Narrative:

On sep/xa/99, I was on a VFR cross country flight from grass valley, ca, to rock springs, wy. We planned to make refueling stops at reno stead airport and at elko, nv. I received a complete (standard) WX briefing from FSS for the entire flight from the rancho murietta FSS at approximately XA00 on the day of the flight. Since I was aware of the special event taking place some time previously, I specifically asked the briefer to include any NOTAMS or restrs affecting stead field. I did not consider contacting reno FSS because as an IAP field, I expected NOTAMS concerning temporary towers and airport closure to be widely distributed to other FSS's. The briefer specifically indicated that there were no NOTAMS for stead field whatsoever, so I proceeded with my plan to use stead field as a refueling stop. Upon arrival in the stead area, we were given an airport advisory on the unicom frequency (122.8) and told to report downwind. We made position reports in the pattern and landed uneventfully. Approximately 1 1/2 hours later, we prepared for takeoff and did not make an additional call to FSS. During our fueling and stay at the FBO, there was no communication noticed by me that a temporary tower was in operation, or that the airport operations were being restr. Upon start-up, I called up the unicom frequency (122.8) with my intention of taxiing for takeoff, but received no response. I made 4 additional calls on unicom announcing my intent and position on the airfield with no response. One of those calls was from my hand-held which confirmed that my radios were all functioning properly. At this time I believed that non tower operations were in progress, and somebody forgot to monitor the unicom frequency at the airport. There was some low level circuit flying taking place, so I waited about 7-8 mins until there was a break in the traffic, and then took off on runway 8 making position report prior to and during departure on 122.8. After departure, I was contacted on 122.8 with the information that I violated FAA restr airspace, and that the airport was closed until XG00. I provided my full call sign and home base to the person on 122.8 and was told to 'have a good flight.' when I queried the person on the unicom why this information was not available during my 5 previous calls on this frequency, his response was that the closure was indicated on the AWOS frequency. I immediately switched over to AWOS at this time, and the recording did indicate that a temporary tower was in operation all day. It, however, did not indicate a unique tower frequency, nor did it mention the airport being closed until XG00. This incident reinforced my belief that pilots sometimes have to go to extreme lengths to get 'all available information' about a flight. Except for not checking AWOS prior to departure, I felt that the steps I took to obtain information about this flight were what a reasonable pilot would do. My concern is that after checking with FSS, on the ramp, and on CTAF on departure, I still did not have sufficient information about airport closure means that a potentially unsafe condition exists for other transient pilots. My recommendations for corrective action are the following: 1) pilot education about the critical function of AWOS frequencys, where it does not provide just WX information, but information about airspace restrs not distributed by NOTAMS. 2) FSS to provide better distant NOTAMS about airport closure, temporary tower, etc -- especially when concerning a high profile airport such as stead field, and especially when the field contains instrument approachs. 3) if the temporary tower at stead relies on AWOS to distribute operations information, the report could be much more informative with airport closure times, and frequency information for pilots to contact tower with questions. 4) airport management could be progressive in placing highly visible notices to pilots about restrs in operations. Secondly, having ground personnel be informed during refueling transient aircraft just to ensure everyone is aware of the restr. 5) most importantly, because if recommendations 1-4 still fail, unicom frequency should be continually monitored by appropriate staff during periods of airport closure or special activity. This would allow any unwary pilot to be turned away before causing a potentiallydangerous airspace transgression.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN INST RATED PLT FLYING A PA28 INTO STEAD, NV, LANDS HIS ACFT WHILE A NOTAM IS IN EFFECT CLOSING THE ARPT.

