Narrative:

All aspects of the flight were uneventful up to the landing rollout. Tower was in communications with and controling runway crossing access for ground vehicles being operated by the contractors conducting construction on the airport, but had no direct communications with vehicles being operated by the contractor conducting post-air show cleanup. While on landing rollout a truck operated by the contractor responsible for post-air show cleanup of rented equipment (tents, chairs, bleachers, etc) entered runway 31 at a high rate of speed crossing directly into the landing aircraft rollout path from east to west on taxiway D. The tower issued a last ditch warning that there was a truck crossing without permission or communication. I braked and swerved the aircraft to pass behind the truck (avoiding collision by less than 50 ft), then completed my landing rollout and delivered my passenger to the GA terminal. They were very upset by this incident and in fact one was nearly unable to exit the aircraft because he was shaking so badly. The salinas airport was operating normally with the control tower open and fully manned at the time of the incident. NOTAMS for the closure of runway 8/26 and for the runway 31 ILS GS being inoperative had been published and were in effect, however there were no NOTAMS concerning post-air show cleanup operations. It was unclr whether the incident contractor had been directly informed of the runway reopening, or whether that notification had been delivered to one of the air show association members...additionally, it appeared that the incident contractor's on-site supervisor was not familiar with airport operations or runway entry restrs. Conclusions: there was a critical breakdown in the chain of communications between the airport management authority/authorized and the driver of the incident contractor's truck. For the preceding several days, that same piece of concrete had been fully available and open for his unrestr access. With the re-opening of the airport to normal operations, the rules changed, but his understanding did not. The contractor conducting airport construction was directly supervised and controled by the airport management authority/authorized and fully understood and complied with runway access and control procedures. The contractor hired by the air show association to conduct equipment set-up and break-down for the air show was not directly supervised and controled by the airport management authority/authorized and did not fully understand and comply with runway access and control procedures. Recommendations: to avoid future confusion concerning responsibility for control of access to aircraft movement areas (specifically runways) the airport management authority/authorized must remain directly in control of this issue. In other words, no matter who hires the contractor, the airport management authority/authorized has to be directly in communication with and maintain direct oversight of that contractor when access to aircraft movement areas is involved.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PIPER PA31 PLT CAME WITHIN 40 FT OF AN UNAUTH VEHICLE XING THE ACTIVE RWY ON LNDG AT SNS.

Narrative: ALL ASPECTS OF THE FLT WERE UNEVENTFUL UP TO THE LNDG ROLLOUT. TWR WAS IN COMS WITH AND CTLING RWY XING ACCESS FOR GND VEHICLES BEING OPERATED BY THE CONTRACTORS CONDUCTING CONSTRUCTION ON THE ARPT, BUT HAD NO DIRECT COMS WITH VEHICLES BEING OPERATED BY THE CONTRACTOR CONDUCTING POST-AIR SHOW CLEANUP. WHILE ON LNDG ROLLOUT A TRUCK OPERATED BY THE CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBLE FOR POST-AIR SHOW CLEANUP OF RENTED EQUIP (TENTS, CHAIRS, BLEACHERS, ETC) ENTERED RWY 31 AT A HIGH RATE OF SPD XING DIRECTLY INTO THE LNDG ACFT ROLLOUT PATH FROM E TO W ON TXWY D. THE TWR ISSUED A LAST DITCH WARNING THAT THERE WAS A TRUCK XING WITHOUT PERMISSION OR COM. I BRAKED AND SWERVED THE ACFT TO PASS BEHIND THE TRUCK (AVOIDING COLLISION BY LESS THAN 50 FT), THEN COMPLETED MY LNDG ROLLOUT AND DELIVERED MY PAX TO THE GA TERMINAL. THEY WERE VERY UPSET BY THIS INCIDENT AND IN FACT ONE WAS NEARLY UNABLE TO EXIT THE ACFT BECAUSE HE WAS SHAKING SO BADLY. THE SALINAS ARPT WAS OPERATING NORMALLY WITH THE CTL TWR OPEN AND FULLY MANNED AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. NOTAMS FOR THE CLOSURE OF RWY 8/26 AND FOR THE RWY 31 ILS GS BEING INOP HAD BEEN PUBLISHED AND WERE IN EFFECT, HOWEVER THERE WERE NO NOTAMS CONCERNING POST-AIR SHOW CLEANUP OPS. IT WAS UNCLR WHETHER THE INCIDENT CONTRACTOR HAD BEEN DIRECTLY INFORMED OF THE RWY REOPENING, OR WHETHER THAT NOTIFICATION HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO ONE OF THE AIR SHOW ASSOCIATION MEMBERS...ADDITIONALLY, IT APPEARED THAT THE INCIDENT CONTRACTOR'S ON-SITE SUPVR WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH ARPT OPS OR RWY ENTRY RESTRS. CONCLUSIONS: THERE WAS A CRITICAL BREAKDOWN IN THE CHAIN OF COMS BTWN THE ARPT MGMNT AUTH AND THE DRIVER OF THE INCIDENT CONTRACTOR'S TRUCK. FOR THE PRECEDING SEVERAL DAYS, THAT SAME PIECE OF CONCRETE HAD BEEN FULLY AVAILABLE AND OPEN FOR HIS UNRESTR ACCESS. WITH THE RE-OPENING OF THE ARPT TO NORMAL OPS, THE RULES CHANGED, BUT HIS UNDERSTANDING DID NOT. THE CONTRACTOR CONDUCTING ARPT CONSTRUCTION WAS DIRECTLY SUPERVISED AND CTLED BY THE ARPT MGMNT AUTH AND FULLY UNDERSTOOD AND COMPLIED WITH RWY ACCESS AND CTL PROCS. THE CONTRACTOR HIRED BY THE AIR SHOW ASSOCIATION TO CONDUCT EQUIP SET-UP AND BREAK-DOWN FOR THE AIR SHOW WAS NOT DIRECTLY SUPERVISED AND CTLED BY THE ARPT MGMNT AUTH AND DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND AND COMPLY WITH RWY ACCESS AND CTL PROCS. RECOMMENDATIONS: TO AVOID FUTURE CONFUSION CONCERNING RESPONSIBILITY FOR CTL OF ACCESS TO ACFT MOVEMENT AREAS (SPECIFICALLY RWYS) THE ARPT MGMNT AUTH MUST REMAIN DIRECTLY IN CTL OF THIS ISSUE. IN OTHER WORDS, NO MATTER WHO HIRES THE CONTRACTOR, THE ARPT MGMNT AUTH HAS TO BE DIRECTLY IN COM WITH AND MAINTAIN DIRECT OVERSIGHT OF THAT CONTRACTOR WHEN ACCESS TO ACFT MOVEMENT AREAS IS INVOLVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.