Narrative:

On nov/xa/99 at about XA20, we departed from slidell, la, airport (6r0) on an instrument training flight in VFR conditions to prepare the pilot for a part 135, air taxi, check ride the following day. I was acting as safety pilot/instructor at the time. Conditions were sky clear, visibility approximately 8 mi in haze. Shortly after departure, the pilot (who is filing a separate NASA report on this same situation) climbed to 3500 ft and proceeded toward hammond, la, airport (0r9) where we intended to perform multiple instrument approachs. In the climb, the pilot contacted new orleans approach control and advised the controller of our intentions. We were given a squawk and cleared direct hammond VOR with instructions to remain VFR. Approximately 1/2 way to hammond, I restr the pilot's outside visibility (simulated IFR) by placing an IFR en route chart across the pilot's side of the front windscreen. We arrived at hammond and commenced with our training approachs. We were in continual contact with new orleans approach control on frequency 119.3 and dutifully broadcast on the hammond advisory frequency (122.9) as directed by approach each time we were nearing the conclusion of an approach maneuver. Each time a missed approach was executed and we returned to approach frequency, the #2 communications radio was placed on the advisory frequency and its selector placed in the 'phone' position so that local traffic could be monitored, as well as approach. We had been in the local area for some time and were concluding perhaps our 4TH or 5TH approach, which in this instance was an ILS to runway 18, conducted with a simulated failure of 1 engine. As had been the norm, when instructed to change to advisory frequency, the pilot did so and announced that we were inbound for the ILS runway 18 at hammond. No radio traffic was heard and no traffic was immediately observed as the approach commenced and continued. At decision ht (244 ft) I instructed the pilot to initiate a missed approach. As he was initiating the single engine missed approach, I observed at approximately our 10:30 - 11 O'clock position, a single engine, high wing aircraft, believed to be a cessna, approaching from our left (east), perpendicular to our course, and traveling west. The aircraft was above us and ahead of us, near the midpoint of the airport and runway 18. A very rough estimate of its altitude is 500-600 ft above us, or 750-800 ft (the pattern altitude is 800 ft AGL). Sensing the potential conflict. I announced to the pilot that I had control of the aircraft, took control, immediately stopped our climb from the decision ht, maintained level flight at or near the decision ht and passed either below or slightly to the rear and underneath the cessna. We did not have to take extraordinary evasive action nor did the cessna which continued in straight and level flight. Vertical separation was estimated at approximately 500-600 ft. No broadcast was heard nor was one made by us concerning the incident. After the uneventful passage, control was returned to the pilot who completed the single engine missed approach, climbing to the assigned altitude of 2000 ft and maintaining runway heading as approach had instructed. The cessna proceeded off to the west as we climbed out to the south. It is unknown whether the cessna entered the pattern and landed. Approximately 15-20 mins later, as we were holding overhead the airport on the hammond VOR at 2000 ft, an aircraft came onto the approach frequency inquiring if approach was in contact with a twin cessna maneuvering over hammond airport. Approach, of course, replied in the affirmative that we had been operating VFR and that we were currently holding on the VOR at 2000 ft. The pilot then asked approach for our registration number and approach asked if he had a complaint of some sort. His response was that we '...were not listening to the local frequency and had nearly caused a midair.' when the pilot concluded his inquiry, I went on approach frequency and clearly stated what approach already knew, that we had been monitoring the local frequency continually, had been in continuous contact with approach, that we had heard no xmissions indicating traffic and that we wished to meet with the complaining pilot. Approach replied that he had left the area and was 6 mi to the north. In retrospect, having immediately and very critically debriefed the situation with the pilot for whom I was acting as safety pilot, we believe, to the best of our collective knowledge, that he did not fail to contact and monitor the advisory frequency when so advised. We have agreed on the below potential contributing factors: 1) use of chart to cover left half of windscreen obstructed safety pilot's vision to left side (that of approaching aircraft). 2) intensity of physical and mental demands/workload associated with the single engine missed approach at low altitude potentially affected the ability to divide attention between safe conduct of the flight and scanning for traffic. 3) communications failure(south) or breakdowns (?) if any, in fact, occurred on our part, they would undoubtedly be due to #2. 4) possible failure of the other party to monitor the advisory frequency and effectively communicate. 5) failure of other party to effectively see and avoid, as well as failure to yield to our aircraft which was both 'landing' and at a lower altitude.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C421 HAD LTSS FROM A CESSNA AT AN UNCTLED ARPT AT HDC.

