Narrative:

We were in IMC on the VOR approach runway 14 into acv. After clearing us for the approach from a terminal routing, ZSE handed us off to CTAF just prior to the FAF. We broadcast to the acv pattern and the person manning unicom that we were approximately 7 mi west descending IMC on the VOR approach from the west. We then listened as a C130 broadcast that it was taxiing into position on runway 32. We were descending in clouds and mist to the approach's MDA of 680 ft with the missed approach at the VOR. I estimated we would break out of the overcast at a couple of mi west of the airport. We had planned to land straight-in on runway 14 since the winds were light out of the west. But since the C130 was in position on the opposite runway, I planned to circle to the south and enter a left downwind to runway 32 if the ceiling allowed. The field in class east airspace was just barely VFR. But obviously we had to break out of the clouds before we could commence our circle (circling minimums were the same at 680 ft). I assumed that the C130 would hold in position until we broke out of the clouds in order that both crews could maintain visual separation. While we were still IMC inbound, the C130 pilot announced that he was on the departure roll from runway 32. I acknowledged his transmission, and again radioed our position as 4 mi west on approach. When he popped up on TCASII, he was about 2 mi in front of us, about 500 ft below and climbing. As our targets rapidly closed on TCASII, I asked the C130 pilot to say his intentions. I thought he might make a sharp break either right or left off the approach course, and I wanted some indication of what he was going to do before I made my move. TCASII showed him climbing right toward us. I had earlier told my first officer, who was flying, to prepare to go around and fly the missed approach. I had thought we might break out of the clouds and be able to see and avoid the traffic visually, but it appeared the cloud bases were lower to the west. As I made my decision to abandon the approach, we got a 'climb, climb' RA which we rapidly complied with. Since we were IMC the whole time, we never did see the C130. Using the TCASII, I estimated that our lateral separation was zero mi, and that our vertical separation was 200-300 ft. It was difficult to know exactly because as the hazard of a collision became apparent, I couldn't concentrate on just the TCASII display as we initiated the published missed approach procedure. Marginal VMC WX in class east airspace at a non controled airfield can be a tricky situation when it comes to the mix of aircraft shooting IFR approachs with aircraft operating VFR in the vicinity of the air traffic area. At the very least, though, I feel the C130 pilot exercised very poor judgement in electing to make his departure toward an approaching aircraft that he had not seen that was flying in IMC close in to the airport. At the very least, he should have begun an early turn to clear our approach path and announced that maneuver on CTAF. Supplemental information from acn 458829: I was departing acv in MVFR conditions via runway 32, planning to climb VFR offshore through the scattered to broken cloud layer. Visibility was approximately 15 NM offshore. During takeoff roll, an air carrier X self-announced a 4 mi final on the VOR runway 14 final. The air carrier X was landing downwind and that was his first radio call. I quickly cleared his arrival path and monitored his position on TCASII. The TCASII did not announce a TA or RA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC BTWN A MIL LOCKHEED 130 ON INITIAL DEP CLB FROM AN UNCTLED ARPT AND A DHC8-200 ON A VOR APCH FROM THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. THE MIL ACFT TURNED OUT OF THE APCH PATH AND THE DHC8 CLBED IN RESPONSE TO A TCASII RA.

