Narrative:

On a multi engine training flight, we were returning to gyr from training in the area of P08 (coolidge municipal airport). The student had chosen 6500 ft MSL for the en route altitude. At the time he announced the altitude, I knew this would be a problem approximately 15 NM later, but elected to allow him time to realize the potential incursion into phx class B airspace. I additionally decided to correct this in the vicinity of olberg, az, which would have allowed us time to descend below 6000 ft MSL well before 20 DME from pxr, where the floor of class B airspace lowers to 6000 ft MSL. This aircraft is equipped with a GPS and autoplt, and the student asked me to explain/demonstrate some of the features of the equipment to him. As this flight was only his second flight in the aircraft, I instructed him on engaging the autoplt, and then proceeded to explain some of the more often used functions of the GPS. At the beginning of the flight, I already had created a 'flight plan' from gyr to st john's indian school (a check point used by our training facility) to P08, and return via the same route. I was programming the vertical navigation, and entering the required rate of descent, so as to reach st john's indian school (approximately 13 NM ese of gyr), when I noticed our position roughly 3 NM southeast of sun lakes, az. The 'cue' to begin descent by the GPS had not activated, and we were watching the GPS display, but not monitoring our position. When I realized that we were, in fact, inside that sector of phx class B airspace at that position and altitude, I immediately instructed the student to disengage the autoplt, which he did, and I immediately exited class B airspace. My position in our company is training instructors, who in turn, train foreign students. We have many aircraft of this same make/mode/type. These are the first aircraft our company purchased last yr for advanced training that have the GPS and autoplt. We have idented the 'problem' already, and have cautioned all instructors and students that extra vigilance is necessary when instructing on, and experimenting with the new 'toys.' too much attention inside of the cockpit -- especially in VMC, and when not in a 'controled' situation -- will lead to: 1) not using enough attention outside for scanning for other aircraft, and 2) not adequately monitoring our position. I also completed a company safety report, and this incident has been included by our safety officer in a safety briefing to all instructors on fri/xa/00.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PIPER PA34 INSTRUCTOR PLT WAS DISTR AND ENTERED PHX CLASS B AIRSPACE WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: ON A MULTI ENG TRAINING FLT, WE WERE RETURNING TO GYR FROM TRAINING IN THE AREA OF P08 (COOLIDGE MUNICIPAL ARPT). THE STUDENT HAD CHOSEN 6500 FT MSL FOR THE ENRTE ALT. AT THE TIME HE ANNOUNCED THE ALT, I KNEW THIS WOULD BE A PROB APPROX 15 NM LATER, BUT ELECTED TO ALLOW HIM TIME TO REALIZE THE POTENTIAL INCURSION INTO PHX CLASS B AIRSPACE. I ADDITIONALLY DECIDED TO CORRECT THIS IN THE VICINITY OF OLBERG, AZ, WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED US TIME TO DSND BELOW 6000 FT MSL WELL BEFORE 20 DME FROM PXR, WHERE THE FLOOR OF CLASS B AIRSPACE LOWERS TO 6000 FT MSL. THIS ACFT IS EQUIPPED WITH A GPS AND AUTOPLT, AND THE STUDENT ASKED ME TO EXPLAIN/DEMONSTRATE SOME OF THE FEATURES OF THE EQUIP TO HIM. AS THIS FLT WAS ONLY HIS SECOND FLT IN THE ACFT, I INSTRUCTED HIM ON ENGAGING THE AUTOPLT, AND THEN PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN SOME OF THE MORE OFTEN USED FUNCTIONS OF THE GPS. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FLT, I ALREADY HAD CREATED A 'FLT PLAN' FROM GYR TO ST JOHN'S INDIAN SCHOOL (A CHK POINT USED BY OUR TRAINING FACILITY) TO P08, AND RETURN VIA THE SAME RTE. I WAS PROGRAMMING THE VERT NAV, AND ENTERING THE REQUIRED RATE OF DSCNT, SO AS TO REACH ST JOHN'S INDIAN SCHOOL (APPROX 13 NM ESE OF GYR), WHEN I NOTICED OUR POS ROUGHLY 3 NM SE OF SUN LAKES, AZ. THE 'CUE' TO BEGIN DSCNT BY THE GPS HAD NOT ACTIVATED, AND WE WERE WATCHING THE GPS DISPLAY, BUT NOT MONITORING OUR POS. WHEN I REALIZED THAT WE WERE, IN FACT, INSIDE THAT SECTOR OF PHX CLASS B AIRSPACE AT THAT POS AND ALT, I IMMEDIATELY INSTRUCTED THE STUDENT TO DISENGAGE THE AUTOPLT, WHICH HE DID, AND I IMMEDIATELY EXITED CLASS B AIRSPACE. MY POS IN OUR COMPANY IS TRAINING INSTRUCTORS, WHO IN TURN, TRAIN FOREIGN STUDENTS. WE HAVE MANY ACFT OF THIS SAME MAKE/MODE/TYPE. THESE ARE THE FIRST ACFT OUR COMPANY PURCHASED LAST YR FOR ADVANCED TRAINING THAT HAVE THE GPS AND AUTOPLT. WE HAVE IDENTED THE 'PROB' ALREADY, AND HAVE CAUTIONED ALL INSTRUCTORS AND STUDENTS THAT EXTRA VIGILANCE IS NECESSARY WHEN INSTRUCTING ON, AND EXPERIMENTING WITH THE NEW 'TOYS.' TOO MUCH ATTN INSIDE OF THE COCKPIT -- ESPECIALLY IN VMC, AND WHEN NOT IN A 'CTLED' SIT -- WILL LEAD TO: 1) NOT USING ENOUGH ATTN OUTSIDE FOR SCANNING FOR OTHER ACFT, AND 2) NOT ADEQUATELY MONITORING OUR POS. I ALSO COMPLETED A COMPANY SAFETY RPT, AND THIS INCIDENT HAS BEEN INCLUDED BY OUR SAFETY OFFICER IN A SAFETY BRIEFING TO ALL INSTRUCTORS ON FRI/XA/00.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.