Narrative:

Nov/xa/99 from sdf to lax. Aside from a late departure out of sdf, the flight was normal in all respects through the top of descent into lax. (First officer was physically flying the aircraft, I was handling radios/cockpit setup.) ATIS throughout the entire flight showed lax was landing using runway 7R and runway 6R. En route, I reviewed these runway approach procedures and made mental notes concerning approachs. It was not until just prior to the top of descent point that lax changed ATIS and runways to runway 25L and runway 24L. The better than VFR WX that had been previously reported was falling rapidly to 1/4 mi with fog. The only runway to meet our landing needs was runway 25L -- a CAT III runway. The first officer and myself set up the cockpit and briefed the CAT III approach to runway 25L. Checking in with 'coast approach' they confirmed that we would be landing on runway 25L at lax. (It is interesting to note that ATIS showed lax to have 6 SM visibility between northwest and northeast.) in-flight visibility to in excess of 50 mi. We could distinctly see the lax airport and city lights surrounding the east and north side of the airport. As we progressed to the airport the approach controller changed our landing/approach to runway 24L. We immediately began changing the FMC approach and setting up the cockpit for this approach. The reason 'coast approach' gave for the change was that the RVR for runway 25L was now 1000 ft and that the approach was 'not' protected.' I heard this as 'now' protected. We had not finished setting up the cockpit and had not 'briefed' the new approach when 'coast approach' again changed us back to runway 25L. Again we set up the FMC and associated navigation equipment for the CAT III approach to runway 25L. From about 20 mi out of the airport we could see a fog bank covering the south side of the lax airport. We could also distinctly see the departure and midfield lights of runway 24L (north side of lax) with a 'finger of fog' laying over the approach end of runway 24L. While slowing the aircraft further and beginning to configure it for landing, approximately 10-15 mi from lax, the approach controller again changed our landing runway back again to runway 24L stating runway 25L was 'not protected.' this was the first time I became aware that the approach was 'not' protected. His first transmission led me to understand that the approach was 'now' protected. I again began quickly trying to reset the FMC for the runway 24L approach, get an identify on the ILS, and tune radios for the approach. The approach controller stated the RVR for runway 24L was at 1000 ft. I was caught up with configuring the aircraft for the approach and failed to understand the significance of this information. I had pulled out of the ILS runway 24L approach plate to quickly verify cockpit setting, thinking to myself that runway 24L was CAT III equipped. We were only about 4-5 mi from the FAF for runway 24L when we were broken off the ILS runway 25L approach. I was just completing the cockpit setup when we were directed to contact lax tower. On initial contact with lax tower (just at the FAF) we were cleared to land and again advised that the approach end RVR was 1000 ft. We were operating in VMC with the departure end of runway 24L and midfield area in plain sight. Again a finger of fog was extending over the approach end of runway 24L. We could intermittently make out the approach sequence lights flashing through the fog. It was at this time that I began verifying the aircraft's confign and the 'correct' approach settings. I again looked at the ILS runway 24L approach plate and then realized that there was no CAT III approach to this runway. We had already commenced an approach to a runway that was reported to be below visibility minimums. At that moment I was caught up with landing the aircraft, I elected to continue the approach. By 400 ft MSL we had the entire runway approach sequence lights in sight, runway end lights, and runway sidelights in view. This was well above the decision ht requirement for runway 24L. In retrospect, I should have discontinued the approach after the third runway change. There was not adequate time to properly brief and set up the approach to runway 24L. (In all, there were 4 runway changes in less than an 8 min period.) also, I should have broken off the approach to runway 24L when I first realized that it was not a CAT III runway. I was plainly in error.for better understanding, the following is provided: over the past 10 yrs of commercial flying, I have flown into lax less than 3 or 4 times. I am not by any stretch of the imagination very familiar with this airport or its 'local' procedures. The rapidly changing situation I found in the final phases of this flight caught me somewhat 'off guard.' the cockpit workload was extremely demanding and intense. Using the FMC database and information, I programmed each runway change before verifying the approach with the commercial approach plates. Had I reviewed each approach first, I may have caught the fact that runway 24L was not CAT III and a 2400 ft RVR was required. In nearly 30 yrs of flying, including 20 yrs flying from aircraft carriers, I cannot remember ever being exposed to any situation as demanding as this was. Added to this is the fact that the first officer and I have never flown together before this flight. Supplemental information from acn 456397: I was the PF and was under the impression that runway 24L was also CAT III as well as runway 25L and did not realize it was just an ILS approach until the captain asked if ILS runway 24L was only approach. When the runway was switched the third time it probably would have been prudent to go around. Next time I will.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 MAKES CAT III APCH TO LAX RWY WITHOUT A CAT III APCH AND LOW RVR READINGS WITH NO ADVISORIES FROM LAX TWR OR APCH.