Narrative: WE WERE IN IMC ON THE VOR APCH RWY 14 INTO ACV. AFTER CLRING US FOR THE APCH FROM A TERMINAL ROUTING, ZSE HANDED US OFF TO CTAF JUST PRIOR TO THE FAF. WE BROADCAST TO THE ACV PATTERN AND THE PERSON MANNING UNICOM THAT WE WERE APPROX 7 MI W DSNDING IMC ON THE VOR APCH FROM THE W. WE THEN LISTENED AS A C130 BROADCAST THAT IT WAS TAXIING INTO POS ON RWY 32. WE WERE DSNDING IN CLOUDS AND MIST TO THE APCH'S MDA OF 680 FT WITH THE MISSED APCH AT THE VOR. I ESTIMATED WE WOULD BREAK OUT OF THE OVCST AT A COUPLE OF MI W OF THE ARPT. WE HAD PLANNED TO LAND STRAIGHT-IN ON RWY 14 SINCE THE WINDS WERE LIGHT OUT OF THE W. BUT SINCE THE C130 WAS IN POS ON THE OPPOSITE RWY, I PLANNED TO CIRCLE TO THE S AND ENTER A L DOWNWIND TO RWY 32 IF THE CEILING ALLOWED. THE FIELD IN CLASS E AIRSPACE WAS JUST BARELY VFR. BUT OBVIOUSLY WE HAD TO BREAK OUT OF THE CLOUDS BEFORE WE COULD COMMENCE OUR CIRCLE (CIRCLING MINIMUMS WERE THE SAME AT 680 FT). I ASSUMED THAT THE C130 WOULD HOLD IN POS UNTIL WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS IN ORDER THAT BOTH CREWS COULD MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION. WHILE WE WERE STILL IMC INBOUND, THE C130 PLT ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS ON THE DEP ROLL FROM RWY 32. I ACKNOWLEDGED HIS XMISSION, AND AGAIN RADIOED OUR POS AS 4 MI W ON APCH. WHEN HE POPPED UP ON TCASII, HE WAS ABOUT 2 MI IN FRONT OF US, ABOUT 500 FT BELOW AND CLBING. AS OUR TARGETS RAPIDLY CLOSED ON TCASII, I ASKED THE C130 PLT TO SAY HIS INTENTIONS. I THOUGHT HE MIGHT MAKE A SHARP BREAK EITHER R OR L OFF THE APCH COURSE, AND I WANTED SOME INDICATION OF WHAT HE WAS GOING TO DO BEFORE I MADE MY MOVE. TCASII SHOWED HIM CLBING RIGHT TOWARD US. I HAD EARLIER TOLD MY FO, WHO WAS FLYING, TO PREPARE TO GO AROUND AND FLY THE MISSED APCH. I HAD THOUGHT WE MIGHT BREAK OUT OF THE CLOUDS AND BE ABLE TO SEE AND AVOID THE TFC VISUALLY, BUT IT APPEARED THE CLOUD BASES WERE LOWER TO THE W. AS I MADE MY DECISION TO ABANDON THE APCH, WE GOT A 'CLB, CLB' RA WHICH WE RAPIDLY COMPLIED WITH. SINCE WE WERE IMC THE WHOLE TIME, WE NEVER DID SEE THE C130. USING THE TCASII, I ESTIMATED THAT OUR LATERAL SEPARATION WAS ZERO MI, AND THAT OUR VERT SEPARATION WAS 200-300 FT. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW EXACTLY BECAUSE AS THE HAZARD OF A COLLISION BECAME APPARENT, I COULDN'T CONCENTRATE ON JUST THE TCASII DISPLAY AS WE INITIATED THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH PROC. MARGINAL VMC WX IN CLASS E AIRSPACE AT A NON CTLED AIRFIELD CAN BE A TRICKY SIT WHEN IT COMES TO THE MIX OF ACFT SHOOTING IFR APCHS WITH ACFT OPERATING VFR IN THE VICINITY OF THE ATA. AT THE VERY LEAST, THOUGH, I FEEL THE C130 PLT EXERCISED VERY POOR JUDGEMENT IN ELECTING TO MAKE HIS DEP TOWARD AN APCHING ACFT THAT HE HAD NOT SEEN THAT WAS FLYING IN IMC CLOSE IN TO THE ARPT. AT THE VERY LEAST, HE SHOULD HAVE BEGUN AN EARLY TURN TO CLR OUR APCH PATH AND ANNOUNCED THAT MANEUVER ON CTAF. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 458829: I WAS DEPARTING ACV IN MVFR CONDITIONS VIA RWY 32, PLANNING TO CLB VFR OFFSHORE THROUGH THE SCATTERED TO BROKEN CLOUD LAYER. VISIBILITY WAS APPROX 15 NM OFFSHORE. DURING TKOF ROLL, AN ACR X SELF-ANNOUNCED A 4 MI FINAL ON THE VOR RWY 14 FINAL. THE ACR X WAS LNDG DOWNWIND AND THAT WAS HIS FIRST RADIO CALL. I QUICKLY CLRED HIS ARR PATH AND MONITORED HIS POS ON TCASII. THE TCASII DID NOT ANNOUNCE A TA OR RA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.