Narrative:

As I recall, the scenario to this situation was as follows: it was a clear and sunny afternoon at pit. We were vectored downwind on the south side of the airport for runway 32. I was flying the aircraft and the first officer was making the radio calls. We had a check captain riding the jump seat. The last vector to final was a 050 degree heading to follow an airbus on final. At this point I recall being assigned a speed of 170 KTS. We called the airbus in sight and were cleared 'to follow the airbus for a visual approach to runway 32.' with my experience this separation looked close and we used the TCASII display to try and stay about 3 mi in trail and no closer. After turning in behind the airbus and xchking for the GS, the first officer called out 2 1/2 mi on the TCASII. I started slowing down to increase the separation. I did not want to get closer than 3 mi as indicated on the TCASII display. At a speed of 155 KTS the controller asked us about our speed and the first officer told him our speed. He got all upset about traffic behind us. At this point my focus was on flying the airplane and trying to get to a 3 mi in trail spacing and stay on the glide path. Being less than 3 mi has a high probability of 'going around.' we continued the approach and landed without incident. After doing some research, I am confident we were operating according to the rules and guidelines not only set down from published FAA regulations and manuals but also within the established guidelines and directives set forth by company operating procedures. Once I received a visual approach clearance to follow another aircraft to landing, it is my responsibility to maintain a safe distance and adjust my speed accordingly. Along with these thoughts are a number of articles issued by company on the virtues of a stabilized approach. Flying too fast on final and then not being able to slow down for a stable approach is against this company policy. My intent was to comply with the last assigned clearance and avoid an unstabilized approach. Getting closer than 3 mi and trying to maintain 170 KTS would have not achieved this intent.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 CAPT CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO FOLLOW AN AIRBUS AND SLOWS WITHOUT ADVISING THE CTLR TO MAINTAIN A 3 MI SPACING.

Narrative: AS I RECALL, THE SCENARIO TO THIS SIT WAS AS FOLLOWS: IT WAS A CLR AND SUNNY AFTERNOON AT PIT. WE WERE VECTORED DOWNWIND ON THE S SIDE OF THE ARPT FOR RWY 32. I WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND THE FO WAS MAKING THE RADIO CALLS. WE HAD A CHK CAPT RIDING THE JUMP SEAT. THE LAST VECTOR TO FINAL WAS A 050 DEG HDG TO FOLLOW AN AIRBUS ON FINAL. AT THIS POINT I RECALL BEING ASSIGNED A SPD OF 170 KTS. WE CALLED THE AIRBUS IN SIGHT AND WERE CLRED 'TO FOLLOW THE AIRBUS FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 32.' WITH MY EXPERIENCE THIS SEPARATION LOOKED CLOSE AND WE USED THE TCASII DISPLAY TO TRY AND STAY ABOUT 3 MI IN TRAIL AND NO CLOSER. AFTER TURNING IN BEHIND THE AIRBUS AND XCHKING FOR THE GS, THE FO CALLED OUT 2 1/2 MI ON THE TCASII. I STARTED SLOWING DOWN TO INCREASE THE SEPARATION. I DID NOT WANT TO GET CLOSER THAN 3 MI AS INDICATED ON THE TCASII DISPLAY. AT A SPD OF 155 KTS THE CTLR ASKED US ABOUT OUR SPD AND THE FO TOLD HIM OUR SPD. HE GOT ALL UPSET ABOUT TFC BEHIND US. AT THIS POINT MY FOCUS WAS ON FLYING THE AIRPLANE AND TRYING TO GET TO A 3 MI IN TRAIL SPACING AND STAY ON THE GLIDE PATH. BEING LESS THAN 3 MI HAS A HIGH PROBABILITY OF 'GOING AROUND.' WE CONTINUED THE APCH AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. AFTER DOING SOME RESEARCH, I AM CONFIDENT WE WERE OPERATING ACCORDING TO THE RULES AND GUIDELINES NOT ONLY SET DOWN FROM PUBLISHED FAA REGS AND MANUALS BUT ALSO WITHIN THE ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES AND DIRECTIVES SET FORTH BY COMPANY OPERATING PROCS. ONCE I RECEIVED A VISUAL APCH CLRNC TO FOLLOW ANOTHER ACFT TO LNDG, IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN A SAFE DISTANCE AND ADJUST MY SPD ACCORDINGLY. ALONG WITH THESE THOUGHTS ARE A NUMBER OF ARTICLES ISSUED BY COMPANY ON THE VIRTUES OF A STABILIZED APCH. FLYING TOO FAST ON FINAL AND THEN NOT BEING ABLE TO SLOW DOWN FOR A STABLE APCH IS AGAINST THIS COMPANY POLICY. MY INTENT WAS TO COMPLY WITH THE LAST ASSIGNED CLRNC AND AVOID AN UNSTABILIZED APCH. GETTING CLOSER THAN 3 MI AND TRYING TO MAINTAIN 170 KTS WOULD HAVE NOT ACHIEVED THIS INTENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.