Narrative:

Runway 28 active, air carrier X lands runway 1, BE58 (aircraft Y) taxied into position runway 28. Air carrier X told to turn left on taxiway B, south on taxiway a, hold short of runway 28 on local control frequency. Air carrier X gave PIREP on final, turns off runway 1. I talked to arrival runway 28, a helicopter, north pad. I did a runway scan. Air carrier X 'appeared' to hold short. Cleared BE58 for takeoff. Air carrier X called me on ground control to check in going to the ramp. He was crossing runway 28 (the active runway). I canceled takeoff clearance of the BE58 immediately. Told air carrier X he was instructed to hold short of runway 28. His reply 'there are 3 in the cockpit. We didn't hear that (approximately).' if he hadn't heard that, then he had no taxi instruction to move when he exited the runway, let alone cross the active. I didn't request a readback of the hold short instructed right away, but I knew he couldn't cross the runway without my permission. Never assume. Supplemental information from acn 451154: this incident involved my aircraft crossing an active runway at alb. A landing was made on runway 1. Runway 28 was also being used, but I opted for runway 1 which is longer. An ILS approach was conducted through rain with some loss/gain of airspeed due to gusty winds. On short final the rain ceased and we were VMC but the gusty crosswind made for a higher than normal stress and workload situation. My landing was uneventful. I turned off at taxiway B. My first officer initiated a call to 'tower' immediately upon turning off. As he spoke with 'tower' about WX conditions and gave a PIREP, I concentrated on turning onto the parallel taxiway, stowing spoilers, etc. At this point in time a combination of distracting factors occurred: 1) my need to get settled down after a somewhat hectic and tense approach and landing. Let's say the adrenaline level was higher than normal. 2) the first officer's longer than normal conversation with tower which included a PIREP. 3) the normal after landing duties and concerns which involve taxiing and finding the terminal and correct gate. 4) some fatigue caused by an early morning wake-up added to a day made longer by delays. 5) forgetting that runway 28 was also in use -- a situation I had never before encountered at alb. We are usually told to taxi to the gate after landing there. 6) a short distance/time between turnoff of runway 1 and the point where the taxiway crosses runway 28. 7) frequency blockage which prevented us from hearing tower tell us to 'hold short' of runway 28. We have become used to hearing specific 'hold short' instructions at every airport using more than 1 runway. Most airports' controllers become audibly irritated when a 'hold short' instruction is not acknowledged. Somehow all of these listed factors combined caused me to believe we had in fact received taxi clearance from tower to the terminal. I remember looking down runway 28 and not seeing an aircraft, so I crossed and proceeded to the gate. Ground contacted us then to say we had been given instructions to hold short of runway 28. No request was heard or acknowledged by me or by my crew. My assumption that the first officer received clearance to the gate during his conversation with tower proved to be incorrect, as I discovered later. A cessna (BE58) at or near the end of runway 28 had been given takeoff clearance close to the time we crossed runway 28. He discontinued his takeoff early in his roll. I never saw the aircraft and was unaware of it until we were fully across runway 28. Neither my first officer nor my so gave any indication of the need to hold short of runway 28. I don't know why tower would clear the cessna for takeoff without receiving an acknowledgement from my aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALB LCL CTLR OBSERVES B727-200 TAXI ACROSS RWY 28, REQUIRING CTLR TO CANCEL TKOF CLRNC OF BE58.

