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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 455287 |
Time | |
Date | 199911 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : zbw.artcc |
State Reference | NH |
Environment | |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zbw.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B767-300 and 300 ER |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : vacating altitude cruise : level descent : intermediate altitude descent : vacating altitude landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight attendant : on duty oversight : flight attendant in charge |
Qualification | flight attendant : currently qualified flight attendant aircraft qualified on : 6 |
Experience | flight attendant time airline total : 11.5 flight attendant time total : 11.5 flight attendant time type : 50 |
ASRS Report | 455287 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : diverted to another airport flight crew : landed as precaution |
Consequence | other other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
15 mins after takeoff out of bos, I noticed that we still weren't climbing. I went to the cockpit to ask if anything was wrong, as I was purser on this flight. The pilots were trying to manually pressurize the cabin, since the autopressurization was broken. Manuals were out, and they were on the radio to dispatch and our main maintenance facility. The captain said that it looked like it could be fixed, but not to use carts or serve food yet. I returned to my first class cabin duties. Within mins, we started to climb, but then my head started to hurt and I was dizzy. I could feel us quickly descending again. I ran to the cockpit and all 3 pilots had their oxygen masks on. The captain said that we would not decompress, that the problem could not be fixed, and we would be turning around and going to jfk to get another aircraft. We did that, and there were no further incidents. Just a note: the third officer (pilot #3) was instructed to make a PA 1 in before landing at jfk by the captain about the rescue vehicles on the runway. Pilot #3's PA was very unprofessional and by trying to joke about a serious situation, he upset many passenger. They let us know how he had made a bad situation worse by joking and not being professional. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that the cockpit crew tried their best to manually pressurize the plane when they climbed above 10000 ft, but immediately began a fairly rapid descent after everyone, including themselves, were getting symptoms of altitude sickness. The captain came on the PA to make an announcement to the passenger describing the nature of the problem (autopressurization) and to reassure them of the safety of the plane. He explained they could either go back to boston and cancel, or go to jfk and change airplanes with one coming in from lax. It was on landing at jfk that the third pilot made an announcement on touchdown that upset and visibly shook up the passenger. He said, 'if you see all the red lights out there (ie, fire trucks and ambulances) when we land, don't worry, we're not going to crash.' he didn't elaborate that this was normal operating procedure. As the passenger got off the plane at jfk, many were crying, and some even yelled at the offending pilot. After a mega delay in jfk, they got under way and had a normal flight. With the lull in services going across the atlantic, the reporter (the purser) talked with the pilot, who made the announcement, about the horrible effect it made on the people. He was new at the position, and was sufficiently mortified about the bad effect his announcement made that he vowed to never do that again, and that he learned from his mistake. Upon landing in paris, the passenger profusely thanked the crew for their safe arrival.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLT ATTENDANT RPT, B767-300, BOS-CDG (PARIS), AUTOPRESSURIZATION MALFUNCTION, CREW AND PAX GOT ALT SICKNESS. DIVERT TO JFK FOR NEW PLANE.
Narrative: 15 MINS AFTER TKOF OUT OF BOS, I NOTICED THAT WE STILL WEREN'T CLBING. I WENT TO THE COCKPIT TO ASK IF ANYTHING WAS WRONG, AS I WAS PURSER ON THIS FLT. THE PLTS WERE TRYING TO MANUALLY PRESSURIZE THE CABIN, SINCE THE AUTOPRESSURIZATION WAS BROKEN. MANUALS WERE OUT, AND THEY WERE ON THE RADIO TO DISPATCH AND OUR MAIN MAINT FACILITY. THE CAPT SAID THAT IT LOOKED LIKE IT COULD BE FIXED, BUT NOT TO USE CARTS OR SERVE FOOD YET. I RETURNED TO MY FIRST CLASS CABIN DUTIES. WITHIN MINS, WE STARTED TO CLB, BUT THEN MY HEAD STARTED TO HURT AND I WAS DIZZY. I COULD FEEL US QUICKLY DSNDING AGAIN. I RAN TO THE COCKPIT AND ALL 3 PLTS HAD THEIR OXYGEN MASKS ON. THE CAPT SAID THAT WE WOULD NOT DECOMPRESS, THAT THE PROB COULD NOT BE FIXED, AND WE WOULD BE TURNING AROUND AND GOING TO JFK TO GET ANOTHER ACFT. WE DID THAT, AND THERE WERE NO FURTHER INCIDENTS. JUST A NOTE: THE THIRD OFFICER (PLT #3) WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A PA 1 IN BEFORE LNDG AT JFK BY THE CAPT ABOUT THE RESCUE VEHICLES ON THE RWY. PLT #3'S PA WAS VERY UNPROFESSIONAL AND BY TRYING TO JOKE ABOUT A SERIOUS SIT, HE UPSET MANY PAX. THEY LET US KNOW HOW HE HAD MADE A BAD SIT WORSE BY JOKING AND NOT BEING PROFESSIONAL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT THE COCKPIT CREW TRIED THEIR BEST TO MANUALLY PRESSURIZE THE PLANE WHEN THEY CLBED ABOVE 10000 FT, BUT IMMEDIATELY BEGAN A FAIRLY RAPID DSCNT AFTER EVERYONE, INCLUDING THEMSELVES, WERE GETTING SYMPTOMS OF ALT SICKNESS. THE CAPT CAME ON THE PA TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX DESCRIBING THE NATURE OF THE PROB (AUTOPRESSURIZATION) AND TO REASSURE THEM OF THE SAFETY OF THE PLANE. HE EXPLAINED THEY COULD EITHER GO BACK TO BOSTON AND CANCEL, OR GO TO JFK AND CHANGE AIRPLANES WITH ONE COMING IN FROM LAX. IT WAS ON LNDG AT JFK THAT THE THIRD PLT MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON TOUCHDOWN THAT UPSET AND VISIBLY SHOOK UP THE PAX. HE SAID, 'IF YOU SEE ALL THE RED LIGHTS OUT THERE (IE, FIRE TRUCKS AND AMBULANCES) WHEN WE LAND, DON'T WORRY, WE'RE NOT GOING TO CRASH.' HE DIDN'T ELABORATE THAT THIS WAS NORMAL OPERATING PROC. AS THE PAX GOT OFF THE PLANE AT JFK, MANY WERE CRYING, AND SOME EVEN YELLED AT THE OFFENDING PLT. AFTER A MEGA DELAY IN JFK, THEY GOT UNDER WAY AND HAD A NORMAL FLT. WITH THE LULL IN SVCS GOING ACROSS THE ATLANTIC, THE RPTR (THE PURSER) TALKED WITH THE PLT, WHO MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT, ABOUT THE HORRIBLE EFFECT IT MADE ON THE PEOPLE. HE WAS NEW AT THE POS, AND WAS SUFFICIENTLY MORTIFIED ABOUT THE BAD EFFECT HIS ANNOUNCEMENT MADE THAT HE VOWED TO NEVER DO THAT AGAIN, AND THAT HE LEARNED FROM HIS MISTAKE. UPON LNDG IN PARIS, THE PAX PROFUSELY THANKED THE CREW FOR THEIR SAFE ARR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.