Narrative: NOV/XA/99 FROM SDF TO LAX. ASIDE FROM A LATE DEP OUT OF SDF, THE FLT WAS NORMAL IN ALL RESPECTS THROUGH THE TOP OF DSCNT INTO LAX. (FO WAS PHYSICALLY FLYING THE ACFT, I WAS HANDLING RADIOS/COCKPIT SETUP.) ATIS THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE FLT SHOWED LAX WAS LNDG USING RWY 7R AND RWY 6R. ENRTE, I REVIEWED THESE RWY APCH PROCS AND MADE MENTAL NOTES CONCERNING APCHS. IT WAS NOT UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO THE TOP OF DSCNT POINT THAT LAX CHANGED ATIS AND RWYS TO RWY 25L AND RWY 24L. THE BETTER THAN VFR WX THAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY RPTED WAS FALLING RAPIDLY TO 1/4 MI WITH FOG. THE ONLY RWY TO MEET OUR LNDG NEEDS WAS RWY 25L -- A CAT III RWY. THE FO AND MYSELF SET UP THE COCKPIT AND BRIEFED THE CAT III APCH TO RWY 25L. CHKING IN WITH 'COAST APCH' THEY CONFIRMED THAT WE WOULD BE LNDG ON RWY 25L AT LAX. (IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT ATIS SHOWED LAX TO HAVE 6 SM VISIBILITY BTWN NW AND NE.) INFLT VISIBILITY TO IN EXCESS OF 50 MI. WE COULD DISTINCTLY SEE THE LAX ARPT AND CITY LIGHTS SURROUNDING THE E AND N SIDE OF THE ARPT. AS WE PROGRESSED TO THE ARPT THE APCH CTLR CHANGED OUR LNDG/APCH TO RWY 24L. WE IMMEDIATELY BEGAN CHANGING THE FMC APCH AND SETTING UP THE COCKPIT FOR THIS APCH. THE REASON 'COAST APCH' GAVE FOR THE CHANGE WAS THAT THE RVR FOR RWY 25L WAS NOW 1000 FT AND THAT THE APCH WAS 'NOT' PROTECTED.' I HEARD THIS AS 'NOW' PROTECTED. WE HAD NOT FINISHED SETTING UP THE COCKPIT AND HAD NOT 'BRIEFED' THE NEW APCH WHEN 'COAST APCH' AGAIN CHANGED US BACK TO RWY 25L. AGAIN WE SET UP THE FMC AND ASSOCIATED NAV EQUIP FOR THE CAT III APCH TO RWY 25L. FROM ABOUT 20 MI OUT OF THE ARPT WE COULD SEE A FOG BANK COVERING THE S SIDE OF THE LAX ARPT. WE COULD ALSO DISTINCTLY SEE THE DEP AND MIDFIELD LIGHTS OF RWY 24L (N SIDE OF LAX) WITH A 'FINGER OF FOG' LAYING OVER THE APCH END OF RWY 24L. WHILE SLOWING THE ACFT FURTHER AND BEGINNING TO CONFIGURE IT FOR LNDG, APPROX 10-15 MI FROM LAX, THE APCH CTLR AGAIN CHANGED OUR LNDG RWY BACK AGAIN TO RWY 24L STATING RWY 25L WAS 'NOT PROTECTED.' THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME I BECAME AWARE THAT THE APCH WAS 'NOT' PROTECTED. HIS FIRST XMISSION LED ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE APCH WAS 'NOW' PROTECTED. I AGAIN BEGAN QUICKLY TRYING TO RESET THE FMC FOR THE RWY 24L APCH, GET AN IDENT ON THE ILS, AND TUNE RADIOS FOR THE APCH. THE APCH CTLR STATED THE RVR FOR RWY 24L WAS AT 1000 FT. I WAS CAUGHT UP WITH CONFIGURING THE ACFT FOR THE APCH AND FAILED TO UNDERSTAND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS INFO. I HAD PULLED OUT OF THE ILS RWY 24L APCH PLATE TO QUICKLY VERIFY COCKPIT SETTING, THINKING TO MYSELF THAT RWY 24L WAS CAT III EQUIPPED. WE WERE ONLY ABOUT 4-5 MI FROM THE FAF FOR RWY 24L WHEN WE WERE BROKEN OFF THE ILS RWY 25L APCH. I WAS JUST COMPLETING THE COCKPIT SETUP WHEN WE WERE DIRECTED TO CONTACT LAX TWR. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH LAX TWR (JUST AT THE FAF) WE WERE CLRED TO LAND AND AGAIN ADVISED THAT THE APCH END RVR WAS 1000 FT. WE WERE OPERATING IN VMC WITH THE DEP END OF RWY 24L AND MIDFIELD AREA IN PLAIN SIGHT. AGAIN A FINGER OF FOG WAS EXTENDING OVER THE APCH END OF RWY 24L. WE COULD INTERMITTENTLY MAKE OUT THE APCH SEQUENCE LIGHTS FLASHING THROUGH THE FOG. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT I BEGAN VERIFYING THE ACFT'S CONFIGN AND THE 'CORRECT' APCH SETTINGS. I AGAIN LOOKED AT THE ILS RWY 24L APCH PLATE AND THEN REALIZED THAT THERE WAS NO CAT III APCH TO THIS RWY. WE HAD ALREADY COMMENCED AN APCH TO A RWY THAT WAS RPTED TO BE BELOW VISIBILITY MINIMUMS. AT THAT MOMENT I WAS CAUGHT UP WITH LNDG THE ACFT, I ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE APCH. BY 400 FT MSL WE HAD THE ENTIRE RWY APCH SEQUENCE LIGHTS IN SIGHT, RWY END LIGHTS, AND RWY SIDELIGHTS IN VIEW. THIS WAS WELL ABOVE THE DECISION HT REQUIREMENT FOR RWY 24L. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD HAVE DISCONTINUED THE APCH AFTER THE THIRD RWY CHANGE. THERE WAS NOT ADEQUATE TIME TO PROPERLY BRIEF AND SET UP THE APCH TO RWY 24L. (IN ALL, THERE WERE 4 RWY CHANGES IN LESS THAN AN 8 MIN PERIOD.) ALSO, I SHOULD HAVE BROKEN OFF THE APCH TO RWY 24L WHEN I FIRST REALIZED THAT IT WAS NOT A CAT III RWY. I WAS PLAINLY IN ERROR.FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING, THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED: OVER THE PAST 10 YRS OF COMMERCIAL FLYING, I HAVE FLOWN INTO LAX LESS THAN 3 OR 4 TIMES. I AM NOT BY ANY STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS ARPT OR ITS 'LCL' PROCS. THE RAPIDLY CHANGING SIT I FOUND IN THE FINAL PHASES OF THIS FLT CAUGHT ME SOMEWHAT 'OFF GUARD.' THE COCKPIT WORKLOAD WAS EXTREMELY DEMANDING AND INTENSE. USING THE FMC DATABASE AND INFO, I PROGRAMMED EACH RWY CHANGE BEFORE VERIFYING THE APCH WITH THE COMMERCIAL APCH PLATES. HAD I REVIEWED EACH APCH FIRST, I MAY HAVE CAUGHT THE FACT THAT RWY 24L WAS NOT CAT III AND A 2400 FT RVR WAS REQUIRED. IN NEARLY 30 YRS OF FLYING, INCLUDING 20 YRS FLYING FROM ACFT CARRIERS, I CANNOT REMEMBER EVER BEING EXPOSED TO ANY SIT AS DEMANDING AS THIS WAS. ADDED TO THIS IS THE FACT THAT THE FO AND I HAVE NEVER FLOWN TOGETHER BEFORE THIS FLT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 456397: I WAS THE PF AND WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT RWY 24L WAS ALSO CAT III AS WELL AS RWY 25L AND DID NOT REALIZE IT WAS JUST AN ILS APCH UNTIL THE CAPT ASKED IF ILS RWY 24L WAS ONLY APCH. WHEN THE RWY WAS SWITCHED THE THIRD TIME IT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN PRUDENT TO GO AROUND. NEXT TIME I WILL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.