Narrative: ON NOV/XA/99 AT ABOUT XA20, WE DEPARTED FROM SLIDELL, LA, ARPT (6R0) ON AN INST TRAINING FLT IN VFR CONDITIONS TO PREPARE THE PLT FOR A PART 135, AIR TAXI, CHK RIDE THE FOLLOWING DAY. I WAS ACTING AS SAFETY PLT/INSTRUCTOR AT THE TIME. CONDITIONS WERE SKY CLR, VISIBILITY APPROX 8 MI IN HAZE. SHORTLY AFTER DEP, THE PLT (WHO IS FILING A SEPARATE NASA RPT ON THIS SAME SIT) CLBED TO 3500 FT AND PROCEEDED TOWARD HAMMOND, LA, ARPT (0R9) WHERE WE INTENDED TO PERFORM MULTIPLE INST APCHS. IN THE CLB, THE PLT CONTACTED NEW ORLEANS APCH CTL AND ADVISED THE CTLR OF OUR INTENTIONS. WE WERE GIVEN A SQUAWK AND CLRED DIRECT HAMMOND VOR WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAIN VFR. APPROX 1/2 WAY TO HAMMOND, I RESTR THE PLT'S OUTSIDE VISIBILITY (SIMULATED IFR) BY PLACING AN IFR ENRTE CHART ACROSS THE PLT'S SIDE OF THE FRONT WINDSCREEN. WE ARRIVED AT HAMMOND AND COMMENCED WITH OUR TRAINING APCHS. WE WERE IN CONTINUAL CONTACT WITH NEW ORLEANS APCH CTL ON FREQ 119.3 AND DUTIFULLY BROADCAST ON THE HAMMOND ADVISORY FREQ (122.9) AS DIRECTED BY APCH EACH TIME WE WERE NEARING THE CONCLUSION OF AN APCH MANEUVER. EACH TIME A MISSED APCH WAS EXECUTED AND WE RETURNED TO APCH FREQ, THE #2 COMS RADIO WAS PLACED ON THE ADVISORY FREQ AND ITS SELECTOR PLACED IN THE 'PHONE' POS SO THAT LCL TFC COULD BE MONITORED, AS WELL AS APCH. WE HAD BEEN IN THE LCL AREA FOR SOME TIME AND WERE CONCLUDING PERHAPS OUR 4TH OR 5TH APCH, WHICH IN THIS INSTANCE WAS AN ILS TO RWY 18, CONDUCTED WITH A SIMULATED FAILURE OF 1 ENG. AS HAD BEEN THE NORM, WHEN INSTRUCTED TO CHANGE TO ADVISORY FREQ, THE PLT DID SO AND ANNOUNCED THAT WE WERE INBOUND FOR THE ILS RWY 18 AT HAMMOND. NO RADIO TFC WAS HEARD AND NO TFC WAS IMMEDIATELY OBSERVED AS THE APCH COMMENCED AND CONTINUED. AT DECISION HT (244 FT) I INSTRUCTED THE PLT TO INITIATE A MISSED APCH. AS HE WAS INITIATING THE SINGLE ENG MISSED APCH, I OBSERVED AT APPROX OUR 10:30 - 11 O'CLOCK POS, A SINGLE ENG, HIGH WING ACFT, BELIEVED TO BE A CESSNA, APCHING FROM OUR L (E), PERPENDICULAR TO OUR COURSE, AND TRAVELING W. THE ACFT WAS ABOVE US AND AHEAD OF US, NEAR THE MIDPOINT OF THE ARPT AND RWY 18. A VERY ROUGH ESTIMATE OF ITS ALT IS 500-600 FT ABOVE US, OR 750-800 FT (THE PATTERN ALT IS 800 FT AGL). SENSING THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT. I ANNOUNCED TO THE PLT THAT I HAD CTL OF THE ACFT, TOOK CTL, IMMEDIATELY STOPPED OUR CLB FROM THE DECISION HT, MAINTAINED LEVEL FLT AT OR NEAR THE DECISION HT AND PASSED EITHER BELOW OR SLIGHTLY TO THE REAR AND UNDERNEATH THE CESSNA. WE DID NOT HAVE TO TAKE EXTRAORDINARY EVASIVE ACTION NOR DID THE CESSNA