Narrative:

I work for a fuel contractor that provides aircraft refueling for air carrier X. I started my shift at XA00 and was responsible for fueling all turnaround flts from XB00 on. My first flight arrived at approximately XB00. I arrived at the aircraft around XB15 and went into the terminal to retrieve my fuel slip. I noticed that there were 2 copies instead of the normal single copy. I read both and discovered that the fuel gauge for the right main tank was inoperative. Since air carrier X does not train their fuelers on inoperative fuel gauge procedures; I went to consult with the captain. (As a side note; I am inoperative gauge qualified for air carrier Y on the MD88; MD90; B737-200/500/800; and B757-200.) the captain was aware of the inoperative gauge and I informed him that I was unfamiliar with inoperative gauge refueling procedures for air carrier X however I had received training from air carrier Y on the MD80 series aircraft and realized that their procedures were different. The captain informed me that all I had to do was to fuel the aircraft and once I was finished that he would have to watch me 'stick' the tank. I asked if he would require pitch and roll readings or arrival fuel stick values; to which he replied no. I said that I would knock on the side of the cockpit when finished so that he could observe the stick. I opened the fuel panel and discovered that the gauge was working but had no placard. I wrote down the arrival fuel on the slip and decided to stick the tank just in case and wrote down the stick reading. I refueled the aircraft to its requested fuel load of approximately 28000 pounds. Just as I finished the first officer and an FAA safety inspector appeared and looked at the stick. At some point after this I saw the first officer and the inspector near the nosewheel and the first officer appeared to be attempting to open the nosewheel door. I asked him if he needed pitch and roll data and offered to open the doors for him as he was in uniform. After opening the doors I looked up and discovered that the plumb bob which is installed in the aircraft was missing. I told him that I could get one and would return shortly. After obtaining the plumb bob I returned to the aircraft and obtained the pitch and roll data; which I gave to the first officer who was standing by the right wing. I attempted to stow the stick however the lock ring was bent and I could not get the stick to lock. One of my co-workers pulled up and tried as well. I informed the first officer and he said 'well; have to go get maintenance' and walked off; and the captain walked up and tried to stow the stick and was successful. I finished the paperwork and turned it in to the gate. The jetbridge was pulled back and the aircraft was pushed back. I noticed that the nosewheel doors were still open and started to close them however the aircraft was on the push and both the captain and first officer had seen them and walked past them multiple times; and had never closed them nor requested that I close them. After thinking about it I assumed that the crew realized that they were open and that they would close upon retraction of the nose gear. I had 2 erj's to fuel; so I fueled them. I went to turn in the paperwork for the rj's when the gate agent informed me that aircraft X is circling because their nosewheel won't come up. Shortly thereafter; the aircraft landed uneventfully and returned to the gate; nosewheel doors open. After talking to the mechanic; he told me that once the doors are released they have to be manually closed or they won't retract. After talking to the captain he told me that there was no annunciator for the open doors and that the only way he knew about it was from vibrations. The aircraft was inspected and refueled; however departed 4 hours after scheduled time. The key points that I learned: first; air carrier X needs to develop a standardized procedure for inoperative gauges. If a standard procedure was in place; this would have been a non issue. Second; whenever there are multiple people involved with a flight; there has to be clear communication to establish what needs to be done. As a pilot I know how hard it is to handle passenger; flight planning; WX; schedules; having the aircraft svced; and actually flying the aircraft by myself; and how much easier everything is with a helping hand; but poor communication to misunderstandings can make things much worse. Third; the PIC is the final authority/authorized; and no matter how qualified your assistance is; the PIC is responsible for everything. Fourth; assume nothing. Don't assume that the other pilot checked the WX; don't assume that the lineman replaced your fuel caps and removed the tow bar; don't assume your passenger knows how to work the seat belt. Fifth; don't get distraction. Having a safety inspector looking over your shoulder is definitely a distraction. Regardless; it is important to stay focused. Regardless of the fact that the whole ordeal turned out as just a big nuisance; it was a valuable learning experience for me; both as a fueler and pilot; and in talking to the first officer a learning experience for him as well; even though he has many hours and yrs of experience.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CONTRACT FUELER RPTS CONFUSION AND DIFFICULTY WHEN FUELING SEVERAL CARRIERS WITH DIFFERENT PROCS FOR INOP FUEL QUANTITY INDICATORS.

