Narrative:

On our return leg from ogg to hnl, the following incident occurred. After switching from center to approach control, we were given a clearance to descend to 1500 ft, fly heading 285 degrees, followed by a heading of 260 degrees. Passing through 6000-7000 ft (rate of descent was between 1500-2000 FPM), approach control advised us to look for previously departed traffic off of runway 8R. Passing through 6000-7000 ft, and within 15 mi first officer the airport, we reported traffic in sight. The traffic was at our 1 - 2 O'clock position and indicating a climb. No further advisories were received by ATC in regards to traffic position or altitude, with the exception of a repeat of the original clearance to 'descend and maintain 1500 ft.' a 'TA' was received a few seconds later, followed by an RA to 'monitor vertical speed.' the situation seemed to have been further compromised when it appeared as if the traffic on TCASII had either decreased its rate of climb or leveled off. The captain responded by increasing rate of descent from 1500 ft to approximately 2500-3000 FPM. This was followed by an RA to descend at approximately 4000-6000 FPM. Just the lower portion of the vsi was illuminated in the green. (The green portion indicated an RA of 4000-6000 FPM descent.) the captain responded accordingly. Traffic passed overhead and showed 500 ft above our altitude on the TCASII. A few seconds later, the air carrier was told to contact approach and we were told 'cleared for the visual runway 8L, via the channel, contact the tower.' supplemental information from acn 453933: approach controller advised us of traffic departing hnl climbing eastbound. We acknowledged 'traffic in sight and the controller advised us to maintain visual separation. At approximately 5000 ft MSL we received a TCASII TA relative to the heavy at about 6 mi on our TCASII and 500 ft below our altitude. He was climbing in excess of 500 FPM. We maintained our heading (260 degrees) and rate of descent (1500-2000 FPM) with the exception that we would pass well below the approaching heavy given our respective altitudes and vertical velocities (he climbing, we descending). A second or 2 after the TCASII TA was announced, we received the TCASII RA, 'monitor vertical speed.' at this time the controller repeated his clearance for us to descend to 1500 ft but gave no indication of a pending conflict with the heavy. While the initial RA ('monitor vertical speed') confirmed my evaluation that the current respective vertical velocities of the 2 aircraft would allow safe separation my visual picture appeared that safe separation was rapidly decreasing. It also appeared that the heavy had leveled off or substantially decreased his rate or climb thereby confusing our TCASII and further compromising safe separation. I increased our rate of descent to approximately 3000 FPM. No further RA's were heard from our TCASII, but the entire display then lit up red except for a small green band in the 4000-6000 FPM descent range. I increased our descent substantially based on this and my visual picture of the situation. We passed directly below the heavy with him indicating +500 ft on our TCASII. His engine noise was very audible. On arrival at the gate, the first flight attendant mentioned that 1 or more passenger had remarked about the proximity of the heavy. Later, by telephone, the hnl tower supervisor stated that they had had a 'communications problem' with the heavy. At no time during the incident did the working controller advise us of a 'communications problem' with the heavy, nor did he ask us to alter course or modify our rate of descent. He did not communicate with us in any way except to repeat his earlier clearance to 1500 ft. If voice communication is lost with 1 or more aircraft in a situation where advice to maintain visual separation has been previously issued controllers should notify all aircraft concerned on the loss of voice communications.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC9 CREW RPTED AN NMAC WITH A B747-100 NEAR HNL.