WHICH CONTINUED IN STRAIGHT AND LEVEL FLT. VERT SEPARATION WAS ESTIMATED AT APPROX 500-600 FT. NO BROADCAST WAS HEARD NOR WAS ONE MADE BY US CONCERNING THE INCIDENT. AFTER THE UNEVENTFUL PASSAGE, CTL WAS RETURNED TO THE PLT WHO COMPLETED THE SINGLE ENG MISSED APCH, CLBING TO THE ASSIGNED ALT OF 2000 FT AND MAINTAINING RWY HDG AS APCH HAD INSTRUCTED. THE CESSNA PROCEEDED OFF TO THE W AS WE CLBED OUT TO THE S. IT IS UNKNOWN WHETHER THE CESSNA ENTERED THE PATTERN AND LANDED. APPROX 15-20 MINS LATER, AS WE WERE HOLDING OVERHEAD THE ARPT ON THE HAMMOND VOR AT 2000 FT, AN ACFT CAME ONTO THE APCH FREQ INQUIRING IF APCH WAS IN CONTACT WITH A TWIN CESSNA MANEUVERING OVER HAMMOND ARPT. APCH, OF COURSE, REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE THAT WE HAD BEEN OPERATING VFR AND THAT WE WERE CURRENTLY HOLDING ON THE VOR AT 2000 FT. THE PLT THEN ASKED APCH FOR OUR REGISTRATION NUMBER AND APCH ASKED IF HE HAD A COMPLAINT OF SOME SORT. HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT WE '...WERE NOT LISTENING TO THE LCL FREQ AND HAD NEARLY CAUSED A MIDAIR.' WHEN THE PLT CONCLUDED HIS INQUIRY, I WENT ON APCH FREQ AND CLRLY STATED WHAT APCH ALREADY KNEW, THAT WE HAD BEEN MONITORING THE LCL FREQ CONTINUALLY, HAD BEEN IN CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH APCH, THAT WE HAD HEARD NO XMISSIONS INDICATING TFC AND THAT WE WISHED TO MEET WITH THE COMPLAINING PLT. APCH REPLIED THAT HE HAD LEFT THE AREA AND WAS 6 MI TO THE N. IN RETROSPECT, HAVING IMMEDIATELY AND VERY CRITICALLY DEBRIEFED THE SIT WITH THE PLT FOR WHOM I WAS ACTING AS SAFETY PLT, WE BELIEVE, TO THE BEST OF OUR COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, THAT HE DID NOT FAIL TO CONTACT AND MONITOR THE ADVISORY FREQ WHEN SO ADVISED. WE HAVE AGREED ON THE BELOW POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) USE OF CHART TO COVER L HALF OF WINDSCREEN OBSTRUCTED SAFETY PLT'S VISION TO L SIDE (THAT OF APCHING ACFT). 2) INTENSITY OF PHYSICAL AND MENTAL DEMANDS/WORKLOAD ASSOCIATED WITH THE SINGLE ENG MISSED APCH AT LOW ALT POTENTIALLY AFFECTED THE ABILITY TO DIVIDE ATTN BTWN SAFE CONDUCT OF THE FLT AND SCANNING FOR TFC. 3) COMS FAILURE(S) OR BREAKDOWNS (?) IF ANY, IN FACT, OCCURRED ON OUR PART, THEY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE DUE TO #2. 4) POSSIBLE FAILURE OF THE OTHER PARTY TO MONITOR THE ADVISORY FREQ AND EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATE. 5) FAILURE OF OTHER PARTY TO EFFECTIVELY SEE AND AVOID, AS WELL AS FAILURE TO YIELD TO OUR ACFT WHICH WAS BOTH 'LNDG' AND AT A LOWER ALT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.