Narrative: ON SEP/XA/99, I WAS ON A VFR XCOUNTRY FLT FROM GRASS VALLEY, CA, TO ROCK SPRINGS, WY. WE PLANNED TO MAKE REFUELING STOPS AT RENO STEAD ARPT AND AT ELKO, NV. I RECEIVED A COMPLETE (STANDARD) WX BRIEFING FROM FSS FOR THE ENTIRE FLT FROM THE RANCHO MURIETTA FSS AT APPROX XA00 ON THE DAY OF THE FLT. SINCE I WAS AWARE OF THE SPECIAL EVENT TAKING PLACE SOME TIME PREVIOUSLY, I SPECIFICALLY ASKED THE BRIEFER TO INCLUDE ANY NOTAMS OR RESTRS AFFECTING STEAD FIELD. I DID NOT CONSIDER CONTACTING RENO FSS BECAUSE AS AN IAP FIELD, I EXPECTED NOTAMS CONCERNING TEMPORARY TWRS AND ARPT CLOSURE TO BE WIDELY DISTRIBUTED TO OTHER FSS'S. THE BRIEFER SPECIFICALLY INDICATED THAT THERE WERE NO NOTAMS FOR STEAD FIELD WHATSOEVER, SO I PROCEEDED WITH MY PLAN TO USE STEAD FIELD AS A REFUELING STOP. UPON ARR IN THE STEAD AREA, WE WERE GIVEN AN ARPT ADVISORY ON THE UNICOM FREQ (122.8) AND TOLD TO RPT DOWNWIND. WE MADE POS RPTS IN THE PATTERN AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. APPROX 1 1/2 HRS LATER, WE PREPARED FOR TKOF AND DID NOT MAKE AN ADDITIONAL CALL TO FSS. DURING OUR FUELING AND STAY AT THE FBO, THERE WAS NO COM NOTICED BY ME THAT A TEMPORARY TWR WAS IN OP, OR THAT THE ARPT OPS WERE BEING RESTR. UPON START-UP, I CALLED UP THE UNICOM FREQ (122.8) WITH MY INTENTION OF TAXIING FOR TKOF, BUT RECEIVED NO RESPONSE. I MADE 4 ADDITIONAL CALLS ON UNICOM ANNOUNCING MY INTENT AND POS ON THE AIRFIELD WITH NO RESPONSE. ONE OF THOSE CALLS WAS FROM MY HAND-HELD WHICH CONFIRMED THAT MY RADIOS WERE ALL FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. AT THIS TIME I BELIEVED THAT NON TWR OPS WERE IN PROGRESS, AND SOMEBODY FORGOT TO MONITOR THE UNICOM FREQ AT THE ARPT. THERE WAS SOME LOW LEVEL CIRCUIT FLYING TAKING PLACE, SO I WAITED ABOUT 7-8 MINS UNTIL THERE WAS A BREAK IN THE TFC, AND THEN TOOK OFF ON RWY 8 MAKING POS RPT PRIOR TO AND DURING DEP ON 122.8. AFTER DEP, I WAS CONTACTED ON 122.8 WITH THE INFO THAT I VIOLATED FAA RESTR AIRSPACE, AND THAT THE ARPT WAS CLOSED UNTIL XG00. I PROVIDED MY FULL CALL SIGN AND HOME BASE TO THE PERSON ON 122.8 AND WAS TOLD TO 'HAVE A GOOD FLT.' WHEN I QUERIED THE PERSON ON THE UNICOM WHY THIS INFO WAS NOT AVAILABLE DURING MY 5 PREVIOUS CALLS ON THIS FREQ, HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT THE CLOSURE WAS INDICATED ON THE AWOS FREQ. I IMMEDIATELY SWITCHED OVER TO AWOS AT THIS TIME, AND THE RECORDING DID INDICATE THAT A TEMPORARY TWR WAS IN OP ALL DAY. IT, HOWEVER, DID NOT INDICATE A UNIQUE TWR FREQ, NOR DID IT MENTION THE ARPT BEING CLOSED UNTIL XG00. THIS INCIDENT REINFORCED MY BELIEF THAT PLTS SOMETIMES HAVE TO GO TO EXTREME LENGTHS TO GET 'ALL AVAILABLE INFO' ABOUT A FLT. EXCEPT FOR NOT CHKING AWOS PRIOR TO DEP, I FELT THAT THE STEPS I TOOK TO OBTAIN INFO ABOUT THIS FLT WERE WHAT A REASONABLE PLT WOULD DO. MY CONCERN IS THAT AFTER CHKING WITH FSS, ON THE RAMP, AND ON CTAF ON DEP, I STILL DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT INFO ABOUT ARPT CLOSURE MEANS THAT A POTENTIALLY UNSAFE CONDITION EXISTS FOR OTHER TRANSIENT PLTS. MY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION ARE THE FOLLOWING: 1) PLT EDUCATION ABOUT THE CRITICAL FUNCTION OF AWOS FREQS, WHERE IT DOES NOT PROVIDE JUST WX INFO, BUT INFO ABOUT AIRSPACE RESTRS NOT DISTRIBUTED BY NOTAMS. 2) FSS TO PROVIDE BETTER DISTANT NOTAMS ABOUT ARPT CLOSURE, TEMPORARY TWR, ETC -- ESPECIALLY WHEN CONCERNING A HIGH PROFILE ARPT SUCH AS STEAD FIELD, AND ESPECIALLY WHEN THE FIELD CONTAINS INST APCHS. 3) IF THE TEMPORARY TWR AT STEAD RELIES ON AWOS TO DISTRIBUTE OPS INFO, THE RPT COULD BE MUCH MORE INFORMATIVE WITH ARPT CLOSURE TIMES, AND FREQ INFO FOR PLTS TO CONTACT TWR WITH QUESTIONS. 4) ARPT MGMNT COULD BE PROGRESSIVE IN PLACING HIGHLY VISIBLE NOTICES TO PLTS ABOUT RESTRS IN OPS. SECONDLY, HAVING GND PERSONNEL BE INFORMED DURING REFUELING TRANSIENT ACFT JUST TO ENSURE EVERYONE IS AWARE OF THE RESTR. 5) MOST IMPORTANTLY, BECAUSE IF RECOMMENDATIONS 1-4 STILL FAIL, UNICOM FREQ SHOULD BE CONTINUALLY MONITORED BY APPROPRIATE STAFF DURING PERIODS OF ARPT CLOSURE OR SPECIAL ACTIVITY. THIS WOULD ALLOW ANY UNWARY PLT TO BE TURNED AWAY BEFORE CAUSING A POTENTIALLYDANGEROUS AIRSPACE TRANSGRESSION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.