Narrative: I WORK FOR A FUEL CONTRACTOR THAT PROVIDES ACFT REFUELING FOR ACR X. I STARTED MY SHIFT AT XA00 AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR FUELING ALL TURNAROUND FLTS FROM XB00 ON. MY FIRST FLT ARRIVED AT APPROX XB00. I ARRIVED AT THE ACFT AROUND XB15 AND WENT INTO THE TERMINAL TO RETRIEVE MY FUEL SLIP. I NOTICED THAT THERE WERE 2 COPIES INSTEAD OF THE NORMAL SINGLE COPY. I READ BOTH AND DISCOVERED THAT THE FUEL GAUGE FOR THE R MAIN TANK WAS INOP. SINCE ACR X DOES NOT TRAIN THEIR FUELERS ON INOP FUEL GAUGE PROCS; I WENT TO CONSULT WITH THE CAPT. (AS A SIDE NOTE; I AM INOP GAUGE QUALIFIED FOR ACR Y ON THE MD88; MD90; B737-200/500/800; AND B757-200.) THE CAPT WAS AWARE OF THE INOP GAUGE AND I INFORMED HIM THAT I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH INOP GAUGE REFUELING PROCS FOR ACR X HOWEVER I HAD RECEIVED TRAINING FROM ACR Y ON THE MD80 SERIES ACFT AND REALIZED THAT THEIR PROCS WERE DIFFERENT. THE CAPT INFORMED ME THAT ALL I HAD TO DO WAS TO FUEL THE ACFT AND ONCE I WAS FINISHED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO WATCH ME 'STICK' THE TANK. I ASKED IF HE WOULD REQUIRE PITCH AND ROLL READINGS OR ARR FUEL STICK VALUES; TO WHICH HE REPLIED NO. I SAID THAT I WOULD KNOCK ON THE SIDE OF THE COCKPIT WHEN FINISHED SO THAT HE COULD OBSERVE THE STICK. I OPENED THE FUEL PANEL AND DISCOVERED THAT THE GAUGE WAS WORKING BUT HAD NO PLACARD. I WROTE DOWN THE ARR FUEL ON THE SLIP AND DECIDED TO STICK THE TANK JUST IN CASE AND WROTE DOWN THE STICK READING. I REFUELED THE ACFT TO ITS REQUESTED FUEL LOAD OF APPROX 28000 LBS. JUST AS I FINISHED THE FO AND AN FAA SAFETY INSPECTOR APPEARED AND LOOKED AT THE STICK. AT SOME POINT AFTER THIS I SAW THE FO AND THE INSPECTOR NEAR THE NOSEWHEEL AND THE FO APPEARED TO BE ATTEMPTING TO OPEN THE NOSEWHEEL DOOR. I ASKED HIM IF HE NEEDED PITCH AND ROLL DATA AND OFFERED TO OPEN THE DOORS FOR HIM AS HE WAS IN UNIFORM. AFTER OPENING THE DOORS I LOOKED UP AND DISCOVERED THAT THE PLUMB BOB WHICH IS INSTALLED IN THE ACFT WAS MISSING. I TOLD HIM THAT I COULD GET ONE AND WOULD RETURN SHORTLY. AFTER OBTAINING THE PLUMB BOB I RETURNED TO THE ACFT AND OBTAINED THE PITCH AND ROLL DATA; WHICH I GAVE TO THE FO WHO WAS STANDING BY THE R WING. I ATTEMPTED TO STOW THE STICK HOWEVER THE LOCK RING WAS BENT AND I COULD NOT GET THE STICK TO LOCK. ONE OF MY CO-WORKERS PULLED UP AND TRIED AS WELL. I INFORMED THE FO AND HE SAID 'WELL; HAVE TO GO GET MAINT' AND WALKED OFF; AND THE CAPT WALKED UP AND TRIED TO STOW THE STICK AND WAS SUCCESSFUL. I FINISHED THE PAPERWORK AND TURNED IT IN TO THE GATE. THE