Narrative:

On climb out from sat with the first officer flying, center gave us a clearance to FL250. I entered this into the altitude alert and we both visually verified the assigned altitude. Shortly thereafter, while passing FL220 and approximately 115 NM from hou, I went off the primary VHF frequency to get the hou ATIS. Upon returning from getting the ATIS, I saw that we were level at FL260 with FL250 still in the altitude alert box. Simultaneously, the first officer was answering a query from ATC, which I had not heard, with the response 'FL250.' I immediately got onto the radio and stated that there was some question as to whether we were cleared to FL250 or FL260. The controller came back with 'no problem' and cleared us to cross lisse at 10000 ft. The question which the alert and benevolent controller had asked was whether we wanted FL250 or FL270 as a final altitude when he obviously recognized that we had busted our altitude. There were several factors for this error. Neither the first officer nor I heard the altitude alert horn, although it had been working and worked subsequently. I had my head down copying the ATIS and had taken myself 'out of the loop' momentarily. Hence, we did not acknowledge the required '1000 ft to go' callout. Additionally, the 200 series autoplt requires that the aircraft be manually leveled off at the required altitude, unlike the other series that do so automatically. The fact that the first officer had not flown the 200 series in quite a while added to the confusion as it was his first leg of the day in the aircraft. This incident could have been prevented via better crew discipline. Getting the ATIS at a time when a leveloff was imminent added to the potential for error, as I was not 'dividing' my time to maintaining situational awareness. The key lesson to be relearned is that murphy's is alive, and continual vigilance and adherence to prescribed procedure are the only ways to keep him quiet.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-200 CREW ALSO QUALIFIED IN FMS CLASS COCKPIT B737'S IGNORE ALT WARNINGS WHEN DISTR AND ACFT DOES NOT LEVEL AT CRUISE ALT AS THE FMS TYPE SYS DO. THE CTLR GAVE A NEW ALT CLRNC TO ACCOMMODATE THE ERROR.

Narrative: ON CLBOUT FROM SAT WITH THE FO FLYING, CTR GAVE US A CLRNC TO FL250. I ENTERED THIS INTO THE ALT ALERT AND WE BOTH VISUALLY VERIFIED THE ASSIGNED ALT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WHILE PASSING FL220 AND APPROX 115 NM FROM HOU, I WENT OFF THE PRIMARY VHF FREQ TO GET THE HOU ATIS. UPON RETURNING FROM GETTING THE ATIS, I SAW THAT WE WERE LEVEL AT FL260 WITH FL250 STILL IN THE ALT ALERT BOX. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE FO WAS ANSWERING A QUERY FROM ATC, WHICH I HAD NOT HEARD, WITH THE RESPONSE 'FL250.' I IMMEDIATELY GOT ONTO THE RADIO AND STATED THAT THERE WAS SOME QUESTION AS TO WHETHER WE WERE CLRED TO FL250 OR FL260. THE CTLR CAME BACK WITH 'NO PROB' AND CLRED US TO CROSS LISSE AT 10000 FT. THE QUESTION WHICH THE ALERT AND BENEVOLENT CTLR HAD ASKED WAS WHETHER WE WANTED FL250 OR FL270 AS A FINAL ALT WHEN HE OBVIOUSLY RECOGNIZED THAT WE HAD BUSTED OUR ALT. THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS FOR THIS ERROR. NEITHER THE FO NOR I HEARD THE ALT ALERT HORN, ALTHOUGH IT HAD BEEN WORKING AND WORKED SUBSEQUENTLY. I HAD MY HEAD DOWN COPYING THE ATIS AND HAD TAKEN MYSELF 'OUT OF THE LOOP' MOMENTARILY. HENCE, WE DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE REQUIRED '1000 FT TO GO' CALLOUT. ADDITIONALLY, THE 200 SERIES AUTOPLT REQUIRES THAT THE ACFT BE MANUALLY LEVELED OFF AT THE REQUIRED ALT, UNLIKE THE OTHER SERIES THAT DO SO AUTOMATICALLY. THE FACT THAT THE FO HAD NOT FLOWN THE 200 SERIES IN QUITE A WHILE ADDED TO THE CONFUSION AS IT WAS HIS FIRST LEG OF THE DAY IN THE ACFT. THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED VIA BETTER CREW DISCIPLINE. GETTING THE ATIS AT A TIME WHEN A LEVELOFF WAS IMMINENT ADDED TO THE POTENTIAL FOR ERROR, AS I WAS NOT 'DIVIDING' MY TIME TO MAINTAINING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. THE KEY LESSON TO BE RELEARNED IS THAT MURPHY'S IS ALIVE, AND CONTINUAL VIGILANCE AND ADHERENCE TO PRESCRIBED PROC ARE THE ONLY WAYS TO KEEP HIM QUIET.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.