Narrative:

Pilot of aircraft #1 was unfamiliar with airport and was taxiing for departure on runway 34. Winds were calm and other aircraft were landing/departing on both runway 16 and runway 34. Pilot of aircraft #1 was obtaining IFR clearance and making general location announcements while taxiing. New york approach advised pilot of aircraft #1 to advise when ready for takeoff. Pilot #1 positioned aircraft #1 behind hold short line for run-up. Pilot #1 then moved aircraft #1 forward, checking (turning left) and called new york approach for release. New york approach immediately advised that a B737 was inbound for runway 16. Pilot #1 immediately halted a few ft beyond the hold short line (taxiway K). Pilot #1 then heard pilot of aircraft #2 announce position 5 mi out. At this point, pilot #1 decided that, due to the presumed speed of aircraft #2, there wouldn't be time to do a 180 degree turn on the runway and then exit again. Pilot #1 also couldn't be certain that a 180 degree turn on taxiway K could be accomplished without coming too close to a taxiway light. Pilot #1 determined that aircraft #1 was a safe distance from runway 16 (although positioned a few ft beyond the hold short line) to allow a safe landing by aircraft #2. Aircraft #2 made a normal landing (without comment by pilot #2). Aircraft then departed runway 34. This incident could be prevented had the control tower been in operation and if pilot #1 were more familiar with the airport. Pilot #1 acknowledges that pilot #2 should have been informed of the situation by pilot #1.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C182 PLT, DURING TWR CLOSURE, TAXIED FOR AN IFR DEP AT HPN AND HAD JUST CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE BY A FEW FT WHEN HE HEARD A B737 ON 5 MI FINAL. THE CESSNA PLT HELD HIS POS UNTIL THE B737 LANDED.

Narrative: PLT OF ACFT #1 WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH ARPT AND WAS TAXIING FOR DEP ON RWY 34. WINDS WERE CALM AND OTHER ACFT WERE LNDG/DEPARTING ON BOTH RWY 16 AND RWY 34. PLT OF ACFT #1 WAS OBTAINING IFR CLRNC AND MAKING GENERAL LOCATION ANNOUNCEMENTS WHILE TAXIING. NEW YORK APCH ADVISED PLT OF ACFT #1 TO ADVISE WHEN READY FOR TKOF. PLT #1 POSITIONED ACFT #1 BEHIND HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RUN-UP. PLT #1 THEN MOVED ACFT #1 FORWARD, CHKING (TURNING L) AND CALLED NEW YORK APCH FOR RELEASE. NEW YORK APCH IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THAT A B737 WAS INBOUND FOR RWY 16. PLT #1 IMMEDIATELY HALTED A FEW FT BEYOND THE HOLD SHORT LINE (TXWY K). PLT #1 THEN HEARD PLT OF ACFT #2 ANNOUNCE POS 5 MI OUT. AT THIS POINT, PLT #1 DECIDED THAT, DUE TO THE PRESUMED SPD OF ACFT #2, THERE WOULDN'T BE TIME TO DO A 180 DEG TURN ON THE RWY AND THEN EXIT AGAIN. PLT #1 ALSO COULDN'T BE CERTAIN THAT A 180 DEG TURN ON TXWY K COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT COMING TOO CLOSE TO A TXWY LIGHT. PLT #1 DETERMINED THAT ACFT #1 WAS A SAFE DISTANCE FROM RWY 16 (ALTHOUGH POSITIONED A FEW FT BEYOND THE HOLD SHORT LINE) TO ALLOW A SAFE LNDG BY ACFT #2. ACFT #2 MADE A NORMAL LNDG (WITHOUT COMMENT BY PLT #2). ACFT THEN DEPARTED RWY 34. THIS INCIDENT COULD BE PREVENTED HAD THE CTL TWR BEEN IN OP AND IF PLT #1 WERE MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT. PLT #1 ACKNOWLEDGES THAT PLT #2 SHOULD HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF THE SIT BY PLT #1.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.