Narrative:

We were on an IFR flight and had filed a direct route from stl to phx. The flight had progressed approximately 1/2 way to phx when center changed our routing from direct phx to direct zun and the fossl 4 arrival to phx. The new routing was programmed into the FMS and confirmed by the captain. I placed the fossl 4 arrival chart on my yoke for reference as well. After crossing zun, I was able to get the ATIS at phx and determined that they were landing on runway 26L&right. I advised the captain that the arrival called for a speed of 250 KTS at tonto intersection and to expect to cross tonto at 12000 ft, which he acknowledged. We were level at FL350 when at a point approximately 45 mi prior to piine intersection center reclred us direct to piine intersection and the remainder of the fossl 4 arrival, to cross tonto intersection at 12000 ft and 250 KTS. I referenced the arrival chart and informed the captain that tonto intersection was 13 mi past the piine intersection on the arrival routing, which he acknowledged. At this point the captain became preoccupied with programming the FMS VNAV and in my opinion wasted valuable time in which we should have been descending. When the captain started to descend he was descending at a slower rate than I would have used, but since this was only my second trip in this model aircraft and since I was a new hire at this company, I was reluctant to say anything to the captain about his flying technique. At a point about 10 mi prior to piine, we were descending through approximately FL280 and I once again reminded the captain that the tonto intersection was 13 mi beyond piine intersection, which he acknowledged. When we crossed piine we were at approximately FL220 and center called and asked if we were going to be able to make the crossing restr at tonto, to which the captain replied affirmative. At this point, I reminded the captain that we had less than 13 mi to be at 12000 ft and 250 KTS. I believe the captain finally realized that we did not have much time left to meet the crossing restr because he moved the power levers to idle and deployed the flight spoilers fully. Even with the resultant high descent rate we were unable to meet the crossing restr and ended up crossing tonto at approximately 15500 ft and 280 KTS. When we were handed off to phx approach at tonto, I could tell by the controller's tone of voice that he as not at all happy with us, but he did not say anything about a loss of separation or traffic conflict. The rest of the flight proceeded normally. I believe this event occurred primarily because the captain lost his situational awareness with relation to our distance from tonto at the very beginning of the descent phase of the flight. I believe contributing factors are: 1) the captain's preoccupation with the FMS VNAV function. 2) my low level of experience in this model aircraft. (I kept thinking that the captain had some trick up his sleeve that would allow us to make the crossing restr.) 3) my lack of assertiveness in not questioning the captain or pointing out the need for a higher descent rate or initiating the descent earlier.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF A CPR JET FAILED TO MAKE STAR XING RESTR SPD AND ALT REQUIREMENT DUE TO DELAYED START OF DSCNT.

Narrative: WE WERE ON AN IFR FLT AND HAD FILED A DIRECT RTE FROM STL TO PHX. THE FLT HAD PROGRESSED APPROX 1/2 WAY TO PHX WHEN CTR CHANGED OUR ROUTING FROM DIRECT PHX TO DIRECT ZUN AND THE FOSSL 4 ARR TO PHX. THE NEW ROUTING WAS PROGRAMMED INTO THE FMS AND CONFIRMED BY THE CAPT. I PLACED THE FOSSL 4 ARR CHART ON MY YOKE FOR REF AS WELL. AFTER XING ZUN, I WAS ABLE TO GET THE ATIS AT PHX AND DETERMINED THAT THEY WERE LNDG ON RWY 26L&R. I ADVISED THE CAPT THAT THE ARR CALLED FOR A SPD OF 250 KTS AT TONTO INTXN AND TO EXPECT TO CROSS TONTO AT 12000 FT, WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED. WE WERE LEVEL AT FL350 WHEN AT A POINT APPROX 45 MI PRIOR TO PIINE INTXN CTR RECLRED US DIRECT TO PIINE INTXN AND THE REMAINDER OF THE FOSSL 4 ARR, TO CROSS TONTO INTXN AT 12000 FT AND 250 KTS. I REFED THE ARR CHART AND INFORMED THE CAPT THAT TONTO INTXN WAS 13 MI PAST THE PIINE INTXN ON THE ARR ROUTING, WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED. AT THIS POINT THE CAPT BECAME PREOCCUPIED WITH PROGRAMMING THE FMS VNAV AND IN MY OPINION WASTED VALUABLE TIME IN WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DSNDING. WHEN THE CAPT STARTED TO DSND HE WAS DSNDING AT A SLOWER RATE THAN I WOULD HAVE USED, BUT SINCE THIS WAS ONLY MY SECOND TRIP IN THIS MODEL ACFT AND SINCE I WAS A NEW HIRE AT THIS COMPANY, I WAS RELUCTANT TO SAY ANYTHING TO THE CAPT ABOUT HIS FLYING TECHNIQUE. AT A POINT ABOUT 10 MI PRIOR TO PIINE, WE WERE DSNDING THROUGH APPROX FL280 AND I ONCE AGAIN REMINDED THE CAPT THAT THE TONTO INTXN WAS 13 MI BEYOND PIINE INTXN, WHICH HE ACKNOWLEDGED. WHEN WE CROSSED PIINE WE WERE AT APPROX FL220 AND CTR CALLED AND ASKED IF WE WERE GOING TO BE ABLE TO MAKE THE XING RESTR AT TONTO, TO WHICH THE CAPT REPLIED AFFIRMATIVE. AT THIS POINT, I REMINDED THE CAPT THAT WE HAD LESS THAN 13 MI TO BE AT 12000 FT AND 250 KTS. I BELIEVE THE CAPT FINALLY REALIZED THAT WE DID NOT HAVE MUCH TIME LEFT TO MEET THE XING RESTR BECAUSE HE MOVED THE PWR LEVERS TO IDLE AND DEPLOYED THE FLT SPOILERS FULLY. EVEN WITH THE RESULTANT HIGH DSCNT RATE WE WERE UNABLE TO MEET THE XING RESTR AND ENDED UP XING TONTO AT APPROX 15500 FT AND 280 KTS. WHEN WE WERE HANDED OFF TO PHX APCH AT TONTO, I COULD TELL BY THE CTLR'S TONE OF VOICE THAT HE AS NOT AT ALL HAPPY WITH US, BUT HE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT A LOSS OF SEPARATION OR TFC CONFLICT. THE REST OF THE FLT PROCEEDED NORMALLY. I BELIEVE THIS EVENT OCCURRED PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE CAPT LOST HIS SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WITH RELATION TO OUR DISTANCE FROM TONTO AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE DSCNT PHASE OF THE FLT. I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ARE: 1) THE CAPT'S PREOCCUPATION WITH THE FMS VNAV FUNCTION. 2) MY LOW LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE IN THIS MODEL ACFT. (I KEPT THINKING THAT THE CAPT HAD SOME TRICK UP HIS SLEEVE THAT WOULD ALLOW US TO MAKE THE XING RESTR.) 3) MY LACK OF ASSERTIVENESS IN NOT QUESTIONING THE CAPT OR POINTING OUT THE NEED FOR A HIGHER DSCNT RATE OR INITIATING THE DSCNT EARLIER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.