Narrative:

I am new on the B757, still on high minimums. My last aircraft was the A320, on which I spent 4 yrs, so FMS is not new to me. I have been enjoying the B757, and eagerly looked forward to seeing what it would do on the FMS bridge visual to runway 28R at sfo. Approach control cleared us for the approach, which we had previously loaded and briefed, but they also gave us speed restrs and held us high until the last second, so we had to use speed brakes between archi and garow intxns to get down to profile. We were still high and hot between trdow and garow, so I also called for gear down. It worked, but the airplane didn't stop at the profile, it kept descending and busted the 4000 ft restr at garow intersection by 400 ft. It took me a few seconds to realize why -- as the aircraft approached the profile, I had not retracted the speed brakes since I was distracted and there are no indications of speed brake deployment to remind you. This is very poor design by boeing. Airbus has solved this problem on the A320 with a blinking amber ECAM message that appears whenever speed brakes are deployed and the engines are not at idle, and it works really well. I strongly recommend boeing retrofit the B757 fleet with a similar warning, perhaps by adding it as a function that illuminates the already-existing 'speed brakes' annunciator light on the forward center instrument panel. Accidents such as the B757 at cali, colombia, and incidents such as mine at sfo point out the need for this improvement to a near- perfect airplane. I'm sure you've received similar reports and suggestions from other B757 pilots. NASA ASRS should compile them and send a packet to boeing! In the meantime, I am not removing my hand from the speed brake lever until they are retracted! Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter was flying a B757-200 and had extended the speed brakes to increase his descent rate because he was a bit higher than normal for this approach. He first noticed that the aircraft required a higher thrust setting during the leveloff and then as it descended through 4000 ft he realized that the speed brakes were still extended. He said that he had looked at the available circuits and he thinks that if the manufacturer could have the present EICAS 'speed brake' message flash it would attract the flight crew's attention more than the present steady illumination. In the meantime he will leave his hand on the speed brake handle when they are deployed while airborne.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B757-200 DSNDED 400 FT BELOW THE 4000 FT XING ALT AT GAROW INTXN BECAUSE THE FLC ATTEMPTED TO LEVEL OFF WHILE STILL HAVING THE SPD BRAKES DEPLOYED. THE CAPT FIRST NOTED THE MUCH GREATER THAN NORMAL PWR REQUIREMENT.

Narrative: I AM NEW ON THE B757, STILL ON HIGH MINIMUMS. MY LAST ACFT WAS THE A320, ON WHICH I SPENT 4 YRS, SO FMS IS NOT NEW TO ME. I HAVE BEEN ENJOYING THE B757, AND EAGERLY LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING WHAT IT WOULD DO ON THE FMS BRIDGE VISUAL TO RWY 28R AT SFO. APCH CTL CLRED US FOR THE APCH, WHICH WE HAD PREVIOUSLY LOADED AND BRIEFED, BUT THEY ALSO GAVE US SPD RESTRS AND HELD US HIGH UNTIL THE LAST SECOND, SO WE HAD TO USE SPD BRAKES BTWN ARCHI AND GAROW INTXNS TO GET DOWN TO PROFILE. WE WERE STILL HIGH AND HOT BTWN TRDOW AND GAROW, SO I ALSO CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN. IT WORKED, BUT THE AIRPLANE DIDN'T STOP AT THE PROFILE, IT KEPT DSNDING AND BUSTED THE 4000 FT RESTR AT GAROW INTXN BY 400 FT. IT TOOK ME A FEW SECONDS TO REALIZE WHY -- AS THE ACFT APCHED THE PROFILE, I HAD NOT RETRACTED THE SPD BRAKES SINCE I WAS DISTRACTED AND THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF SPD BRAKE DEPLOYMENT TO REMIND YOU. THIS IS VERY POOR DESIGN BY BOEING. AIRBUS HAS SOLVED THIS PROB ON THE A320 WITH A BLINKING AMBER ECAM MESSAGE THAT APPEARS WHENEVER SPD BRAKES ARE DEPLOYED AND THE ENGS ARE NOT AT IDLE, AND IT WORKS REALLY WELL. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND BOEING RETROFIT THE B757 FLEET WITH A SIMILAR WARNING, PERHAPS BY ADDING IT AS A FUNCTION THAT ILLUMINATES THE ALREADY-EXISTING 'SPD BRAKES' ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT ON THE FORWARD CTR INST PANEL. ACCIDENTS SUCH AS THE B757 AT CALI, COLOMBIA, AND INCIDENTS SUCH AS MINE AT SFO POINT OUT THE NEED FOR THIS IMPROVEMENT TO A NEAR- PERFECT AIRPLANE. I'M SURE YOU'VE RECEIVED SIMILAR RPTS AND SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER B757 PLTS. NASA ASRS SHOULD COMPILE THEM AND SEND A PACKET TO BOEING! IN THE MEANTIME, I AM NOT REMOVING MY HAND FROM THE SPD BRAKE LEVER UNTIL THEY ARE RETRACTED! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR WAS FLYING A B757-200 AND HAD EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKES TO INCREASE HIS DSCNT RATE BECAUSE HE WAS A BIT HIGHER THAN NORMAL FOR THIS APCH. HE FIRST NOTICED THAT THE ACFT REQUIRED A HIGHER THRUST SETTING DURING THE LEVELOFF AND THEN AS IT DSNDED THROUGH 4000 FT HE REALIZED THAT THE SPD BRAKES WERE STILL EXTENDED. HE SAID THAT HE HAD LOOKED AT THE AVAILABLE CIRCUITS AND HE THINKS THAT IF THE MANUFACTURER COULD HAVE THE PRESENT EICAS 'SPD BRAKE' MESSAGE FLASH IT WOULD ATTRACT THE FLC'S ATTN MORE THAN THE PRESENT STEADY ILLUMINATION. IN THE MEANTIME HE WILL LEAVE HIS HAND ON THE SPD BRAKE HANDLE WHEN THEY ARE DEPLOYED WHILE AIRBORNE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.