Narrative:

I was receiving a flight orientation by a qualified flight instructor. We were using a turbocharged C206. I had done the preflight and had measured 20 gallons of fuel in 1 tank and 16 gallons of fuel in the other. I switched the selector to the fullest tank. During the flight, I was in the left seat and instructor was in the right seat. My 2 young children were passenger. Instructor and I were both using headsets but could only speak to each other by using the interpos on the audio selector panel. Otherwise we could both hear my xmissions and outside xmissions on whatever frequency we had tuned. Instructor did not have a push-to-talk switch. We had done some stalls and slow flight in a training area north of ryan field en route to pinal airpark where we had done several touch-and-go lndgs. We had returned directly to the ryan field traffic pattern and had done 1 l-hand pattern on runway 6R. At the time only runway 6R was open as there was heavy equipment removing macadam on runway 15/33, which included the runway 6L landing area. On right downwind abeam the runway numbers for ryan runway 6R, I reduced power for the descent to landing. Instructor was looking towards final approach clearing for airplanes sequenced for landing in front of us. I noticed the aircraft begin to lose power. As instructor looked back into the cockpit, I motioned to him that the engine had lost power. Instructor removed his headset to listen to the engine and looked at the engine instruments. We observed nothing abnormal, but got no response when I moved the throttle slightly. I motioned to instructor to take the controls, being the more experienced pilot. The propeller continued turning throughout the approach. Instructor assumed control of the airplane, and asked me to declare an emergency. Instructor switched the fuel selector from left tank to right tank position as he turned the airplane toward the airport. Instructor motioned toward the electric fuel boost pump switches that were out of his reach. I was distraction due to talking with tower and I did not pick up on his gestures. We were descending rapidly and instructor felt the airplane would not reach the runway. He angled his turn to align with taxiway B, which ran south of, but parallel to, runway 6R. Fortunately no aircraft were moving on the txwys along our flight path. I had configured the aircraft with 10 degrees of flap extension before instructor assumed control and he selected full flaps just before the flare. The airplane dropped dramatically with full flaps and bounced about 3 ft into the air. A more normal touchdown completed the landing just prior to the intersection of taxiway B with taxiway 2. On landing rollout, instructor asked me to activate the electric fuel boost pump and the engine immediately started. We taxied back to the hangar under our own power. The airplane was not damaged and no one was hurt. My children were riding along. Pointing out points of interest to them on the way back to the field had distraction us from doing an approach-to-the-field check, which includes switching tanks. During the preflight, I had been interrupted 3 times with phone calls and questions by a person doing maintenance on another plane. Mentally I was dealing with many things that distraction me from concentrating on flying. During the flight I had not performed as well as previous orientation flts, and I commented to the instructor that I was 'just not up to speed and probably shouldn't be flying today.' I was flying ok, but seemed to be behind the airplane at times. We did not brief on any emergency procedures during the preflight briefing. We did review the flight itinerary and wrote a card with airport information for the fields we intended to use. During the flight, instructor had emphasized doing the gumps check, a series of before landing checks, for each pattern and stressed doing what one was saying. Even though I acknowledged a fuel check on each approach, I did not follow through with the switching to the fullest tank in the air. Using headsets without an intercom led to some confusion in the cockpit and poor communication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PWR LOSS ON FINAL DUE FUEL PUMP NOT BEING ON LEADS TO AN EMER TXWY LNDG AT RYN FOR INSTRUCTOR INSTRUCTING INSTRUCTOR.

