Narrative:

The situation started at top of descent when the flight engineer passed up the landing data card for approach into slc. The WX was near CAT I minimums and runway 34L was closed according to the ATIS. Crew discussed briefing CAT I versus CAT ii approach, and elected CAT I to be flown by first officer (myself -- new to the first officer position, 213 hours total time as first officer). Captain elected not to brief a CAT ii as CAT ii signal protection is not provided at current WX conditions. Coupled ILS to runway 34R slc (as runway 34L closed according to ATIS) briefed prior to top of descent. I mentioned that WX was deteriorating from our WX briefs received prior to takeoff, and that we might need to do a CAT ii if subsequent WX reports dictated. Crew reviewed CAT ii equipment requirements and procedures. Initial descent was normal, and when we initially contacted slc approach, I was sure, beyond a doubt in my mind, that approach said 'plan the ILS runway 34R, RVR 2600/2800/2600.' I vividly remember this as I was a bit relieved that the WX was holding and we wouldn't have to rebrief a CAT ii. Descent was given out of 11000 ft for 8000 ft, and I disconnected the autoplt so a smoother, increased rate of descent could be made, as it was apparent that we were #1 for the field. I then remember a base turn to the east, descent to 7000 ft. Shortly thereafter, we were turned to an intercept heading right at the marker, and cleared approach. I was very busy at this point, trying to level off at 7000 ft with a block iv autoplt (no automatic altitude capture capability), and couple the autoplt for the approach. I believed we were cleared for an ILS to runway 34R, but due to the heavy workload at this point in the approach, I concede the possibility that I misheard the correct runway in the clearance. If so, the entire crew missed it as well. As far as we knew, runway 34L was closed. Our minds were closed to the possibility of an approach to runway 34L. Final approach monitor then called, showing us right of course, when the captain replied he showed us on the localizer runway 34R. Controller then stated that the approach clearance had been for runway 34L, but to continue runway 34R approach and contact the east tower. Rest of approach and landing were normal. After landing, captain contacted approach control via telephone. Approach confirmed clearance was for runway 34L, and that 2 subsequent ATIS broadcasts to the one we had received showed runway 34L as open. We received no updates after checking on slc approach frequency with the original ATIS. Contributing factors: ATIS showing runway 34L closed -- updates not broadcast during approach. 'Short' approach final intercept heading to marker, above GS. High crew workload intercepting the localizer. Crew inattn to approach clearance. WX near CAT I minimums -- crew more focused on type of approach than on specific approach clearance (runway). Block iv autoplt (no altitude capture capability) increased workload during localizer intercept. Relative inexperience of PF (first officer). Crew heard what they expected to hear during approach clearance. Preventing a recurrence: fight tendency to 'hear' what you expect to hear. Actively seek ATIS updates. Refused a short approach in similar WX conditions -- especially with block iv autoplt. Repeat approach clearance back verbatim with emphasis on runway. Fight tendency to become fixated on any aspect of the approach (WX versus runway).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 CREW FLEW APCH TO THE WRONG RWY.

