Narrative:

This report is, sadly, a continuation of a report I filed exactly a week ago. There is simply nothing in this story worthy of NASA personnel's time to research. I am writing to, if things get real bad, to be able to salvage a career. Last week's report concerned myself and a captain violating an aircraft limitation. In the report I stated how the captain disregarded the limitation despite my objections and eventually overriding me and using his authority/authorized to do as he wished. Well in response to that issue I went to the union professional standards committee and presumably they spoke with him. I was paired with the same captain, less than 1 week later. I asked before the trip began if he had been contacted by professional standards. He said no, but he behaved unlike he had in the past. I suspected that he had been contacted. It was a tense trip, because of the situation, but we acted extremely professional and his performance was fine. On our last leg, however, all of this was about to change. On normal route for the leg iad direct day includes J149 from aml to sumet. About hacks intersection, we were cleared direct to day. We were issued a descent at pilot's discretion to 16000 ft from 22000 ft. We descended very slowly. At about 19500 ft, we were told to cross 35 mi east of dayton at 11000 ft. The captain told me to hold off on putting the waypoint in the FMS (VNAV) (it was not capable to VNAV) because he wanted to calculate it. I realized after a while that we were only about 15 mi from the waypoint. I plugged it in and noticed his descent rate would have us level at 11000 ft about over dayton. I said this to him (it's easy in the DO328 because, it draws a line on the FMS where you will reach the selected altitude if current speed/descent rate are maintained) and he said we were fine (about 500 FPM). Coming through 18000 ft we were still going to miss it by a lot and I told him again. He said we were fine. I then pointed at the leveloff predictor on the FMS. He again said we were fine. 3 mi from the waypoint we were at about 15000 ft. I again voiced my concern. By now he had the power levers at idle. Am told I made, in my estimation 5 remarks about it. We were handed off to dayton approach at this point. When I checked with dayton I made a mental note that we were about 0.7 mi from the waypoint at 12500 ft. I checked on out of 12000 ft for 11000 ft and we were then assigned direct zambo, down to 4000 ft. In my conservative estimation we missed the restr by 1100 ft. We completed the flight without incident. After cooling down, I approached the captain. This was the second time in 1 week he had disregarded me. I brought it up by saying 'I hope we don't hear about that crossing restr.' he said not to worry, he's the captain, it's on him. He followed it up with 'don't go crying to the company again either.' I reminded him that the union is the company. An argument ensued about what actually happened in the previous incident. At times he lied blatantly. Finally he went to the 'experience is knowledge,' and by saying 'I've flown with a lot of people and you're by far..., well, you just need to relax, you're too uptight.' (1100 ft, I remind you.) he did it all on purpose. He told me he knew I was nervous about the restr, so he thought he would just '*&^% with' me. A real professional. That's sad. From here forward, I will refuse to fly with this captain.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CONTINUING CONFLICT BTWN CREW MEMBERS RESULTS IN A XING RESTR NOT BEING MET ON APCH TO DAY, OH.

