Narrative:

Leveled at FL240, we were instructed to maintain 310 KTS or faster. Upon clearance to descend to 16000 ft, captain set and armed 16000 ft and I read back 16000 ft long before captain set and armed 16000 ft. Later on while level at 16000 ft, controller asked us to stop descending. I replied 'we are not descending, we are at 16000 ft as instructed.' his answer was 'I cleared you to 17000 ft.' I queried if he wanted us to climb to 17000 ft since he never instructed anything else. His answer was only 'I will pull the tapes.' he never mentioned anything else. Controller was very overloaded with traffic. To date we haven't heard whether he cleared us to 16000 ft or 17000 ft. It seems the emphasis is on assigning blame rather than solving a situation. Of course, he is not sitting at 16000 ft and of course, I don't have a radar screen to look at other traffic. He seemed more concerned about who was at fault than reassuring us that there were no conflicts with other traffic at 16000 ft. Supplemental information from acn 454393: when pilots are given a clearance, the pilot reads back the clearance to 1) acknowledge the clearance, and 2) expect the controller to correct an incorrect response. If no correction is made by the controller, the pilot does not know of a possible conflict, which results in a less than safe situation. If 2) above does not exist and only 1) does, then perhaps we should always respond with 'roger.' that would cut down on frequency clutter. That idea is ridiculous, absurd, illogical and potentially dangerous. The FAA should change their policy regarding not being responsible for accuracy of readbacks. Until they do, the skies will be less safe.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG CREW SURPRISED WHEN CTLR TOLD THEM THEY WERE CLRED TO 17000 FT AFTER THEY HAD READ BACK, DSNDED TO, AND WERE MAINTAINING 16000 FT NEAR EWR.

Narrative: LEVELED AT FL240, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN 310 KTS OR FASTER. UPON CLRNC TO DSND TO 16000 FT, CAPT SET AND ARMED 16000 FT AND I READ BACK 16000 FT LONG BEFORE CAPT SET AND ARMED 16000 FT. LATER ON WHILE LEVEL AT 16000 FT, CTLR ASKED US TO STOP DSNDING. I REPLIED 'WE ARE NOT DSNDING, WE ARE AT 16000 FT AS INSTRUCTED.' HIS ANSWER WAS 'I CLRED YOU TO 17000 FT.' I QUERIED IF HE WANTED US TO CLB TO 17000 FT SINCE HE NEVER INSTRUCTED ANYTHING ELSE. HIS ANSWER WAS ONLY 'I WILL PULL THE TAPES.' HE NEVER MENTIONED ANYTHING ELSE. CTLR WAS VERY OVERLOADED WITH TFC. TO DATE WE HAVEN'T HEARD WHETHER HE CLRED US TO 16000 FT OR 17000 FT. IT SEEMS THE EMPHASIS IS ON ASSIGNING BLAME RATHER THAN SOLVING A SIT. OF COURSE, HE IS NOT SITTING AT 16000 FT AND OF COURSE, I DON'T HAVE A RADAR SCREEN TO LOOK AT OTHER TFC. HE SEEMED MORE CONCERNED ABOUT WHO WAS AT FAULT THAN REASSURING US THAT THERE WERE NO CONFLICTS WITH OTHER TFC AT 16000 FT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 454393: WHEN PLTS ARE GIVEN A CLRNC, THE PLT READS BACK THE CLRNC TO 1) ACKNOWLEDGE THE CLRNC, AND 2) EXPECT THE CTLR TO CORRECT AN INCORRECT RESPONSE. IF NO CORRECTION IS MADE BY THE CTLR, THE PLT DOES NOT KNOW OF A POSSIBLE CONFLICT, WHICH RESULTS IN A LESS THAN SAFE SIT. IF 2) ABOVE DOES NOT EXIST AND ONLY 1) DOES, THEN PERHAPS WE SHOULD ALWAYS RESPOND WITH 'ROGER.' THAT WOULD CUT DOWN ON FREQ CLUTTER. THAT IDEA IS RIDICULOUS, ABSURD, ILLOGICAL AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS. THE FAA SHOULD CHANGE THEIR POLICY REGARDING NOT BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR ACCURACY OF READBACKS. UNTIL THEY DO, THE SKIES WILL BE LESS SAFE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.