Narrative:

Sep/xa/99, XA30, display system replacement certification began with the klamath falls radar (lmt ARSR) being OTS. Controllers were told to verify that darc (backup system) was operational and then revert to darc operations, as the host/NAS system was taken OTS for system certification. XB18: all active flight plans had been re-entered into host/NAS and the controllers were told they could switch back to host/NAS operations (ie, host/NAS system certification completed). XB00: ZOA has to manually hand off air carrier X (FL310, ont..pdx) and air carrier Y (FL350, ont..tou./.panc). A beacon target with mode C was observed on air carrier Y, but not on air carrier X. Believing this to be part of the 'normal' lmt ARSR outage, the controller stated 'radar contact' on air carrier X and advised ZOA that there was no beacon target or 'primary' on air carrier Y ZOA was given clearance to enter ZSE airspace with air carrier Y and ZSE would call 'radar' as soon as there was target acquisition. At approximately the same time, air carrier Z (at 16000 ft) was notified that radar contact was lost due to the lmt ARSR outage and that air carrier Z should be reidented abeam or just north of the rogue valley (oed) VOR. (Note: the loss of radar on air carrier Z took place where the controller expected it to happen with the lmt ARSR outage.) XB05: there was still no target on air carrier Y and ZOA was asked to verify air carrier Y's position in relation to air carrier X. ZOA advised that air carrier Y was at 10 O'clock and 15 mi from air carrier X. ZSE was still unable to see a target, even though air carrier Y was 4000 ft higher and in front of air carrier X. Controller switched to darc to see if it was possible to identify air carrier Y. The proper beacon code, including mode C, was found in the location stated by ZOA for air carrier Y. Note: while on darc, a beacon code and mode C were seen for air carrier Z. Controller switched back to host/NAS operations and confirmed that there was no target for either air carrier Y or air carrier Z. XB07: amic and their airways facilities counterpart were notified of a problem with the host/NAS operations. During this notification, radar contact was lost on air carrier X. (Air carrier went into coast track on host/NAS operation, but on darc the aircraft could be monitored with the proper beacon code/mode C.) XB17: all aircraft became identifiable on host/NAS operations and were reidented and altitudes confirmed before xferring control to the next sector. Initial investigation discovered that when the host/NAS system was brought back on-line, the host/NAS system was not told that lmt ARSR was OTS. Therefore, the host/NAS system said there weren't any targets or aircraft in the vicinity because the information supposedly received from the lmt ARSR said there were no targets. Once the command was inputted to the host/NAS system that the lmt ARSR was OTS, the host/NAS system immediately brought up the aircraft by using the other operational, overlapping radar sites. If this incident had occurred 30-45 mins earlier, when the sector had numerous traffic at the same altitudes and crossing each other's flight paths, the potential for disaster was high. If the host/NAS system had been certified utilizing the tools available and designed for dsr, then the host/NAS system should have still known that the lmt ARSR was OTS (ie, the host/NAS system would not have lost its brains during the certification process and had to have its brains reloaded because of the shutdown). Proposed solution: dsr was designed to accomplish 'normal' host/NAS system certifications without having controllers revert to the darc (backup) system for operations. Suggest that all 'normal' host/NAS system certifications utilize the tools provided by dsr.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZSE CTLR DESCRIBES COORD FAILURE WHEN ZSE MAINT INCORRECTLY CONFIGURES RADAR SITE DURING AUTOMATION SYS CERTIFICATION PROC.