Narrative: THIS RPT IS, SADLY, A CONTINUATION OF A RPT I FILED EXACTLY A WK AGO. THERE IS SIMPLY NOTHING IN THIS STORY WORTHY OF NASA PERSONNEL'S TIME TO RESEARCH. I AM WRITING TO, IF THINGS GET REAL BAD, TO BE ABLE TO SALVAGE A CAREER. LAST WK'S RPT CONCERNED MYSELF AND A CAPT VIOLATING AN ACFT LIMITATION. IN THE RPT I STATED HOW THE CAPT DISREGARDED THE LIMITATION DESPITE MY OBJECTIONS AND EVENTUALLY OVERRIDING ME AND USING HIS AUTH TO DO AS HE WISHED. WELL IN RESPONSE TO THAT ISSUE I WENT TO THE UNION PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS COMMITTEE AND PRESUMABLY THEY SPOKE WITH HIM. I WAS PAIRED WITH THE SAME CAPT, LESS THAN 1 WK LATER. I ASKED BEFORE THE TRIP BEGAN IF HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. HE SAID NO, BUT HE BEHAVED UNLIKE HE HAD IN THE PAST. I SUSPECTED THAT HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED. IT WAS A TENSE TRIP, BECAUSE OF THE SIT, BUT WE ACTED EXTREMELY PROFESSIONAL AND HIS PERFORMANCE WAS FINE. ON OUR LAST LEG, HOWEVER, ALL OF THIS WAS ABOUT TO CHANGE. ON NORMAL RTE FOR THE LEG IAD DIRECT DAY INCLUDES J149 FROM AML TO SUMET. ABOUT HACKS INTXN, WE WERE CLRED DIRECT TO DAY. WE WERE ISSUED A DSCNT AT PLT'S DISCRETION TO 16000 FT FROM 22000 FT. WE DSNDED VERY SLOWLY. AT ABOUT 19500 FT, WE WERE TOLD TO CROSS 35 MI E OF DAYTON AT 11000 FT. THE CAPT TOLD ME TO HOLD OFF ON PUTTING THE WAYPOINT IN THE FMS (VNAV) (IT WAS NOT CAPABLE TO VNAV) BECAUSE HE WANTED TO CALCULATE IT. I REALIZED AFTER A WHILE THAT WE WERE ONLY ABOUT 15 MI FROM THE WAYPOINT. I PLUGGED IT IN AND NOTICED HIS DSCNT RATE WOULD HAVE US LEVEL AT 11000 FT ABOUT OVER DAYTON. I SAID THIS TO HIM (IT'S EASY IN THE DO328 BECAUSE, IT DRAWS A LINE ON THE FMS WHERE YOU WILL REACH THE SELECTED ALT IF CURRENT SPD/DSCNT RATE ARE MAINTAINED) AND HE SAID WE WERE FINE (ABOUT 500 FPM). COMING THROUGH 18000 FT WE WERE STILL GOING TO MISS IT BY A LOT AND I TOLD HIM AGAIN. HE SAID WE WERE FINE. I THEN POINTED AT THE LEVELOFF PREDICTOR ON THE FMS. HE AGAIN SAID WE WERE FINE. 3 MI FROM THE WAYPOINT WE WERE AT ABOUT 15000 FT. I AGAIN VOICED MY CONCERN. BY NOW HE HAD THE PWR LEVERS AT IDLE. AM TOLD I MADE, IN MY ESTIMATION 5 REMARKS ABOUT IT. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO DAYTON APCH AT THIS POINT. WHEN I CHKED WITH DAYTON I MADE A MENTAL NOTE THAT WE WERE ABOUT 0.7 MI FROM THE WAYPOINT AT 12500 FT. I CHKED ON OUT OF 12000 FT FOR 11000 FT AND WE WERE THEN ASSIGNED DIRECT ZAMBO, DOWN TO 4000 FT. IN MY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATION WE MISSED THE RESTR BY 1100 FT. WE COMPLETED THE FLT WITHOUT INCIDENT. AFTER COOLING DOWN, I APCHED THE CAPT. THIS WAS THE SECOND TIME IN 1 WK HE HAD DISREGARDED ME. I BROUGHT IT UP BY SAYING 'I HOPE WE DON'T HEAR ABOUT THAT XING RESTR.' HE SAID NOT TO WORRY, HE'S THE CAPT, IT'S ON HIM. HE FOLLOWED IT UP WITH 'DON'T GO CRYING TO THE COMPANY AGAIN EITHER.' I REMINDED HIM THAT THE UNION IS THE COMPANY. AN ARGUMENT ENSUED ABOUT WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED IN THE PREVIOUS INCIDENT. AT TIMES HE LIED BLATANTLY. FINALLY HE WENT TO THE 'EXPERIENCE IS KNOWLEDGE,' AND BY SAYING 'I'VE FLOWN WITH A LOT OF PEOPLE AND YOU'RE BY FAR..., WELL, YOU JUST NEED TO RELAX, YOU'RE TOO UPTIGHT.' (1100 FT, I REMIND YOU.) HE DID IT ALL ON PURPOSE. HE TOLD ME HE KNEW I WAS NERVOUS ABOUT THE RESTR, SO HE THOUGHT HE WOULD JUST '*&^% WITH' ME. A REAL PROFESSIONAL. THAT'S SAD. FROM HERE FORWARD, I WILL REFUSE TO FLY WITH THIS CAPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.