Narrative:

First officer set up FMC at the gate. I verified the route and performance data. Noted the cruise altitude he had set and checked that the pressurization system was set for the same altitude. I did not xchk the cruise altitude with the pre departure clearance, as is my usual practice. I believe that I had relaxed my vigilance a bit because the first officer (whom I was flying with for the very first time and first leg) flew the same aircraft I had flown in the military and we knew some of the same people. At any rate, he had set everything up for FL310, while the paperwork indicated FL350. This was oversight #1. During our climb out, ZNY cleared us to FL350, which I set in the altitude window. However, the autoplt leveled us off at FL310. I'm not certain how long we were at FL310 when the controller asked us to verify our altitude. At this point I noted the altitude window set for FL350 but we were level at FL310. I responded to the controller, 'we're at FL310, but you wanted us at FL350, right?' he responded, 'affirmative,' and I initiated a climb to FL350, reprogramming the FMC. I checked the paperwork at this point and noted everything consistent with FL350. I'm still not sure why the first officer set up everything for FL310. Contributing factors may be lower alertness due to XA00 wake-up after 4 hours sleep for an XC45 show time and 2 hour drive to airport. Also, as previously stated, I had lowered my guard slightly due to the first officer's backgnd. And thirdly, we were probably talking during the climb about the military, family, etc. Doing the 'getting to know you' routine. As a result, I did not catch the computer stopping the climb prematurely until the ATC query.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-500 CAPT DID NOT CATCH HIS FO'S PROGRAMMING MISTAKE, CAUSING THEM TO UNDERSHOOT THEIR CRUISE ALT.

Narrative: FO SET UP FMC AT THE GATE. I VERIFIED THE RTE AND PERFORMANCE DATA. NOTED THE CRUISE ALT HE HAD SET AND CHKED THAT THE PRESSURIZATION SYS WAS SET FOR THE SAME ALT. I DID NOT XCHK THE CRUISE ALT WITH THE PDC, AS IS MY USUAL PRACTICE. I BELIEVE THAT I HAD RELAXED MY VIGILANCE A BIT BECAUSE THE FO (WHOM I WAS FLYING WITH FOR THE VERY FIRST TIME AND FIRST LEG) FLEW THE SAME ACFT I HAD FLOWN IN THE MIL AND WE KNEW SOME OF THE SAME PEOPLE. AT ANY RATE, HE HAD SET EVERYTHING UP FOR FL310, WHILE THE PAPERWORK INDICATED FL350. THIS WAS OVERSIGHT #1. DURING OUR CLBOUT, ZNY CLRED US TO FL350, WHICH I SET IN THE ALT WINDOW. HOWEVER, THE AUTOPLT LEVELED US OFF AT FL310. I'M NOT CERTAIN HOW LONG WE WERE AT FL310 WHEN THE CTLR ASKED US TO VERIFY OUR ALT. AT THIS POINT I NOTED THE ALT WINDOW SET FOR FL350 BUT WE WERE LEVEL AT FL310. I RESPONDED TO THE CTLR, 'WE'RE AT FL310, BUT YOU WANTED US AT FL350, RIGHT?' HE RESPONDED, 'AFFIRMATIVE,' AND I INITIATED A CLB TO FL350, REPROGRAMMING THE FMC. I CHKED THE PAPERWORK AT THIS POINT AND NOTED EVERYTHING CONSISTENT WITH FL350. I'M STILL NOT SURE WHY THE FO SET UP EVERYTHING FOR FL310. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS MAY BE LOWER ALERTNESS DUE TO XA00 WAKE-UP AFTER 4 HRS SLEEP FOR AN XC45 SHOW TIME AND 2 HR DRIVE TO ARPT. ALSO, AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, I HAD LOWERED MY GUARD SLIGHTLY DUE TO THE FO'S BACKGND. AND THIRDLY, WE WERE PROBABLY TALKING DURING THE CLB ABOUT THE MIL, FAMILY, ETC. DOING THE 'GETTING TO KNOW YOU' ROUTINE. AS A RESULT, I DID NOT CATCH THE COMPUTER STOPPING THE CLB PREMATURELY UNTIL THE ATC QUERY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.