Narrative:

Flight xyz was ready for pushback at sfo gate a. The checklist had been accomplished and I, as captain, requested the first officer to call for pushback clearance. He turned to his company page and misread the procedure and called ramp control. The person that answered hesitated and cleared us to push back from gate a. We pushed back onto taxiway a and were starting engines when we noticed a yellow vehicle with red flashing lights and the driver motioning to the push crew. I asked the push crew to see what the problem was and the driver said we had pushed without a clearance. The first officer queried the ramp controller and that person said they had made a mistake but had already called ground control in the tower and said that it had been worked out and everything was ok. However, when we called ground control they said they were filing a report for our pushing without calling first. We took a hard look then at the company page and both realized our error in not calling ground for pushback clearance. This error could possibly have been prevented if the ramp controller had told us to either contact ground or that they had no jurisdiction over gate a pushback. The failure of myself, the captain, to check the pushback procedure against the first officer's actions would also have prevented the inadvertent pushback without the proper clearance. My assumption of the first officer's knowledge and familiarity of the ramp operations at sfo is inexcusable and I should have been the cockpit backup to our pushback/taxi operation. Supplemental information from acn 449008: I failed to read the operations page closely. The operations page says 'prior to pushback contact ground.' we very quickly found out that the ramp space behind us was actually a ground controled taxiway. Most company operations pages do have the 'contact ground prior to pushback' message printed in bold face.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 CREW CALLED RAMP CTL FOR PERMISSION TO PUSH INTO A GND CTLED TXWY. ATC THREATENED TO FILE A RPT.

Narrative: FLT XYZ WAS READY FOR PUSHBACK AT SFO GATE A. THE CHKLIST HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND I, AS CAPT, REQUESTED THE FO TO CALL FOR PUSHBACK CLRNC. HE TURNED TO HIS COMPANY PAGE AND MISREAD THE PROC AND CALLED RAMP CTL. THE PERSON THAT ANSWERED HESITATED AND CLRED US TO PUSH BACK FROM GATE A. WE PUSHED BACK ONTO TXWY A AND WERE STARTING ENGS WHEN WE NOTICED A YELLOW VEHICLE WITH RED FLASHING LIGHTS AND THE DRIVER MOTIONING TO THE PUSH CREW. I ASKED THE PUSH CREW TO SEE WHAT THE PROB WAS AND THE DRIVER SAID WE HAD PUSHED WITHOUT A CLRNC. THE FO QUERIED THE RAMP CTLR AND THAT PERSON SAID THEY HAD MADE A MISTAKE BUT HAD ALREADY CALLED GND CTL IN THE TWR AND SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN WORKED OUT AND EVERYTHING WAS OK. HOWEVER, WHEN WE CALLED GND CTL THEY SAID THEY WERE FILING A RPT FOR OUR PUSHING WITHOUT CALLING FIRST. WE TOOK A HARD LOOK THEN AT THE COMPANY PAGE AND BOTH REALIZED OUR ERROR IN NOT CALLING GND FOR PUSHBACK CLRNC. THIS ERROR COULD POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IF THE RAMP CTLR HAD TOLD US TO EITHER CONTACT GND OR THAT THEY HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER GATE A PUSHBACK. THE FAILURE OF MYSELF, THE CAPT, TO CHK THE PUSHBACK PROC AGAINST THE FO'S ACTIONS WOULD ALSO HAVE PREVENTED THE INADVERTENT PUSHBACK WITHOUT THE PROPER CLRNC. MY ASSUMPTION OF THE FO'S KNOWLEDGE AND FAMILIARITY OF THE RAMP OPS AT SFO IS INEXCUSABLE AND I SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE COCKPIT BACKUP TO OUR PUSHBACK/TAXI OP. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 449008: I FAILED TO READ THE OPS PAGE CLOSELY. THE OPS PAGE SAYS 'PRIOR TO PUSHBACK CONTACT GND.' WE VERY QUICKLY FOUND OUT THAT THE RAMP SPACE BEHIND US WAS ACTUALLY A GND CTLED TXWY. MOST COMPANY OPS PAGES DO HAVE THE 'CONTACT GND PRIOR TO PUSHBACK' MESSAGE PRINTED IN BOLD FACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.