Narrative: SEP/XA/99, XA30, DISPLAY SYS REPLACEMENT CERTIFICATION BEGAN WITH THE KLAMATH FALLS RADAR (LMT ARSR) BEING OTS. CTLRS WERE TOLD TO VERIFY THAT DARC (BACKUP SYS) WAS OPERATIONAL AND THEN REVERT TO DARC OPS, AS THE HOST/NAS SYS WAS TAKEN OTS FOR SYS CERTIFICATION. XB18: ALL ACTIVE FLT PLANS HAD BEEN RE-ENTERED INTO HOST/NAS AND THE CTLRS WERE TOLD THEY COULD SWITCH BACK TO HOST/NAS OPS (IE, HOST/NAS SYS CERTIFICATION COMPLETED). XB00: ZOA HAS TO MANUALLY HAND OFF ACR X (FL310, ONT..PDX) AND ACR Y (FL350, ONT..TOU./.PANC). A BEACON TARGET WITH MODE C WAS OBSERVED ON ACR Y, BUT NOT ON ACR X. BELIEVING THIS TO BE PART OF THE 'NORMAL' LMT ARSR OUTAGE, THE CTLR STATED 'RADAR CONTACT' ON ACR X AND ADVISED ZOA THAT THERE WAS NO BEACON TARGET OR 'PRIMARY' ON ACR Y ZOA WAS GIVEN CLRNC TO ENTER ZSE AIRSPACE WITH ACR Y AND ZSE WOULD CALL 'RADAR' AS SOON AS THERE WAS TARGET ACQUISITION. AT APPROX THE SAME TIME, ACR Z (AT 16000 FT) WAS NOTIFIED THAT RADAR CONTACT WAS LOST DUE TO THE LMT ARSR OUTAGE AND THAT ACR Z SHOULD BE REIDENTED ABEAM OR JUST N OF THE ROGUE VALLEY (OED) VOR. (NOTE: THE LOSS OF RADAR ON ACR Z TOOK PLACE WHERE THE CTLR EXPECTED IT TO HAPPEN WITH THE LMT ARSR OUTAGE.) XB05: THERE WAS STILL NO TARGET ON ACR Y AND ZOA WAS ASKED TO VERIFY ACR Y'S POS IN RELATION TO ACR X. ZOA ADVISED THAT ACR Y WAS AT 10 O'CLOCK AND 15 MI FROM ACR X. ZSE WAS STILL UNABLE TO SEE A TARGET, EVEN THOUGH ACR Y WAS 4000 FT HIGHER AND IN FRONT OF ACR X. CTLR SWITCHED TO DARC TO SEE IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO IDENT ACR Y. THE PROPER BEACON CODE, INCLUDING MODE C, WAS FOUND IN THE LOCATION STATED BY ZOA FOR ACR Y. NOTE: WHILE ON DARC, A BEACON CODE AND MODE C WERE SEEN FOR ACR Z. CTLR SWITCHED BACK TO HOST/NAS OPS AND CONFIRMED THAT THERE WAS NO TARGET FOR EITHER ACR Y OR ACR Z. XB07: AMIC AND THEIR AIRWAYS FACILITIES COUNTERPART WERE NOTIFIED OF A PROB WITH THE HOST/NAS OPS. DURING THIS NOTIFICATION, RADAR CONTACT WAS LOST ON ACR X. (ACR WENT INTO COAST TRACK ON HOST/NAS OP, BUT ON DARC THE ACFT COULD BE MONITORED WITH THE PROPER BEACON CODE/MODE C.) XB17: ALL ACFT BECAME IDENTIFIABLE ON HOST/NAS OPS AND WERE REIDENTED AND ALTS CONFIRMED BEFORE XFERRING CTL TO THE NEXT SECTOR. INITIAL INVESTIGATION DISCOVERED THAT WHEN THE HOST/NAS SYS WAS BROUGHT BACK ON-LINE, THE HOST/NAS SYS WAS NOT TOLD THAT LMT ARSR WAS OTS. THEREFORE, THE HOST/NAS SYS SAID THERE WEREN'T ANY TARGETS OR ACFT IN THE VICINITY BECAUSE THE INFO SUPPOSEDLY RECEIVED FROM THE LMT ARSR SAID THERE WERE NO TARGETS. ONCE THE COMMAND WAS INPUTTED TO THE HOST/NAS SYS THAT THE LMT ARSR WAS OTS, THE HOST/NAS SYS IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT UP THE ACFT BY USING THE OTHER OPERATIONAL, OVERLAPPING RADAR SITES. IF THIS INCIDENT HAD OCCURRED 30-45 MINS EARLIER, WHEN THE SECTOR HAD NUMEROUS TFC AT THE SAME ALTS AND XING EACH OTHER'S FLT PATHS, THE POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER WAS HIGH. IF THE HOST/NAS SYS HAD BEEN CERTIFIED UTILIZING THE TOOLS AVAILABLE AND DESIGNED FOR DSR, THEN THE HOST/NAS SYS SHOULD HAVE STILL KNOWN THAT THE LMT ARSR WAS OTS (IE, THE HOST/NAS SYS WOULD NOT HAVE LOST ITS BRAINS DURING THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS AND HAD TO HAVE ITS BRAINS RELOADED BECAUSE OF THE SHUTDOWN). PROPOSED SOLUTION: DSR WAS DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH 'NORMAL' HOST/NAS SYS CERTIFICATIONS WITHOUT HAVING CTLRS REVERT TO THE DARC (BACKUP) SYS FOR OPS. SUGGEST THAT ALL 'NORMAL' HOST/NAS SYS CERTIFICATIONS UTILIZE THE TOOLS PROVIDED BY DSR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.