Narrative: THE SIT STARTED AT TOP OF DSCNT WHEN THE FE PASSED UP THE LNDG DATA CARD FOR APCH INTO SLC. THE WX WAS NEAR CAT I MINIMUMS AND RWY 34L WAS CLOSED ACCORDING TO THE ATIS. CREW DISCUSSED BRIEFING CAT I VERSUS CAT II APCH, AND ELECTED CAT I TO BE FLOWN BY FO (MYSELF -- NEW TO THE FO POS, 213 HRS TOTAL TIME AS FO). CAPT ELECTED NOT TO BRIEF A CAT II AS CAT II SIGNAL PROTECTION IS NOT PROVIDED AT CURRENT WX CONDITIONS. COUPLED ILS TO RWY 34R SLC (AS RWY 34L CLOSED ACCORDING TO ATIS) BRIEFED PRIOR TO TOP OF DSCNT. I MENTIONED THAT WX WAS DETERIORATING FROM OUR WX BRIEFS RECEIVED PRIOR TO TKOF, AND THAT WE MIGHT NEED TO DO A CAT II IF SUBSEQUENT WX RPTS DICTATED. CREW REVIEWED CAT II EQUIP REQUIREMENTS AND PROCS. INITIAL DSCNT WAS NORMAL, AND WHEN WE INITIALLY CONTACTED SLC APCH, I WAS SURE, BEYOND A DOUBT IN MY MIND, THAT APCH SAID 'PLAN THE ILS RWY 34R, RVR 2600/2800/2600.' I VIVIDLY REMEMBER THIS AS I WAS A BIT RELIEVED THAT THE WX WAS HOLDING AND WE WOULDN'T HAVE TO REBRIEF A CAT II. DSCNT WAS GIVEN OUT OF 11000 FT FOR 8000 FT, AND I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT SO A SMOOTHER, INCREASED RATE OF DSCNT COULD BE MADE, AS IT WAS APPARENT THAT WE WERE #1 FOR THE FIELD. I THEN REMEMBER A BASE TURN TO THE E, DSCNT TO 7000 FT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE WERE TURNED TO AN INTERCEPT HDG RIGHT AT THE MARKER, AND CLRED APCH. I WAS VERY BUSY AT THIS POINT, TRYING TO LEVEL OFF AT 7000 FT WITH A BLOCK IV AUTOPLT (NO AUTOMATIC ALT CAPTURE CAPABILITY), AND COUPLE THE AUTOPLT FOR THE APCH. I BELIEVED WE WERE CLRED FOR AN ILS TO RWY 34R, BUT DUE TO THE HVY WORKLOAD AT THIS POINT IN THE APCH, I CONCEDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT I MISHEARD THE CORRECT RWY IN THE CLRNC. IF SO, THE ENTIRE CREW MISSED IT AS WELL. AS FAR AS WE KNEW, RWY 34L WAS CLOSED. OUR MINDS WERE CLOSED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN APCH TO RWY 34L. FINAL APCH MONITOR THEN CALLED, SHOWING US R OF COURSE, WHEN THE CAPT REPLIED HE SHOWED US ON THE LOC RWY 34R. CTLR THEN STATED THAT THE APCH CLRNC HAD BEEN FOR RWY 34L, BUT TO CONTINUE RWY 34R APCH AND CONTACT THE E TWR. REST OF APCH AND LNDG WERE NORMAL. AFTER LNDG, CAPT CONTACTED APCH CTL VIA TELEPHONE. APCH CONFIRMED CLRNC WAS FOR RWY 34L, AND THAT 2 SUBSEQUENT ATIS BROADCASTS TO THE ONE WE HAD RECEIVED SHOWED RWY 34L AS OPEN. WE RECEIVED NO UPDATES AFTER CHKING ON SLC APCH FREQ WITH THE ORIGINAL ATIS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ATIS SHOWING RWY 34L CLOSED -- UPDATES NOT BROADCAST DURING APCH. 'SHORT' APCH FINAL INTERCEPT HDG TO MARKER, ABOVE GS. HIGH CREW WORKLOAD INTERCEPTING THE LOC. CREW INATTN TO APCH CLRNC. WX NEAR CAT I MINIMUMS -- CREW MORE FOCUSED ON TYPE OF APCH THAN ON SPECIFIC APCH CLRNC (RWY). BLOCK IV AUTOPLT (NO ALT CAPTURE CAPABILITY) INCREASED WORKLOAD DURING LOC INTERCEPT. RELATIVE INEXPERIENCE OF PF (FO). CREW HEARD WHAT THEY EXPECTED TO HEAR DURING APCH CLRNC. PREVENTING A RECURRENCE: FIGHT TENDENCY TO 'HEAR' WHAT YOU EXPECT TO HEAR. ACTIVELY SEEK ATIS UPDATES. REFUSED A SHORT APCH IN SIMILAR WX CONDITIONS -- ESPECIALLY WITH BLOCK IV AUTOPLT. REPEAT APCH CLRNC BACK VERBATIM WITH EMPHASIS ON RWY. FIGHT TENDENCY TO BECOME FIXATED ON ANY ASPECT OF THE APCH (WX VERSUS RWY).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.