JETBRIDGE WAS PULLED BACK AND THE ACFT WAS PUSHED BACK. I NOTICED THAT THE NOSEWHEEL DOORS WERE STILL OPEN AND STARTED TO CLOSE THEM HOWEVER THE ACFT WAS ON THE PUSH AND BOTH THE CAPT AND FO HAD SEEN THEM AND WALKED PAST THEM MULTIPLE TIMES; AND HAD NEVER CLOSED THEM NOR REQUESTED THAT I CLOSE THEM. AFTER THINKING ABOUT IT I ASSUMED THAT THE CREW REALIZED THAT THEY WERE OPEN AND THAT THEY WOULD CLOSE UPON RETRACTION OF THE NOSE GEAR. I HAD 2 ERJ'S TO FUEL; SO I FUELED THEM. I WENT TO TURN IN THE PAPERWORK FOR THE RJ'S WHEN THE GATE AGENT INFORMED ME THAT ACFT X IS CIRCLING BECAUSE THEIR NOSEWHEEL WON'T COME UP. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; THE ACFT LANDED UNEVENTFULLY AND RETURNED TO THE GATE; NOSEWHEEL DOORS OPEN. AFTER TALKING TO THE MECH; HE TOLD ME THAT ONCE THE DOORS ARE RELEASED THEY HAVE TO BE MANUALLY CLOSED OR THEY WON'T RETRACT. AFTER TALKING TO THE CAPT HE TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS NO ANNUNCIATOR FOR THE OPEN DOORS AND THAT THE ONLY WAY HE KNEW ABOUT IT WAS FROM VIBRATIONS. THE ACFT WAS INSPECTED AND REFUELED; HOWEVER DEPARTED 4 HRS AFTER SCHEDULED TIME. THE KEY POINTS THAT I LEARNED: FIRST; ACR X NEEDS TO DEVELOP A STANDARDIZED PROC FOR INOP GAUGES. IF A STANDARD PROC WAS IN PLACE; THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A NON ISSUE. SECOND; WHENEVER THERE ARE MULTIPLE PEOPLE INVOLVED WITH A FLT; THERE HAS TO BE CLR COM TO ESTABLISH WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE. AS A PLT I KNOW HOW HARD IT IS TO HANDLE PAX; FLT PLANNING; WX; SCHEDULES; HAVING THE ACFT SVCED; AND ACTUALLY FLYING THE ACFT BY MYSELF; AND HOW MUCH EASIER EVERYTHING IS WITH A HELPING HAND; BUT POOR COM TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS CAN MAKE THINGS MUCH WORSE. THIRD; THE PIC IS THE FINAL AUTH; AND NO MATTER HOW QUALIFIED YOUR ASSISTANCE IS; THE PIC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR EVERYTHING. FOURTH; ASSUME NOTHING. DON'T ASSUME THAT THE OTHER PLT CHKED THE WX; DON'T ASSUME THAT THE LINEMAN REPLACED YOUR FUEL CAPS AND REMOVED THE TOW BAR; DON'T ASSUME YOUR PAX KNOWS HOW TO WORK THE SEAT BELT. FIFTH; DON'T GET DISTR. HAVING A SAFETY INSPECTOR LOOKING OVER YOUR SHOULDER IS DEFINITELY A DISTR. REGARDLESS; IT IS IMPORTANT TO STAY FOCUSED. REGARDLESS OF THE FACT THAT THE WHOLE ORDEAL TURNED OUT AS JUST A BIG NUISANCE; IT WAS A VALUABLE LEARNING EXPERIENCE FOR ME; BOTH AS A FUELER AND PLT; AND IN TALKING TO THE FO A LEARNING EXPERIENCE FOR HIM AS WELL; EVEN THOUGH HE HAS MANY HRS AND YRS OF EXPERIENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.