Narrative:

On approximately 2 1/2 mi final to runway 36L while executing a visual approach to runway 36L, stabilized at 170 KIAS on localizer and on glide path, our TCASII gave us a TA to our right at 1000 ft MSL. While looking for traffic, tower came up to point out traffic, a helicopter maneuvering over a highway. Within seconds of this, our TCASII gave us an RA commanding no more than a 200 FPM descent which I complied with. My first officer was the PNF, and he visually acquired, then lost traffic in the ground clutter. We never stated we had traffic in sight to dfw tower. My first officer visually reacquired traffic as we passed him, saw the helicopter turning steeply behind us. When I advised tower of the RA, they did not seem concerned. When I later spoke with the tower supervisor on land line, all the supervisor seemed to care about was telling why they could legally put this aircraft so close to ours. He did not at all seem concerned that our TCASII kept the 2 aircraft out of harms' way. When I became more insistent, he said he didn't like my attitude, and would simply send it to his quality assurance people. This attitude toward a safety, not personality issue, by dfw ATC personnel is nothing short of unconscionable. Safety should be #1. The tower supervisor said 'he had to accommodate many interests.' safety is not an 'accommodation,' it is the first priority. What would have happened this day if my TCASII had been inoperative? The 'see and avoid' when tower is aware of and positively controling aircraft on a published approach and allowing VFR helicopters to encroach the localizer and GS, regardless of flight conditions, is a practice which should not be allowed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SF340 PIC OBJECTS TO THE ATC PROCS USED BY DFW TWR CTLR WHICH ALLOWED A VFR HELI TO GET IN PROX OF THE APCH RTE TO RWY 36L AT DFW, TX.

Narrative: ON APPROX 2 1/2 MI FINAL TO RWY 36L WHILE EXECUTING A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 36L, STABILIZED AT 170 KIAS ON LOC AND ON GLIDE PATH, OUR TCASII GAVE US A TA TO OUR R AT 1000 FT MSL. WHILE LOOKING FOR TFC, TWR CAME UP TO POINT OUT TFC, A HELI MANEUVERING OVER A HWY. WITHIN SECONDS OF THIS, OUR TCASII GAVE US AN RA COMMANDING NO MORE THAN A 200 FPM DSCNT WHICH I COMPLIED WITH. MY FO WAS THE PNF, AND HE VISUALLY ACQUIRED, THEN LOST TFC IN THE GND CLUTTER. WE NEVER STATED WE HAD TFC IN SIGHT TO DFW TWR. MY FO VISUALLY REACQUIRED TFC AS WE PASSED HIM, SAW THE HELI TURNING STEEPLY BEHIND US. WHEN I ADVISED TWR OF THE RA, THEY DID NOT SEEM CONCERNED. WHEN I LATER SPOKE WITH THE TWR SUPVR ON LAND LINE, ALL THE SUPVR SEEMED TO CARE ABOUT WAS TELLING WHY THEY COULD LEGALLY PUT THIS ACFT SO CLOSE TO OURS. HE DID NOT AT ALL SEEM CONCERNED THAT OUR TCASII KEPT THE 2 ACFT OUT OF HARMS' WAY. WHEN I BECAME MORE INSISTENT, HE SAID HE DIDN'T LIKE MY ATTITUDE, AND WOULD SIMPLY SEND IT TO HIS QUALITY ASSURANCE PEOPLE. THIS ATTITUDE TOWARD A SAFETY, NOT PERSONALITY ISSUE, BY DFW ATC PERSONNEL IS NOTHING SHORT OF UNCONSCIONABLE. SAFETY SHOULD BE #1. THE TWR SUPVR SAID 'HE HAD TO ACCOMMODATE MANY INTERESTS.' SAFETY IS NOT AN 'ACCOMMODATION,' IT IS THE FIRST PRIORITY. WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED THIS DAY IF MY TCASII HAD BEEN INOP? THE 'SEE AND AVOID' WHEN TWR IS AWARE OF AND POSITIVELY CTLING ACFT ON A PUBLISHED APCH AND ALLOWING VFR HELIS TO ENCROACH THE LOC AND GS, REGARDLESS OF FLT CONDITIONS, IS A PRACTICE WHICH SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.