Narrative:

Yaw damper was inoperative and placarded as per MEL. First officer was the PF. Very turbulence approach. Approach control instructed us to 'maintain 170 KTS.' approximately 9-10 mi radar vector to ILS final approach said we were '4 from the slope, cleared for the approach, contact tower at ???.' at GS intercept, we were in landing confign and the first officer slowed to final approach speed, vref +10 KTS (approximately 135 KIAS). Unsure of the fix name, I contacted tower and was told 'you're #3.' short time later, tower told us to return to approach frequency. The controller was angry that we had not maintained 170 KTS and returned us to tower frequency. I did not have time to explain our yaw damper was inoperative and that we had slowed to final approach speed to minimize dutch roll. We landed to the south on the east runway and exited to the west side. First officer contacted ground, told them we were unfamiliar and requested progressive taxi. We were cleared to 'cross runway 33R, take the second right on taxiway a, hold short of runway 24L on taxiway west.' the first officer used the #2 radio to contact the FBO to confirm our parking location. I did not have the airport diagram (first officer had only copy). The mechanic seated in the jump seat stated 'it's over there, turn left here, that's what we did last time.' the hold short lights were not on and we inadvertently crossed the active runway. On the other side of the runway ground control told us 'hey guys, you just crossed the active.' I saw a jet on final going around. Upon arrival at the FBO, a message to contact the controller supervisor was waiting. I contacted him and discussed both incidents. I feel that the approach controller's instructions were unclr as he did not state how long to maintain to 170 KTS. The ground controller was not real helpful, even when we stated we were unfamiliar and requested progressive. Only having 1 airport diagram was not good. Using CRM to take the input of our mechanic should have been balanced with his non flying backgnd, even though his insistence that he knew the txwys. Supplemental information from acn 459806: night, unfamiliar airport, busy ground controller, lack of runway hold lights, and jump seat (non crew member) interjecting misleading directional instructions which caused interference and confusion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW DEALING WITH YAW DAMPER INOP HAS DIFFICULTY WITH APCH AND TAXI AT CYYZ.

Narrative: YAW DAMPER WAS INOP AND PLACARDED AS PER MEL. FO WAS THE PF. VERY TURB APCH. APCH CTL INSTRUCTED US TO 'MAINTAIN 170 KTS.' APPROX 9-10 MI RADAR VECTOR TO ILS FINAL APCH SAID WE WERE '4 FROM THE SLOPE, CLRED FOR THE APCH, CONTACT TWR AT ???.' AT GS INTERCEPT, WE WERE IN LNDG CONFIGN AND THE FO SLOWED TO FINAL APCH SPD, VREF +10 KTS (APPROX 135 KIAS). UNSURE OF THE FIX NAME, I CONTACTED TWR AND WAS TOLD 'YOU'RE #3.' SHORT TIME LATER, TWR TOLD US TO RETURN TO APCH FREQ. THE CTLR WAS ANGRY THAT WE HAD NOT MAINTAINED 170 KTS AND RETURNED US TO TWR FREQ. I DID NOT HAVE TIME TO EXPLAIN OUR YAW DAMPER WAS INOP AND THAT WE HAD SLOWED TO FINAL APCH SPD TO MINIMIZE DUTCH ROLL. WE LANDED TO THE S ON THE E RWY AND EXITED TO THE W SIDE. FO CONTACTED GND, TOLD THEM WE WERE UNFAMILIAR AND REQUESTED PROGRESSIVE TAXI. WE WERE CLRED TO 'CROSS RWY 33R, TAKE THE SECOND R ON TXWY A, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 24L ON TXWY W.' THE FO USED THE #2 RADIO TO CONTACT THE FBO TO CONFIRM OUR PARKING LOCATION. I DID NOT HAVE THE ARPT DIAGRAM (FO HAD ONLY COPY). THE MECH SEATED IN THE JUMP SEAT STATED 'IT'S OVER THERE, TURN L HERE, THAT'S WHAT WE DID LAST TIME.' THE HOLD SHORT LIGHTS WERE NOT ON AND WE INADVERTENTLY CROSSED THE ACTIVE RWY. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RWY GND CTL TOLD US 'HEY GUYS, YOU JUST CROSSED THE ACTIVE.' I SAW A JET ON FINAL GOING AROUND. UPON ARR AT THE FBO, A MESSAGE TO CONTACT THE CTLR SUPVR WAS WAITING. I CONTACTED HIM AND DISCUSSED BOTH INCIDENTS. I FEEL THAT THE APCH CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE UNCLR AS HE DID NOT STATE HOW LONG TO MAINTAIN TO 170 KTS. THE GND CTLR WAS NOT REAL HELPFUL, EVEN WHEN WE STATED WE WERE UNFAMILIAR AND REQUESTED PROGRESSIVE. ONLY HAVING 1 ARPT DIAGRAM WAS NOT GOOD. USING CRM TO TAKE THE INPUT OF OUR MECH SHOULD HAVE BEEN BALANCED WITH HIS NON FLYING BACKGND, EVEN THOUGH HIS INSISTENCE THAT HE KNEW THE TXWYS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 459806: NIGHT, UNFAMILIAR ARPT, BUSY GND CTLR, LACK OF RWY HOLD LIGHTS, AND JUMP SEAT (NON CREW MEMBER) INTERJECTING MISLEADING DIRECTIONAL INSTRUCTIONS WHICH CAUSED INTERFERENCE AND CONFUSION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.