Narrative:

I was copilot #2, sitting in the jump seat of a B767 on an localizer/DME approach to paris charles de gaulle airport. This was an all-night flight and we were landing at AB00 body time. The WX was approximately 5000 ft overcast and 5000 meters visibility. Paris approach kept us high and fast until approaching the FAF necessitating the use of all drag devices to get down to FAF altitude and speed. Thus we started the approach slightly behind the profile but the captain was correcting nicely. During this time we began having trouble with the automatic mode of the autoplt, it signaled it wouldn't track the localizer. The captain correctly engaged a self-steering mode of the autoplt and continued to track the localizer and descend. The first officer (PNF) became fixated on what the captain had done to the exclusion of all other events. He commented that we should be on autoplt for this approach (which we were). He seemed to feel that the steering mode the captain had selected was incorrect. The captain called for 'gear down' 3 times before the PNF reacted. The PNF was not making the required DME calls and was not resetting the next altitude in the autoplt system. At this point we became VFR, saw the runway was clear, and continued. Our company requires a 1000 ft and 500 ft AGL call which the PNF missed and I made. We were on profile over the threshold when the captain asked the PNF if we were cleared to land. The PNF didn't answer. The captain asked again in a very firm tone and the PNF said yes in an equally firm tone. After landing, I saw the PNF change a frequency and heard the tower say that we had landed without clearance. The PNF started to argue with the tower controller but the captain told him to stop and apologize, which he did. In my opinion, the PNF became fixated on the localizer problem and lost situational awareness. He is a very experienced pilot with 5+ yrs in this aircraft which unconsciously led me to trust him and not back him up until it was too late. I never heard a landing clearance but trusted him when he said we had one. I still can't believe he said we had a clearance when we didn't and then he argued with the tower. We have raised this issue with our 'professional standards' monitors to see if something else might be at play (medical, psychological, fatigue, etc). In the future, I will take nothing for granted. Supplemental information from acn 448950: the captain called for flaps and gear just as approach gave me tower frequency. I thought I set the frequency correctly but with the new .08 MHZ radios we have just installed, it's sometimes possible to be only close -- and have it look ok. I called tower and thought I heard a landing clearance in heavily accented french. On short final, I tried twice to confirm the landing clearance but got no answer to my call, but heard other traffic on the frequency in french. We talked to tower and he said there was no traffic conflict and had no problem with us landing, but he did not hear us call at all. I believe task saturation with a possible navigation problem (in IMC), an autoplt disconnect unexpectedly, gear and flap calls by the captain, and the frequency change on an unfamiliar radio caused us to land without clearance. Fatigue was also a problem on this 7 hour 30 min flight that departed the united states at XY35. Also 3 tower frequencys are listed on this temporary approach plate. There was no traffic ahead of us to clue us on which one was in use ahead of time. Supplemental information from acn 448997: while on approach to the temporary procedure localizer DME runway 27 at lfpg, we had a degrading of the localizer mode of the autoplt. As raw data was still available, I chose to continue the approach in heading select. I was concentrating on 'flying the airplane' and not as alert as I should have been to ATC communications. I did not hear tower clearance to land, but confirmed it with the first officer. As I did not hear the tower clearance, I thought of a go around, but elected not to for the following reasons: first, the first officer confirmed landing clearance. Second, the first officer seemed to 'fall apart on me' during the approach. I believed a combination of fatigue, the non precision approach, and a fixation on a different roll mode of the autoplt led to his confusion. With a clear runway in sight with no other aircraft near the runway, I felt landing was the safer alternative than going around with a first officer who I felt would not be much help at the critical phase of a go around. I feel a go around at an earlier point in the approach would have been obvious if I had recognized the first officer's confusion earlier.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 CREW LANDS WITHOUT CLRNC AFTER A NON STANDARD APCH TO RWY 27 AT LFPG, FO.