Narrative: I WAS RECEIVING A FLT ORIENTATION BY A QUALIFIED FLT INSTRUCTOR. WE WERE USING A TURBOCHARGED C206. I HAD DONE THE PREFLT AND HAD MEASURED 20 GALLONS OF FUEL IN 1 TANK AND 16 GALLONS OF FUEL IN THE OTHER. I SWITCHED THE SELECTOR TO THE FULLEST TANK. DURING THE FLT, I WAS IN THE L SEAT AND INSTRUCTOR WAS IN THE R SEAT. MY 2 YOUNG CHILDREN WERE PAX. INSTRUCTOR AND I WERE BOTH USING HEADSETS BUT COULD ONLY SPEAK TO EACH OTHER BY USING THE INTERPOS ON THE AUDIO SELECTOR PANEL. OTHERWISE WE COULD BOTH HEAR MY XMISSIONS AND OUTSIDE XMISSIONS ON WHATEVER FREQ WE HAD TUNED. INSTRUCTOR DID NOT HAVE A PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH. WE HAD DONE SOME STALLS AND SLOW FLT IN A TRAINING AREA N OF RYAN FIELD ENRTE TO PINAL AIRPARK WHERE WE HAD DONE SEVERAL TOUCH-AND-GO LNDGS. WE HAD RETURNED DIRECTLY TO THE RYAN FIELD TFC PATTERN AND HAD DONE 1 L-HAND PATTERN ON RWY 6R. AT THE TIME ONLY RWY 6R WAS OPEN AS THERE WAS HVY EQUIP REMOVING MACADAM ON RWY 15/33, WHICH INCLUDED THE RWY 6L LNDG AREA. ON R DOWNWIND ABEAM THE RWY NUMBERS FOR RYAN RWY 6R, I REDUCED PWR FOR THE DSCNT TO LNDG. INSTRUCTOR WAS LOOKING TOWARDS FINAL APCH CLRING FOR AIRPLANES SEQUENCED FOR LNDG IN FRONT OF US. I NOTICED THE ACFT BEGIN TO LOSE PWR. AS INSTRUCTOR LOOKED BACK INTO THE COCKPIT, I MOTIONED TO HIM THAT THE ENG HAD LOST PWR. INSTRUCTOR REMOVED HIS HEADSET TO LISTEN TO THE ENG AND LOOKED AT THE ENG INSTS. WE OBSERVED NOTHING ABNORMAL, BUT GOT NO RESPONSE WHEN I MOVED THE THROTTLE SLIGHTLY. I MOTIONED TO INSTRUCTOR TO TAKE THE CTLS, BEING THE MORE EXPERIENCED PLT. THE PROP CONTINUED TURNING THROUGHOUT THE APCH. INSTRUCTOR ASSUMED CTL OF THE AIRPLANE, AND ASKED ME TO DECLARE AN EMER. INSTRUCTOR SWITCHED THE FUEL SELECTOR FROM L TANK TO R TANK POS AS HE TURNED THE AIRPLANE TOWARD THE ARPT. INSTRUCTOR MOTIONED TOWARD THE ELECTRIC FUEL BOOST PUMP SWITCHES THAT WERE OUT OF HIS REACH. I WAS DISTR DUE TO TALKING WITH TWR AND I DID NOT PICK UP ON HIS GESTURES. WE WERE DSNDING RAPIDLY AND INSTRUCTOR FELT THE AIRPLANE WOULD NOT REACH THE RWY. HE ANGLED HIS TURN TO ALIGN WITH TXWY B, WHICH RAN S OF, BUT PARALLEL TO, RWY 6R. FORTUNATELY NO ACFT WERE MOVING ON THE TXWYS ALONG OUR FLT PATH. I HAD CONFIGURED THE ACFT WITH 10 DEGS OF FLAP EXTENSION BEFORE INSTRUCTOR ASSUMED CTL AND HE SELECTED FULL FLAPS JUST BEFORE THE FLARE. THE AIRPLANE DROPPED DRAMATICALLY WITH FULL FLAPS AND BOUNCED ABOUT 3 FT INTO THE AIR. A MORE NORMAL TOUCHDOWN COMPLETED THE LNDG JUST PRIOR TO THE INTXN OF TXWY B WITH TXWY 2. ON LNDG ROLLOUT, INSTRUCTOR ASKED ME TO ACTIVATE THE ELECTRIC FUEL BOOST PUMP AND THE ENG IMMEDIATELY STARTED. WE TAXIED BACK TO THE HANGAR UNDER OUR OWN PWR. THE AIRPLANE WAS NOT DAMAGED AND NO ONE WAS HURT. MY CHILDREN WERE RIDING ALONG. POINTING OUT POINTS OF INTEREST TO THEM ON THE WAY BACK TO THE FIELD HAD DISTR US FROM DOING AN APCH-TO-THE-FIELD CHK, WHICH INCLUDES SWITCHING TANKS. DURING THE PREFLT, I HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED 3 TIMES WITH PHONE CALLS AND QUESTIONS BY A PERSON DOING MAINT ON ANOTHER PLANE. MENTALLY I WAS DEALING WITH MANY THINGS THAT DISTR ME FROM CONCENTRATING ON FLYING. DURING THE FLT I HAD NOT PERFORMED AS WELL AS PREVIOUS ORIENTATION FLTS, AND I COMMENTED TO THE INSTRUCTOR THAT I WAS 'JUST NOT UP TO SPD AND PROBABLY SHOULDN'T BE FLYING TODAY.' I WAS FLYING OK, BUT SEEMED TO BE BEHIND THE AIRPLANE AT TIMES. WE DID NOT BRIEF ON ANY EMER PROCS DURING THE PREFLT BRIEFING. WE DID REVIEW THE FLT ITINERARY AND WROTE A CARD WITH ARPT INFO FOR THE FIELDS WE INTENDED TO USE. DURING THE FLT, INSTRUCTOR HAD EMPHASIZED DOING THE GUMPS CHK, A SERIES OF BEFORE LNDG CHKS, FOR EACH PATTERN AND STRESSED DOING WHAT ONE WAS SAYING. EVEN THOUGH I ACKNOWLEDGED A FUEL CHK ON EACH APCH, I DID NOT FOLLOW THROUGH WITH THE SWITCHING TO THE FULLEST TANK IN THE AIR. USING HEADSETS WITHOUT AN INTERCOM LED TO SOME CONFUSION IN THE COCKPIT AND POOR COM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.