Narrative:

We were #2 on final runway 3L behind a B757 about 20-25 NM out. They opened the right runway (runway 3R) with full ILS and offered it to everybody lined up on runway 3L. The B757 in front of us declined, so we accepted the ILS to runway 3R. Approach gave us a vector to intercept and gave us the ILS frequency. We dialed the frequency in (no DME) and turned to intercept. We were then given a descent to 3000 ft and were cleared for the approach. We were both in the process of getting the proper approach plate out so we could quickly review the proper frequency/identify, altitudes and minimums, touchdown zone, elevation, etc. Also, the first officer was flying the airplane (his leg). But we were advised that braking action was poor so the captain had to make the landing since the first officer had less than 100 hours in the aircraft. Therefore, we were also deconfiguring the autoplt so the captain could shoot the approach/land. Needless to say, we were as busy as a 1 armed paper hangar and did not have time to adequately review the approach plate. The ILS to runway 34 is an unusual approach in that the DME is centered 1/2 way along the approach (ie, DME gets smaller, then bigger -- not a distance from the field). Since we had been cleared to 3000 ft and cleared for the approach, I was looking at the GS intercept point (huron) at 4 DME. Approaching 4 DME, the GS was still pegged at the top of the display, so I assumed it didn't work either, so I told the first officer we would fly localizer only minimums and I began a descent from 3000 ft. We quickly got a visual on the ground and the visibility was about 3 mi. I continued visually down to localizer minimum of 1000 ft and continued to fly the localizer course. Tower called to alert us that they had a low altitude alert on us. I said we didn't get the GS so we had descended on the localizer and were continuing. Something did not seem right to me and I continued to check the approach plate, frequencys, etc. I finally realized the situation with the DME (we had descended on the wrong side of the VOR). We continued in visually on the localizer and landed safety and taxied to the gate. I'd like to add that had we not gotten visual contact with the ground while descending on the localizer, we would have executed a missed approach -- again, because something did not seem right to me about that approach. Basically, what we ended up flying was a contact approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FLC DSNDS ABOUT 10 MI TOO EARLY ON AN ASSUMED LOC APCH FROM THEIR INITIAL APCH ALT WHEN THE PIC MISREADS THE CRL DME. FLT STARTED DOWN FROM 2367 FT AGL AT 20 MI OUT, REACHING 367 FT AGL AT 7 MI FROM RWY 3R AT DTW, MI.

Narrative: WE WERE #2 ON FINAL RWY 3L BEHIND A B757 ABOUT 20-25 NM OUT. THEY OPENED THE R RWY (RWY 3R) WITH FULL ILS AND OFFERED IT TO EVERYBODY LINED UP ON RWY 3L. THE B757 IN FRONT OF US DECLINED, SO WE ACCEPTED THE ILS TO RWY 3R. APCH GAVE US A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT AND GAVE US THE ILS FREQ. WE DIALED THE FREQ IN (NO DME) AND TURNED TO INTERCEPT. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A DSCNT TO 3000 FT AND WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. WE WERE BOTH IN THE PROCESS OF GETTING THE PROPER APCH PLATE OUT SO WE COULD QUICKLY REVIEW THE PROPER FREQ/IDENT, ALTS AND MINIMUMS, TOUCHDOWN ZONE, ELEVATION, ETC. ALSO, THE FO WAS FLYING THE AIRPLANE (HIS LEG). BUT WE WERE ADVISED THAT BRAKING ACTION WAS POOR SO THE CAPT HAD TO MAKE THE LNDG SINCE THE FO HAD LESS THAN 100 HRS IN THE ACFT. THEREFORE, WE WERE ALSO DECONFIGURING THE AUTOPLT SO THE CAPT COULD SHOOT THE APCH/LAND. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE WERE AS BUSY AS A 1 ARMED PAPER HANGAR AND DID NOT HAVE TIME TO ADEQUATELY REVIEW THE APCH PLATE. THE ILS TO RWY 34 IS AN UNUSUAL APCH IN THAT THE DME IS CTRED 1/2 WAY ALONG THE APCH (IE, DME GETS SMALLER, THEN BIGGER -- NOT A DISTANCE FROM THE FIELD). SINCE WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO 3000 FT AND CLRED FOR THE APCH, I WAS LOOKING AT THE GS INTERCEPT POINT (HURON) AT 4 DME. APCHING 4 DME, THE GS WAS STILL PEGGED AT THE TOP OF THE DISPLAY, SO I ASSUMED IT DIDN'T WORK EITHER, SO I TOLD THE FO WE WOULD FLY LOC ONLY MINIMUMS AND I BEGAN A DSCNT FROM 3000 FT. WE QUICKLY GOT A VISUAL ON THE GND AND THE VISIBILITY WAS ABOUT 3 MI. I CONTINUED VISUALLY DOWN TO LOC MINIMUM OF 1000 FT AND CONTINUED TO FLY THE LOC COURSE. TWR CALLED TO ALERT US THAT THEY HAD A LOW ALT ALERT ON US. I SAID WE DIDN'T GET THE GS SO WE HAD DSNDED ON THE LOC AND WERE CONTINUING. SOMETHING DID NOT SEEM RIGHT TO ME AND I CONTINUED TO CHK THE APCH PLATE, FREQS, ETC. I FINALLY REALIZED THE SIT WITH THE DME (WE HAD DSNDED ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE VOR). WE CONTINUED IN VISUALLY ON THE LOC AND LANDED SAFETY AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. I'D LIKE TO ADD THAT HAD WE NOT GOTTEN VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE GND WHILE DSNDING ON THE LOC, WE WOULD HAVE EXECUTED A MISSED APCH -- AGAIN, BECAUSE SOMETHING DID NOT SEEM RIGHT TO ME ABOUT THAT APCH. BASICALLY, WHAT WE ENDED UP FLYING WAS A CONTACT APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.