Narrative: I WAS COPLT #2, SITTING IN THE JUMP SEAT OF A B767 ON AN LOC/DME APCH TO PARIS CHARLES DE GAULLE ARPT. THIS WAS AN ALL-NIGHT FLT AND WE WERE LNDG AT AB00 BODY TIME. THE WX WAS APPROX 5000 FT OVCST AND 5000 METERS VISIBILITY. PARIS APCH KEPT US HIGH AND FAST UNTIL APCHING THE FAF NECESSITATING THE USE OF ALL DRAG DEVICES TO GET DOWN TO FAF ALT AND SPD. THUS WE STARTED THE APCH SLIGHTLY BEHIND THE PROFILE BUT THE CAPT WAS CORRECTING NICELY. DURING THIS TIME WE BEGAN HAVING TROUBLE WITH THE AUTOMATIC MODE OF THE AUTOPLT, IT SIGNALED IT WOULDN'T TRACK THE LOC. THE CAPT CORRECTLY ENGAGED A SELF-STEERING MODE OF THE AUTOPLT AND CONTINUED TO TRACK THE LOC AND DSND. THE FO (PNF) BECAME FIXATED ON WHAT THE CAPT HAD DONE TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER EVENTS. HE COMMENTED THAT WE SHOULD BE ON AUTOPLT FOR THIS APCH (WHICH WE WERE). HE SEEMED TO FEEL THAT THE STEERING MODE THE CAPT HAD SELECTED WAS INCORRECT. THE CAPT CALLED FOR 'GEAR DOWN' 3 TIMES BEFORE THE PNF REACTED. THE PNF WAS NOT MAKING THE REQUIRED DME CALLS AND WAS NOT RESETTING THE NEXT ALT IN THE AUTOPLT SYS. AT THIS POINT WE BECAME VFR, SAW THE RWY WAS CLR, AND CONTINUED. OUR COMPANY REQUIRES A 1000 FT AND 500 FT AGL CALL WHICH THE PNF MISSED AND I MADE. WE WERE ON PROFILE OVER THE THRESHOLD WHEN THE CAPT ASKED THE PNF IF WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. THE PNF DIDN'T ANSWER. THE CAPT ASKED AGAIN IN A VERY FIRM TONE AND THE PNF SAID YES IN AN EQUALLY FIRM TONE. AFTER LNDG, I SAW THE PNF CHANGE A FREQ AND HEARD THE TWR SAY THAT WE HAD LANDED WITHOUT CLRNC. THE PNF STARTED TO ARGUE WITH THE TWR CTLR BUT THE CAPT TOLD HIM TO STOP AND APOLOGIZE, WHICH HE DID. IN MY OPINION, THE PNF BECAME FIXATED ON THE LOC PROB AND LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. HE IS A VERY EXPERIENCED PLT WITH 5+ YRS IN THIS ACFT WHICH UNCONSCIOUSLY LED ME TO TRUST HIM AND NOT BACK HIM UP UNTIL IT WAS TOO LATE. I NEVER HEARD A LNDG CLRNC BUT TRUSTED HIM WHEN HE SAID WE HAD ONE. I STILL CAN'T BELIEVE HE SAID WE HAD A CLRNC WHEN WE DIDN'T AND THEN HE ARGUED WITH THE TWR. WE HAVE RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH OUR 'PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS' MONITORS TO SEE IF SOMETHING ELSE MIGHT BE AT PLAY (MEDICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, FATIGUE, ETC). IN THE FUTURE, I WILL TAKE NOTHING FOR GRANTED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 448950: THE CAPT CALLED FOR FLAPS AND GEAR JUST AS APCH GAVE ME TWR FREQ. I THOUGHT I SET THE FREQ CORRECTLY BUT WITH THE NEW .08 MHZ RADIOS WE HAVE JUST INSTALLED, IT'S SOMETIMES POSSIBLE TO BE ONLY CLOSE -- AND HAVE IT LOOK OK. I CALLED TWR AND THOUGHT I HEARD A LNDG CLRNC IN HEAVILY ACCENTED FRENCH. ON SHORT FINAL, I TRIED TWICE TO CONFIRM THE LNDG CLRNC BUT GOT NO ANSWER TO MY CALL, BUT HEARD OTHER TFC ON THE FREQ IN FRENCH. WE TALKED TO TWR AND HE SAID THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT AND HAD NO PROB WITH US LNDG, BUT HE DID NOT HEAR US CALL AT ALL. I BELIEVE TASK SATURATION WITH A POSSIBLE NAV PROB (IN IMC), AN AUTOPLT DISCONNECT UNEXPECTEDLY, GEAR AND FLAP CALLS BY THE CAPT, AND THE FREQ CHANGE ON AN UNFAMILIAR RADIO CAUSED US TO LAND WITHOUT CLRNC. FATIGUE WAS ALSO A PROB ON THIS 7 HR 30 MIN FLT THAT DEPARTED THE UNITED STATES AT XY35. ALSO 3 TWR FREQS ARE LISTED ON THIS TEMPORARY APCH PLATE. THERE WAS NO TFC AHEAD OF US TO CLUE US ON WHICH ONE WAS IN USE AHEAD OF TIME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 448997: WHILE ON APCH TO THE TEMPORARY PROC LOC DME RWY 27 AT LFPG, WE HAD A DEGRADING OF THE LOC MODE OF THE AUTOPLT. AS RAW DATA WAS STILL AVAILABLE, I CHOSE TO CONTINUE THE APCH IN HDG SELECT. I WAS CONCENTRATING ON 'FLYING THE AIRPLANE' AND NOT AS ALERT AS I SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO ATC COMS. I DID NOT HEAR TWR CLRNC TO LAND, BUT CONFIRMED IT WITH THE FO. AS I DID NOT HEAR THE TWR CLRNC, I THOUGHT OF A GAR, BUT ELECTED NOT TO FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: FIRST, THE FO CONFIRMED LNDG CLRNC. SECOND, THE FO SEEMED TO 'FALL APART ON ME' DURING THE APCH. I BELIEVED A COMBINATION OF FATIGUE, THE NON PRECISION APCH, AND A FIXATION ON A DIFFERENT ROLL MODE OF THE AUTOPLT LED TO HIS CONFUSION. WITH A CLR RWY IN SIGHT WITH NO OTHER ACFT NEAR THE RWY, I FELT LNDG WAS THE SAFER ALTERNATIVE THAN GOING AROUND WITH A FO WHO I FELT WOULD NOT BE MUCH HELP AT THE CRITICAL PHASE OF A GAR. I FEEL A GAR AT AN EARLIER POINT IN THE APCH WOULD HAVE BEEN OBVIOUS IF I HAD RECOGNIZED THE FO'S CONFUSION EARLIER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.