Narrative:

We were a gulfstream 4 en route on a cpr transportation flight IFR flight plan from lincoln, northeast, to carlsbad, ca. Flight conditions: some clouds, visibility approximately 4 mi or less in haze. We had intercepted the carlsbad, ca, ILS localizer about 35 mi out as directed by socal approach control, and were tracking it inbound. We were cleared to descend from 8000 ft to 7000 ft and were so doing, on autoplt, at about 1000 FPM descent rate. At about 7400 ft we noticed TCASII traffic indicating level at 7000 ft (our next altitude). At 11:30 O'clock position relative tracking towards us, entering the 5 mi TCASII ring. We could not see the traffic visually due to the haze, but were concerned about descending into the conflicting traffic. We advised approach that we had TCASII traffic but no visual. Approach said he appeared to be turning northbound (which would put him right in front of us at our altitude). I began to slow our rate of descent and instinctively turned slightly right to avoid a possible head-on. Shortly thereafter we got the yellow TCASII symbol and 'traffic' audio followed shortly by the red symbol and 'climb' RA. I had just added power to climb when the captain and I sighted the traffic visually at about our 10 O'clock position, level, about 1/2 mi or less range and seemingly headed at us. I banked right to put some distance between us and maneuvered to avoid him to keep him in sight. Once clear we got back on altitude and track. During the maneuver I estimate our altitude varied +/-300 ft from assigned. The traffic passed out of sight behind us. I do not recall hearing the 'clear of conflict' message while busy avoiding the traffic. During our maneuvering, socal repeatedly asked if we were responding to a TCASII RA, to which we responded each time 'affirmative.' they then asked our home base and then cleared us further on the approach with no further conversation about the conflict. We fly in this region often. Flying in southern california at low altitudes is usually hectic, somewhat tense due to numerous reported and unrpted small aircraft at close ranges. This was too close for comfort. I feel the TCASII saved our bacon this time. I continue to wonder why approach would instruct us to descend into what, in retrospect, seems to be a perfect conflict set up. At the time of our conflict we were descending with flaps. Although I added climb power our transition to actual climb was slower than I would have liked and ultimately did not put sufficient vertical separation between us and the other aircraft, necessitating further course diversion. Our maneuvers were not violent and the passenger were unaware of the event. I do not feel that we passed close enough to the traffic to categorize it as a 'near miss,' just enough to be quite uncomfortable. In retrospect, the need to maneuver could possibly have been avoided had we asked for a vector around the traffic as soon as we saw it on TCASII.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE DSNDING TO ASSIGNED 7000 FT INBOUND TO CRQ, A GLF4 FLC RECEIVED A TCASII RA TO CLB.

Narrative: WE WERE A GULFSTREAM 4 ENRTE ON A CPR TRANSPORTATION FLT IFR FLT PLAN FROM LINCOLN, NE, TO CARLSBAD, CA. FLT CONDITIONS: SOME CLOUDS, VISIBILITY APPROX 4 MI OR LESS IN HAZE. WE HAD INTERCEPTED THE CARLSBAD, CA, ILS LOC ABOUT 35 MI OUT AS DIRECTED BY SOCAL APCH CTL, AND WERE TRACKING IT INBOUND. WE WERE CLRED TO DSND FROM 8000 FT TO 7000 FT AND WERE SO DOING, ON AUTOPLT, AT ABOUT 1000 FPM DSCNT RATE. AT ABOUT 7400 FT WE NOTICED TCASII TFC INDICATING LEVEL AT 7000 FT (OUR NEXT ALT). AT 11:30 O'CLOCK POS RELATIVE TRACKING TOWARDS US, ENTERING THE 5 MI TCASII RING. WE COULD NOT SEE THE TFC VISUALLY DUE TO THE HAZE, BUT WERE CONCERNED ABOUT DSNDING INTO THE CONFLICTING TFC. WE ADVISED APCH THAT WE HAD TCASII TFC BUT NO VISUAL. APCH SAID HE APPEARED TO BE TURNING NBOUND (WHICH WOULD PUT HIM RIGHT IN FRONT OF US AT OUR ALT). I BEGAN TO SLOW OUR RATE OF DSCNT AND INSTINCTIVELY TURNED SLIGHTLY R TO AVOID A POSSIBLE HEAD-ON. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE GOT THE YELLOW TCASII SYMBOL AND 'TFC' AUDIO FOLLOWED SHORTLY BY THE RED SYMBOL AND 'CLB' RA. I HAD JUST ADDED PWR TO CLB WHEN THE CAPT AND I SIGHTED THE TFC VISUALLY AT ABOUT OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS, LEVEL, ABOUT 1/2 MI OR LESS RANGE AND SEEMINGLY HEADED AT US. I BANKED R TO PUT SOME DISTANCE BTWN US AND MANEUVERED TO AVOID HIM TO KEEP HIM IN SIGHT. ONCE CLR WE GOT BACK ON ALT AND TRACK. DURING THE MANEUVER I ESTIMATE OUR ALT VARIED +/-300 FT FROM ASSIGNED. THE TFC PASSED OUT OF SIGHT BEHIND US. I DO NOT RECALL HEARING THE 'CLR OF CONFLICT' MESSAGE WHILE BUSY AVOIDING THE TFC. DURING OUR MANEUVERING, SOCAL REPEATEDLY ASKED IF WE WERE RESPONDING TO A TCASII RA, TO WHICH WE RESPONDED EACH TIME 'AFFIRMATIVE.' THEY THEN ASKED OUR HOME BASE AND THEN CLRED US FURTHER ON THE APCH WITH NO FURTHER CONVERSATION ABOUT THE CONFLICT. WE FLY IN THIS REGION OFTEN. FLYING IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AT LOW ALTS IS USUALLY HECTIC, SOMEWHAT TENSE DUE TO NUMEROUS RPTED AND UNRPTED SMALL ACFT AT CLOSE RANGES. THIS WAS TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT. I FEEL THE TCASII SAVED OUR BACON THIS TIME. I CONTINUE TO WONDER WHY APCH WOULD INSTRUCT US TO DSND INTO WHAT, IN RETROSPECT, SEEMS TO BE A PERFECT CONFLICT SET UP. AT THE TIME OF OUR CONFLICT WE WERE DSNDING WITH FLAPS. ALTHOUGH I ADDED CLB PWR OUR TRANSITION TO ACTUAL CLB WAS SLOWER THAN I WOULD HAVE LIKED AND ULTIMATELY DID NOT PUT SUFFICIENT VERT SEPARATION BTWN US AND THE OTHER ACFT, NECESSITATING FURTHER COURSE DIVERSION. OUR MANEUVERS WERE NOT VIOLENT AND THE PAX WERE UNAWARE OF THE EVENT. I DO NOT FEEL THAT WE PASSED CLOSE ENOUGH TO THE TFC TO CATEGORIZE IT AS A 'NEAR MISS,' JUST ENOUGH TO BE QUITE UNCOMFORTABLE. IN RETROSPECT, THE NEED TO MANEUVER COULD POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN AVOIDED HAD WE ASKED FOR A VECTOR AROUND THE TFC AS SOON AS WE SAW IT ON TCASII.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.