Narrative:

When climbing through approximately FL250, the captain (me) selected the copy active prompt on the secondary flight plan page of the mcdu. When the copy active prompt was selected, the autoplt, autothrust, and autopressurization all failed due to a dual FMGC computer failure. The new database automatically switched and this probably caused the dual FMGC failure which in turn caused the autoplt, autothrottle, and autopressurization problem. If a pilot selects a new database in-flight, all of the above problems occur. I find it interesting that selecting the copy active prompt would cause the navigation database to change. This appears to be a programming problem that airbus will have to address. I have flown the A320 for 10 yrs and have been a training captain for almost the whole time. We are on an operating experience trip. My first officer is the PF and has less than 15 hours in the aircraft. CRM -- the first officer did not automatically take control of the stick until I told him to do so. I had to tell him twice to fly the aircraft. He wanted to know what was going on with the aircraft. His first job was to fly the aircraft. I am sure that this is a very normal reaction. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: conversation with reporter indicated that he was indeed highly qualified in the equipment he was flying and well versed in the teaching and operation of the FMS system. His company has removed flight recorders for investigation and is coordinating with airbus and FMS manufacturer to try to discover the anomaly that caused this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 CREW HAS DUAL FMC FAILURE WHEN DATABASE CHANGED INADVERTENTLY INFLT. RESULTING FAILURES CONNECTED WITH FMC FAILURE WERE AUTOPLT, AUTOTHROTTLE AND AUTOPRESSURIZATION CTL.

Narrative: WHEN CLBING THROUGH APPROX FL250, THE CAPT (ME) SELECTED THE COPY ACTIVE PROMPT ON THE SECONDARY FLT PLAN PAGE OF THE MCDU. WHEN THE COPY ACTIVE PROMPT WAS SELECTED, THE AUTOPLT, AUTOTHRUST, AND AUTOPRESSURIZATION ALL FAILED DUE TO A DUAL FMGC COMPUTER FAILURE. THE NEW DATABASE AUTOMATICALLY SWITCHED AND THIS PROBABLY CAUSED THE DUAL FMGC FAILURE WHICH IN TURN CAUSED THE AUTOPLT, AUTOTHROTTLE, AND AUTOPRESSURIZATION PROB. IF A PLT SELECTS A NEW DATABASE INFLT, ALL OF THE ABOVE PROBS OCCUR. I FIND IT INTERESTING THAT SELECTING THE COPY ACTIVE PROMPT WOULD CAUSE THE NAV DATABASE TO CHANGE. THIS APPEARS TO BE A PROGRAMMING PROB THAT AIRBUS WILL HAVE TO ADDRESS. I HAVE FLOWN THE A320 FOR 10 YRS AND HAVE BEEN A TRAINING CAPT FOR ALMOST THE WHOLE TIME. WE ARE ON AN OPERATING EXPERIENCE TRIP. MY FO IS THE PF AND HAS LESS THAN 15 HRS IN THE ACFT. CRM -- THE FO DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY TAKE CTL OF THE STICK UNTIL I TOLD HIM TO DO SO. I HAD TO TELL HIM TWICE TO FLY THE ACFT. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON WITH THE ACFT. HIS FIRST JOB WAS TO FLY THE ACFT. I AM SURE THAT THIS IS A VERY NORMAL REACTION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CONVERSATION WITH RPTR INDICATED THAT HE WAS INDEED HIGHLY QUALIFIED IN THE EQUIP HE WAS FLYING AND WELL VERSED IN THE TEACHING AND OP OF THE FMS SYS. HIS COMPANY HAS REMOVED FLT RECORDERS FOR INVESTIGATION AND IS COORDINATING WITH AIRBUS AND FMS MANUFACTURER TO TRY TO DISCOVER THE ANOMALY THAT CAUSED THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.