Narrative:

Captain commenced takeoff roll on taxiway leading up to (800 ft short of) runway 28 atl. This was the second time the captain did this today after repeated verbal intervention on my part before, during, and after each event. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the first officer reported that he and the captain developed a bond when they both found out that the other had been a T38 instructor. The captain has been in the left seat for 13 yrs while the first officer has been with his company for 2 yrs. The first officer was extremely distressed by the captain's actions and reported to the analyst other instances of unusual behavior during their sequence together. The first officer has discussed his concerns with his professional standards people, but feels that the captain will be protected because of the inflexibility of his company regarding crew assignments. In his opinion, the company will not get the message that this captain is unacceptable because the pilots cannot refuse their sequence pairings. The reporter provided further backgnd information regarding the event at atl. He reported that new construction included the removal of runway 27L/9R, closest to the south cargo ramp. This has been replaced by a taxiway (he thinks taxiway right) which has been converted, with runway quality pavement, lighting, etc, into runway 28. The reporter recalled that the captain wanted to talk, at length, about the details of the conversion and how it impacted the flight they were about to make to phl. One of the notes on the plate stated that takeoffs were forbidden from the taxiway that leads to runway 28. They discussed this note and continued their briefing. When they were cleared for takeoff, still on the taxiway to runway 28, the captain 'clamped the autothrottles.' the first officer felt trapped because he did not want to try and reduce the throttles once they were clamped. They barely crossed the white runway line as they rotated. After they cleaned up, the first officer said that he confronted the captain and made it clear that he was outraged, especially since they violated the note on the commercial chart in front of the tower and 3 company aircraft behind them awaiting takeoff. The captain replied, 'I don't want to leave all that concrete behind me.' they flew back to atl, briefed the departure for a flight to augusta, and the captain took off from the taxiway again, for the second time in the same day. Again, the first officer confronted the captain and he gave the same reply. In the first officer's opinion, this captain seems to hold it together long enough to appear normal for check rides and other evaluations, but loses his facade of competence when he's flying day-to-day. He felt that this captain is bereft of judgement as demonstrated by his use of reduced thrust for the takeoff. The first officer posited that, if the captain was so concerned about the length of the runway, and therefore used the taxiway to provide a cushion, then he would also utilize the engine's maximum power to take off. In the first officer's opinion, his use of reduced thrust makes no sense when taken in context with his other comments.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD88 FO RPTED THAT, FOR THE SECOND TIME IN THE SAME DAY, HIS CAPT COMMENCED THE TKOF ROLL WHILE ON THE TXWY.

Narrative: CAPT COMMENCED TKOF ROLL ON TXWY LEADING UP TO (800 FT SHORT OF) RWY 28 ATL. THIS WAS THE SECOND TIME THE CAPT DID THIS TODAY AFTER REPEATED VERBAL INTERVENTION ON MY PART BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER EACH EVENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO RPTED THAT HE AND THE CAPT DEVELOPED A BOND WHEN THEY BOTH FOUND OUT THAT THE OTHER HAD BEEN A T38 INSTRUCTOR. THE CAPT HAS BEEN IN THE L SEAT FOR 13 YRS WHILE THE FO HAS BEEN WITH HIS COMPANY FOR 2 YRS. THE FO WAS EXTREMELY DISTRESSED BY THE CAPT'S ACTIONS AND RPTED TO THE ANALYST OTHER INSTANCES OF UNUSUAL BEHAVIOR DURING THEIR SEQUENCE TOGETHER. THE FO HAS DISCUSSED HIS CONCERNS WITH HIS PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS PEOPLE, BUT FEELS THAT THE CAPT WILL BE PROTECTED BECAUSE OF THE INFLEXIBILITY OF HIS COMPANY REGARDING CREW ASSIGNMENTS. IN HIS OPINION, THE COMPANY WILL NOT GET THE MESSAGE THAT THIS CAPT IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE THE PLTS CANNOT REFUSE THEIR SEQUENCE PAIRINGS. THE RPTR PROVIDED FURTHER BACKGND INFO REGARDING THE EVENT AT ATL. HE RPTED THAT NEW CONSTRUCTION INCLUDED THE REMOVAL OF RWY 27L/9R, CLOSEST TO THE S CARGO RAMP. THIS HAS BEEN REPLACED BY A TXWY (HE THINKS TXWY R) WHICH HAS BEEN CONVERTED, WITH RWY QUALITY PAVEMENT, LIGHTING, ETC, INTO RWY 28. THE RPTR RECALLED THAT THE CAPT WANTED TO TALK, AT LENGTH, ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE CONVERSION AND HOW IT IMPACTED THE FLT THEY WERE ABOUT TO MAKE TO PHL. ONE OF THE NOTES ON THE PLATE STATED THAT TKOFS WERE FORBIDDEN FROM THE TXWY THAT LEADS TO RWY 28. THEY DISCUSSED THIS NOTE AND CONTINUED THEIR BRIEFING. WHEN THEY WERE CLRED FOR TKOF, STILL ON THE TXWY TO RWY 28, THE CAPT 'CLAMPED THE AUTOTHROTTLES.' THE FO FELT TRAPPED BECAUSE HE DID NOT WANT TO TRY AND REDUCE THE THROTTLES ONCE THEY WERE CLAMPED. THEY BARELY CROSSED THE WHITE RWY LINE AS THEY ROTATED. AFTER THEY CLEANED UP, THE FO SAID THAT HE CONFRONTED THE CAPT AND MADE IT CLR THAT HE WAS OUTRAGED, ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY VIOLATED THE NOTE ON THE COMMERCIAL CHART IN FRONT OF THE TWR AND 3 COMPANY ACFT BEHIND THEM AWAITING TKOF. THE CAPT REPLIED, 'I DON'T WANT TO LEAVE ALL THAT CONCRETE BEHIND ME.' THEY FLEW BACK TO ATL, BRIEFED THE DEP FOR A FLT TO AUGUSTA, AND THE CAPT TOOK OFF FROM THE TXWY AGAIN, FOR THE SECOND TIME IN THE SAME DAY. AGAIN, THE FO CONFRONTED THE CAPT AND HE GAVE THE SAME REPLY. IN THE FO'S OPINION, THIS CAPT SEEMS TO HOLD IT TOGETHER LONG ENOUGH TO APPEAR NORMAL FOR CHK RIDES AND OTHER EVALUATIONS, BUT LOSES HIS FACADE OF COMPETENCE WHEN HE'S FLYING DAY-TO-DAY. HE FELT THAT THIS CAPT IS BEREFT OF JUDGEMENT AS DEMONSTRATED BY HIS USE OF REDUCED THRUST FOR THE TKOF. THE FO POSITED THAT, IF THE CAPT WAS SO CONCERNED ABOUT THE LENGTH OF THE RWY, AND THEREFORE USED THE TXWY TO PROVIDE A CUSHION, THEN HE WOULD ALSO UTILIZE THE ENG'S MAX PWR TO TAKE OFF. IN THE FO'S OPINION, HIS USE OF REDUCED THRUST MAKES NO SENSE WHEN TAKEN IN CONTEXT WITH HIS OTHER COMMENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.