Narrative: ON OUR RETURN LEG FROM OGG TO HNL, THE FOLLOWING INCIDENT OCCURRED. AFTER SWITCHING FROM CTR TO APCH CTL, WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO DSND TO 1500 FT, FLY HDG 285 DEGS, FOLLOWED BY A HDG OF 260 DEGS. PASSING THROUGH 6000-7000 FT (RATE OF DSCNT WAS BTWN 1500-2000 FPM), APCH CTL ADVISED US TO LOOK FOR PREVIOUSLY DEPARTED TFC OFF OF RWY 8R. PASSING THROUGH 6000-7000 FT, AND WITHIN 15 MI FO THE ARPT, WE RPTED TFC IN SIGHT. THE TFC WAS AT OUR 1 - 2 O'CLOCK POS AND INDICATING A CLB. NO FURTHER ADVISORIES WERE RECEIVED BY ATC IN REGARDS TO TFC POS OR ALT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A REPEAT OF THE ORIGINAL CLRNC TO 'DSND AND MAINTAIN 1500 FT.' A 'TA' WAS RECEIVED A FEW SECONDS LATER, FOLLOWED BY AN RA TO 'MONITOR VERT SPD.' THE SIT SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN FURTHER COMPROMISED WHEN IT APPEARED AS IF THE TFC ON TCASII HAD EITHER DECREASED ITS RATE OF CLB OR LEVELED OFF. THE CAPT RESPONDED BY INCREASING RATE OF DSCNT FROM 1500 FT TO APPROX 2500-3000 FPM. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY AN RA TO DSND AT APPROX 4000-6000 FPM. JUST THE LOWER PORTION OF THE VSI WAS ILLUMINATED IN THE GREEN. (THE GREEN PORTION INDICATED AN RA OF 4000-6000 FPM DSCNT.) THE CAPT RESPONDED ACCORDINGLY. TFC PASSED OVERHEAD AND SHOWED 500 FT ABOVE OUR ALT ON THE TCASII. A FEW SECONDS LATER, THE ACR WAS TOLD TO CONTACT APCH AND WE WERE TOLD 'CLRED FOR THE VISUAL RWY 8L, VIA THE CHANNEL, CONTACT THE TWR.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 453933: APCH CTLR ADVISED US OF TFC DEPARTING HNL CLBING EBOUND. WE ACKNOWLEDGED 'TFC IN SIGHT AND THE CTLR ADVISED US TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION. AT APPROX 5000 FT MSL WE RECEIVED A TCASII TA RELATIVE TO THE HVY AT ABOUT 6 MI ON OUR TCASII AND 500 FT BELOW OUR ALT. HE WAS CLBING IN EXCESS OF 500 FPM. WE MAINTAINED OUR HDG (260 DEGS) AND RATE OF DSCNT (1500-2000 FPM) WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT WE WOULD PASS WELL BELOW THE APCHING HVY GIVEN OUR RESPECTIVE ALTS AND VERT VELOCITIES (HE CLBING, WE DSNDING). A SECOND OR 2 AFTER THE TCASII TA WAS ANNOUNCED, WE RECEIVED THE TCASII RA, 'MONITOR VERT SPD.' AT THIS TIME THE CTLR REPEATED HIS CLRNC FOR US TO DSND TO 1500 FT BUT GAVE NO INDICATION OF A PENDING CONFLICT WITH THE HVY. WHILE THE INITIAL RA ('MONITOR VERT SPD') CONFIRMED MY EVALUATION THAT THE CURRENT RESPECTIVE VERT VELOCITIES OF THE 2 ACFT WOULD ALLOW SAFE SEPARATION MY VISUAL PICTURE APPEARED THAT SAFE SEPARATION WAS RAPIDLY DECREASING. IT ALSO APPEARED THAT THE HVY HAD LEVELED OFF OR SUBSTANTIALLY DECREASED HIS RATE OR CLB THEREBY CONFUSING OUR TCASII AND FURTHER COMPROMISING SAFE SEPARATION. I INCREASED OUR RATE OF DSCNT TO APPROX 3000 FPM. NO FURTHER RA'S WERE HEARD FROM OUR TCASII, BUT THE ENTIRE DISPLAY THEN LIT UP RED EXCEPT FOR A SMALL GREEN BAND IN THE 4000-6000 FPM DSCNT RANGE. I INCREASED OUR DSCNT SUBSTANTIALLY BASED ON THIS AND MY VISUAL PICTURE OF THE SIT. WE PASSED DIRECTLY BELOW THE HVY WITH HIM INDICATING +500 FT ON OUR TCASII. HIS ENG NOISE WAS VERY AUDIBLE. ON ARR AT THE GATE, THE FIRST FLT ATTENDANT MENTIONED THAT 1 OR MORE PAX HAD REMARKED ABOUT THE PROX OF THE HVY. LATER, BY TELEPHONE, THE HNL TWR SUPVR STATED THAT THEY HAD HAD A 'COMS PROB' WITH THE HVY. AT NO TIME DURING THE INCIDENT DID THE WORKING CTLR ADVISE US OF A 'COMS PROB' WITH THE HVY, NOR DID HE ASK US TO ALTER COURSE OR MODIFY OUR RATE OF DSCNT. HE DID NOT COMMUNICATE WITH US IN ANY WAY EXCEPT TO REPEAT HIS EARLIER CLRNC TO 1500 FT. IF VOICE COM IS LOST WITH 1 OR MORE ACFT IN A SIT WHERE ADVICE TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ISSUED CTLRS SHOULD NOTIFY ALL ACFT CONCERNED ON THE LOSS OF VOICE COMS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.