such problems but never experienced any myself. I was astonished at this controller's blatant and confrontational attitude. Zan has historically been very supportive of our efforts with required navigation precision. If there are 1 or 2 controllers who don't want to support required navigation precision, then why is such a controller put in a sector such as southeast alaska where required navigation precision approachs are so crucial? Why not put him in the fai sector or anywhere else where required navigation precision approachs are not being used? Air safety demands it! Looking at jnu 10-2L-1, mendn 2 arrival and 19-7-1, required navigation precision runway 8 we were just past fakes when we first contacted the controller in question. When we realized what was happening, we figured we could just continue direct to cushi and then pick up the lda-2 runway 8 (jnu 11-9). When we asked, 'request the lda,' the controller cleared us 'direct cushi, cross cushi at or above 11000 ft, then cleared the lda to runway 8. Report passing 8000 ft.' after landing and reviewing what had happened, the captain became concerned someone might question our flying the mendn 2 arrival to the lda since our direct clearance to cushi kept us on the same track as the mendn 2 arrival. The mendn 2 arrival is a feeder procedure to the required navigation precision final approach, not the lda, and he feels there are some issues regarding proper adherence to the IAF's we may have violated. I do not think there is any such issue, and I have not had a chance to discuss this with him prior to his sending his NASA report. Though our actual track was the same as the mendn 2 arrival when cleared direct to cushi, we were not cleared via the mendn 2 arrival, but instead, were cleared direct to cushi at the mora of 11000 ft. (We had a dual FMS aircraft, and RNAV direct to any point when in radar contact or not, is legal!) when at cushi we flew the lda as published. Summary: I believe the cockpit crew performed admirably under unnecessarily trying circumstances caused by an unprofessional controller more concerned about his 'bone to pick' than in air safety. I also believe the cockpit crew flew a perfectly reasonable and legal descent and approach that after great discussion and 'monday morning quarterbacking' might somehow be considered technically illegal. There is little I would do differently. I hope zan will resolve their controller problems, and I regret the FAA has in the past been so ambiguous about some truly petty and nebulous issues that I now feel a need to submit this report. More importantly, however, FAA priority wasted in the past on such 'non issues' distracts resources from far more important air safety issues, and for that, we all suffer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WAS REFUSED REQUESTED PRECISION ARR AND APCH BY ARTCC WITH NO REASON GIVEN, AND FLT WAS ISSUED HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS. CLRNC FOR SUBSEQUENT LDA APCH WAS ISSUED AND ACCEPTED.

Narrative: ON SEP/WED/99 AT ABOUT XA35 WITH ACR FLT XXX WE WERE ON THE REQUIRED NAV PRECISION PORTION OF THE DSCNT INTO JNU. WE HAD BEEN CLRED SHORTLY AFTER TKOF FROM ANC TO PROCEED TO LAIRE, YAK, FAKES, AND THEN THE MENDN 2 ARR FOR THE REQUIRED NAV PRECISION APCH TO RWY 8. AFTER PASSING FAKES, WE CHKED IN THE ZAN ON 133.9 AND REQUESTED LOWER AT PLT'S DISCRETION. THE CTLR'S RESPONSE WAS SIMPLY, 'WHERE DO YOU WANT TO HOLD?' WE ASKED IF THERE WAS A TFC CONFLICT AND HE SAID NO, AND HE OFFERED NO REASON AS TO OUR HAVING TO HOLD. ALL THIS WAS HAPPENING AS WE WERE PAST OUR TOP OF DSCNT AND STILL AT CRUISE ALT. WHEN ASKED IF WE WOULD HAVE ANY DELAYS IF WE WERE CLRED THE REGULAR LDA INTO JNU, HE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO DELAYS, BUT AGAIN CONFIRMED THERE WOULD BE DELAYS IF WE WANTED THE REQUIRED NAV PRECISION. WHEN ASKED WHY, HE SAID HE WAS 'TOO BUSY' TO EXPLAIN. THE TONE OF HIS VOICE MADE IT CLR HE WAS TAKING PLEASURE IN DELAYING OUR FLT IF WE CONTINUED WITH OUR REQUEST FOR THE REQUIRED NAV PRECISION APCH. WE ASKED FOR THE LDA AND HE CLRED US DIRECT TO CUSHI AT OR ABOVE 11000 FT, THEN THE LDA TO RWY 8. WE WERE WELL ABOVE THE OPTIMUM DSCNT PATH BY THE TIME WE WERE GIVEN THIS CLRNC, AND I CONFIGURED FLAPS AND GEAR PRIOR TO CUSHI AND HAD NO PROB GETTING TO NORMAL ALTS AND APCH SPDS BY DIBOL. THIS CTLR SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED AIR SAFETY BY INTERJECTING CONSIDERABLE DISTR TO THE COCKPIT CREW WITH HIS CONFRONTATIONAL ATTITUDE ABOUT NOT WANTING TO SUPPORT THE REQUIRED NAV PRECISION APCH INTO JNU. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL AS BOTH PLTS CONSCIOUSLY SAID TO OURSELVES TO 'LET IT GO' UNTIL WE SAFELY GET ON THE GND. THE CAPT AND ACR HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH ZAN SUPVRS AND THE CTLR IN QUESTION IS BEING GIVEN A QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW.' HISTORY: AT GREAT EXPENSE AND EFFORT, ACR IS THE FIRST AIRLINE QUALIFIED TO FLY REQUIRED NAV PRECISION APCHS AND DEPS IN SOME VERY CHALLENGING WX AND TERRAIN. THESE REQUIRED NAV PRECISION PROCS PROVIDE A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN SAFETY VERSUS THE NON PRECISION APCHS THAT ARE BEING REPLACED BY THE REQUIRED NAV PRECISION PROCS. A PROB AT ZAN IS THAT SOME CTLRS FEEL THEY SHOULD BE PAID MORE FOR LEARNING THE ADDED WAYPOINTS AND PROCS FOR CLRING A FLT ON AN REQUIRED NAV PRECISION APCH. THESE CTLRS WILL NOT CLR ACFT TO FLY A REQUIRED NAV PRECISION APCH. SUCH UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT CAN SERIOUSLY AFFECT OUR SAFETY AND ABILITY TO FLY AN APCH TO OUR SE ALASKA ARPTS WHEN THE WX IS PARTICULARLY TREACHEROUS. WE'VE SPENT MILLIONS ON EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING AND NOW AN UNPROFESSIONAL CTLR IS ALLOWED TO NEGATE IT ALL. UNTIL THIS INCIDENT, I HAD ONLY HEARD OF SUCH PROBS BUT NEVER EXPERIENCED ANY MYSELF. I WAS ASTONISHED AT THIS CTLR'S BLATANT AND CONFRONTATIONAL ATTITUDE. ZAN HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN VERY SUPPORTIVE OF OUR EFFORTS WITH REQUIRED NAV PRECISION. IF THERE ARE 1 OR 2 CTLRS WHO DON'T WANT TO SUPPORT REQUIRED NAV PRECISION, THEN WHY IS SUCH A CTLR PUT IN A SECTOR SUCH AS SE ALASKA WHERE REQUIRED NAV PRECISION APCHS ARE SO CRUCIAL? WHY NOT PUT HIM IN THE FAI SECTOR OR ANYWHERE ELSE WHERE REQUIRED NAV PRECISION APCHS ARE NOT BEING USED? AIR SAFETY DEMANDS IT! LOOKING AT JNU 10-2L-1, MENDN 2 ARR AND 19-7-1, REQUIRED NAV PRECISION RWY 8 WE WERE JUST PAST FAKES WHEN WE FIRST CONTACTED THE CTLR IN QUESTION. WHEN WE REALIZED WHAT WAS HAPPENING, WE FIGURED WE COULD JUST CONTINUE DIRECT TO CUSHI AND THEN PICK UP THE LDA-2 RWY 8 (JNU 11-9). WHEN WE ASKED, 'REQUEST THE LDA,' THE CTLR CLRED US 'DIRECT CUSHI, CROSS CUSHI AT OR ABOVE 11000 FT, THEN CLRED THE LDA TO RWY 8. RPT PASSING 8000 FT.' AFTER LNDG AND REVIEWING WHAT HAD HAPPENED, THE CAPT BECAME CONCERNED SOMEONE MIGHT QUESTION OUR FLYING THE MENDN 2 ARR TO THE LDA SINCE OUR DIRECT CLRNC TO CUSHI KEPT US ON THE SAME TRACK AS THE MENDN 2 ARR. THE MENDN 2 ARR IS A FEEDER PROC TO THE REQUIRED NAV PRECISION FINAL APCH, NOT THE LDA, AND HE FEELS THERE ARE SOME ISSUES REGARDING PROPER ADHERENCE TO THE IAF'S WE MAY HAVE VIOLATED. I DO NOT THINK THERE IS ANY SUCH ISSUE, AND I HAVE NOT HAD A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH HIM PRIOR TO HIS SENDING HIS NASA RPT. THOUGH OUR ACTUAL TRACK WAS THE SAME AS THE MENDN 2 ARR WHEN CLRED DIRECT TO CUSHI, WE WERE NOT CLRED VIA THE MENDN 2 ARR, BUT INSTEAD, WERE CLRED DIRECT TO CUSHI AT THE MORA OF 11000 FT. (WE HAD A DUAL FMS ACFT, AND RNAV DIRECT TO ANY POINT WHEN IN RADAR CONTACT OR NOT, IS LEGAL!) WHEN AT CUSHI WE FLEW THE LDA AS PUBLISHED. SUMMARY: I BELIEVE THE COCKPIT CREW PERFORMED ADMIRABLY UNDER UNNECESSARILY TRYING CIRCUMSTANCES CAUSED BY AN UNPROFESSIONAL CTLR MORE CONCERNED ABOUT HIS 'BONE TO PICK' THAN IN AIR SAFETY. I ALSO BELIEVE THE COCKPIT CREW FLEW A PERFECTLY REASONABLE AND LEGAL DSCNT AND APCH THAT AFTER GREAT DISCUSSION AND 'MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKING' MIGHT SOMEHOW BE CONSIDERED TECHNICALLY ILLEGAL. THERE IS LITTLE I WOULD DO DIFFERENTLY. I HOPE ZAN WILL RESOLVE THEIR CTLR PROBS, AND I REGRET THE FAA HAS IN THE PAST BEEN SO AMBIGUOUS ABOUT SOME TRULY PETTY AND NEBULOUS ISSUES THAT I NOW FEEL A NEED TO SUBMIT THIS RPT. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, FAA PRIORITY WASTED IN THE PAST ON SUCH 'NON ISSUES' DISTRACTS RESOURCES FROM FAR MORE IMPORTANT AIR SAFETY ISSUES, AND FOR THAT, WE ALL SUFFER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.