Narrative: RWY 28 ACTIVE, ACR X LANDS RWY 1, BE58 (ACFT Y) TAXIED INTO POS RWY 28. ACR X TOLD TO TURN L ON TXWY B, S ON TXWY A, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28 ON LCL CTL FREQ. ACR X GAVE PIREP ON FINAL, TURNS OFF RWY 1. I TALKED TO ARR RWY 28, A HELI, N PAD. I DID A RWY SCAN. ACR X 'APPEARED' TO HOLD SHORT. CLRED BE58 FOR TKOF. ACR X CALLED ME ON GND CTL TO CHK IN GOING TO THE RAMP. HE WAS XING RWY 28 (THE ACTIVE RWY). I CANCELED TKOF CLRNC OF THE BE58 IMMEDIATELY. TOLD ACR X HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28. HIS REPLY 'THERE ARE 3 IN THE COCKPIT. WE DIDN'T HEAR THAT (APPROX).' IF HE HADN'T HEARD THAT, THEN HE HAD NO TAXI INSTRUCTION TO MOVE WHEN HE EXITED THE RWY, LET ALONE CROSS THE ACTIVE. I DIDN'T REQUEST A READBACK OF THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTED RIGHT AWAY, BUT I KNEW HE COULDN'T CROSS THE RWY WITHOUT MY PERMISSION. NEVER ASSUME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 451154: THIS INCIDENT INVOLVED MY ACFT XING AN ACTIVE RWY AT ALB. A LNDG WAS MADE ON RWY 1. RWY 28 WAS ALSO BEING USED, BUT I OPTED FOR RWY 1 WHICH IS LONGER. AN ILS APCH WAS CONDUCTED THROUGH RAIN WITH SOME LOSS/GAIN OF AIRSPD DUE TO GUSTY WINDS. ON SHORT FINAL THE RAIN CEASED AND WE WERE VMC BUT THE GUSTY XWIND MADE FOR A HIGHER THAN NORMAL STRESS AND WORKLOAD SIT. MY LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. I TURNED OFF AT TXWY B. MY FO INITIATED A CALL TO 'TWR' IMMEDIATELY UPON TURNING OFF. AS HE SPOKE WITH 'TWR' ABOUT WX CONDITIONS AND GAVE A PIREP, I CONCENTRATED ON TURNING ONTO THE PARALLEL TXWY, STOWING SPOILERS, ETC. AT THIS POINT IN TIME A COMBINATION OF DISTRACTING FACTORS OCCURRED: 1) MY NEED TO GET SETTLED DOWN AFTER A SOMEWHAT HECTIC AND TENSE APCH AND LNDG. LET'S SAY THE ADRENALINE LEVEL WAS HIGHER THAN NORMAL. 2) THE FO'S LONGER THAN NORMAL CONVERSATION WITH TWR WHICH INCLUDED A PIREP. 3) THE NORMAL AFTER LNDG DUTIES AND CONCERNS WHICH INVOLVE TAXIING AND FINDING THE TERMINAL AND CORRECT GATE. 4) SOME FATIGUE CAUSED BY AN EARLY MORNING WAKE-UP ADDED TO A DAY MADE LONGER BY DELAYS. 5) FORGETTING THAT RWY 28 WAS ALSO IN USE -- A SIT I HAD NEVER BEFORE ENCOUNTERED AT ALB. WE ARE USUALLY TOLD TO TAXI TO THE GATE AFTER LNDG THERE. 6) A SHORT DISTANCE/TIME BTWN TURNOFF OF RWY 1 AND THE POINT WHERE THE TXWY CROSSES RWY 28. 7) FREQ BLOCKAGE WHICH PREVENTED US FROM HEARING TWR TELL US TO 'HOLD SHORT' OF RWY 28. WE HAVE BECOME USED TO HEARING SPECIFIC 'HOLD SHORT' INSTRUCTIONS AT EVERY ARPT USING MORE THAN 1 RWY. MOST ARPTS' CTLRS BECOME AUDIBLY IRRITATED WHEN A 'HOLD SHORT' INSTRUCTION IS NOT ACKNOWLEDGED. SOMEHOW ALL OF THESE LISTED FACTORS COMBINED CAUSED ME TO BELIEVE WE HAD IN FACT RECEIVED TAXI CLRNC FROM TWR TO THE TERMINAL. I REMEMBER LOOKING DOWN RWY 28 AND NOT SEEING AN ACFT, SO I CROSSED AND PROCEEDED TO THE GATE. GND CONTACTED US THEN TO SAY WE HAD BEEN GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28. NO REQUEST WAS HEARD OR ACKNOWLEDGED BY ME OR BY MY CREW. MY ASSUMPTION THAT THE FO RECEIVED CLRNC TO THE GATE DURING HIS CONVERSATION WITH TWR PROVED TO BE INCORRECT, AS I DISCOVERED LATER. A CESSNA (BE58) AT OR NEAR THE END OF RWY 28 HAD BEEN GIVEN TKOF CLRNC CLOSE TO THE TIME WE CROSSED RWY 28. HE DISCONTINUED HIS TKOF EARLY IN HIS ROLL. I NEVER SAW THE ACFT AND WAS UNAWARE OF IT UNTIL WE WERE FULLY ACROSS RWY 28. NEITHER MY FO NOR MY SO GAVE ANY INDICATION OF THE NEED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28. I DON'T KNOW WHY TWR WOULD CLR THE CESSNA FOR TKOF WITHOUT RECEIVING AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FROM MY ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.