Narrative:

During climb out from dtw with the captain as PF, we were instructed to level at 13000 ft. Passing approximately 10000-11000 ft, we were given a 220 degree heading to proceed direct cavvs when able. With the autoplt engaged, captain became involved with selecting flight guidance modes and INS destination direct to cavvs. Approaching 13000 ft (leveloff altitude), with captain still distraction with FGS/INS activities, I mentioned that we did not have an altitude capture annunciation on our FMA panel. As we passed through 13000 ft still climbing 300-400 FPM, I stated 'we need to level at 13000 ft.' captain made an initial move to bring the aircraft back to 13000 ft, then again began working with FGS modes, autoplt and autothrottles. The aircraft again began climbing, slowly at first, and then more rapidly. Approaching 13200 ft, called 'level 13000 ft.' simultaneously, the so called 'still climbing.' when the captain did not intervene, I took control of the aircraft, disconnected the autoplt, and made a positive correction back toward 13000 ft. Altitude had increased to almost 13500 ft (500 ft high). Within seconds, ZOB issued further climb clearance to FL210. Controller did not mention altitude deviation and no proximity traffic was noted. After stabilizing the aircraft in the new climb, I re-engaged the autoplt, selected the proper flight guidance modes, and returned control of the aircraft to the captain. This was our first leg together, as the entire crew had been called out from reserve for this trip. Although fairly new in the DC10, I had just finished a 4-DAY trip the day prior and felt proficient. The captain had commented that he had flown very little recently and had limited experience on the aircraft. Still he chose to fly the first leg. During the final stages of the climb to 13000 ft, the captain was very involved in lateral navigation and airspeed control with the INS, FGS and autothrottles. I believe, when the selections he was attempting to make did not give the anticipated results and indications, he became somewhat confused and overloaded to the exclusion of altitude awareness. When he was made aware of the first altitude excursion, he initially made a move back toward 13000 ft, but quickly became distraction again trying to make the autoflt system control and indicate as he desired. He never got the aircraft positively leveled off. The one thing that did work right throughout the scenario was the 3-MAN cockpit concept. When I noticed the captain overly focused on the autoflt system, it caused me to become very attentive and focused on aircraft performance throughout the scenario. As well, the initial altitude excursion caused the so to become very focused on monitoring aircraft performance. Even though she was new at the airline, she did not hesitate to speak up as the second excursion was occurring. To his credit, the captain was not offended by having aircraft control taken away, but rather appreciative. Given the circumstances, he exercised very good CRM after the incident had passed, and was very open to discussing the entire situation in order for all of us to learn from it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC10 CREW HAD ALT OVERSHOOT.

Narrative: DURING CLBOUT FROM DTW WITH THE CAPT AS PF, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO LEVEL AT 13000 FT. PASSING APPROX 10000-11000 FT, WE WERE GIVEN A 220 DEG HDG TO PROCEED DIRECT CAVVS WHEN ABLE. WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED, CAPT BECAME INVOLVED WITH SELECTING FLT GUIDANCE MODES AND INS DEST DIRECT TO CAVVS. APCHING 13000 FT (LEVELOFF ALT), WITH CAPT STILL DISTR WITH FGS/INS ACTIVITIES, I MENTIONED THAT WE DID NOT HAVE AN ALT CAPTURE ANNUNCIATION ON OUR FMA PANEL. AS WE PASSED THROUGH 13000 FT STILL CLBING 300-400 FPM, I STATED 'WE NEED TO LEVEL AT 13000 FT.' CAPT MADE AN INITIAL MOVE TO BRING THE ACFT BACK TO 13000 FT, THEN AGAIN BEGAN WORKING WITH FGS MODES, AUTOPLT AND AUTOTHROTTLES. THE ACFT AGAIN BEGAN CLBING, SLOWLY AT FIRST, AND THEN MORE RAPIDLY. APCHING 13200 FT, CALLED 'LEVEL 13000 FT.' SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE SO CALLED 'STILL CLBING.' WHEN THE CAPT DID NOT INTERVENE, I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT, DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT, AND MADE A POSITIVE CORRECTION BACK TOWARD 13000 FT. ALT HAD INCREASED TO ALMOST 13500 FT (500 FT HIGH). WITHIN SECONDS, ZOB ISSUED FURTHER CLB CLRNC TO FL210. CTLR DID NOT MENTION ALTDEV AND NO PROX TFC WAS NOTED. AFTER STABILIZING THE ACFT IN THE NEW CLB, I RE-ENGAGED THE AUTOPLT, SELECTED THE PROPER FLT GUIDANCE MODES, AND RETURNED CTL OF THE ACFT TO THE CAPT. THIS WAS OUR FIRST LEG TOGETHER, AS THE ENTIRE CREW HAD BEEN CALLED OUT FROM RESERVE FOR THIS TRIP. ALTHOUGH FAIRLY NEW IN THE DC10, I HAD JUST FINISHED A 4-DAY TRIP THE DAY PRIOR AND FELT PROFICIENT. THE CAPT HAD COMMENTED THAT HE HAD FLOWN VERY LITTLE RECENTLY AND HAD LIMITED EXPERIENCE ON THE ACFT. STILL HE CHOSE TO FLY THE FIRST LEG. DURING THE FINAL STAGES OF THE CLB TO 13000 FT, THE CAPT WAS VERY INVOLVED IN LATERAL NAV AND AIRSPD CTL WITH THE INS, FGS AND AUTOTHROTTLES. I BELIEVE, WHEN THE SELECTIONS HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO MAKE DID NOT GIVE THE ANTICIPATED RESULTS AND INDICATIONS, HE BECAME SOMEWHAT CONFUSED AND OVERLOADED TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALT AWARENESS. WHEN HE WAS MADE AWARE OF THE FIRST ALT EXCURSION, HE INITIALLY MADE A MOVE BACK TOWARD 13000 FT, BUT QUICKLY BECAME DISTR AGAIN TRYING TO MAKE THE AUTOFLT SYS CTL AND INDICATE AS HE DESIRED. HE NEVER GOT THE ACFT POSITIVELY LEVELED OFF. THE ONE THING THAT DID WORK RIGHT THROUGHOUT THE SCENARIO WAS THE 3-MAN COCKPIT CONCEPT. WHEN I NOTICED THE CAPT OVERLY FOCUSED ON THE AUTOFLT SYS, IT CAUSED ME TO BECOME VERY ATTENTIVE AND FOCUSED ON ACFT PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT THE SCENARIO. AS WELL, THE INITIAL ALT EXCURSION CAUSED THE SO TO BECOME VERY FOCUSED ON MONITORING ACFT PERFORMANCE. EVEN THOUGH SHE WAS NEW AT THE AIRLINE, SHE DID NOT HESITATE TO SPEAK UP AS THE SECOND EXCURSION WAS OCCURRING. TO HIS CREDIT, THE CAPT WAS NOT OFFENDED BY HAVING ACFT CTL TAKEN AWAY, BUT RATHER APPRECIATIVE. GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE EXERCISED VERY GOOD CRM AFTER THE INCIDENT HAD PASSED, AND WAS VERY OPEN TO DISCUSSING THE ENTIRE SIT IN ORDER FOR ALL OF US TO LEARN FROM IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.