Narrative:

On dec/xa/99, I was working an 'a' check with 2 other aircraft mechanics. During the check, I discovered that 1 tire of the aircraft was questionable on wear limits and probably needed replacing. When one of the other mechanics arrived, he confirmed that it needed to be replaced. I had only been activity working on the line for about 1 month, after my orientation training, and therefore felt I should ask more experienced mechanics for their opinion. The 2 more experienced mechanics changed the tire while I continued with the assigned maintenance I had been working on that evening. When we completed all the work and went into the office to complete our paperwork, one of the mechanics that had performed the work was not available (I don't know specifically where he was or why). When the tire change was recorded in the non routine items of the 'a' check, the mechanic that changed the tire signed the tire change completion. Since the second mechanic that worked on the tire was not present, the crew chief told me that I could sign the confirmation. I challenged him and stated that I wasn't qualified to sign a confirmation and he said, 'anyone can sign the confirmation.' I felt that being I was told to sign it by my crew chief that I would be jeopardizing my job by challenging his authority/authorized, particularly during my probation period. In the months since this incident, I have learned that it would have been appropriate to refuse to sign the confirmation. I have also learned that the person signing the confirmation check should be present during the maintenance work being performed to ensure that all the actions in the maintenance procedure are followed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH IMPROPER LOGBOOK ENTRIES FOR WORK ACCOMPLISHED BY A TECHNICIAN WHO DID NOT DO THE WORK.

Narrative: ON DEC/XA/99, I WAS WORKING AN 'A' CHK WITH 2 OTHER ACFT MECHS. DURING THE CHK, I DISCOVERED THAT 1 TIRE OF THE ACFT WAS QUESTIONABLE ON WEAR LIMITS AND PROBABLY NEEDED REPLACING. WHEN ONE OF THE OTHER MECHS ARRIVED, HE CONFIRMED THAT IT NEEDED TO BE REPLACED. I HAD ONLY BEEN ACTIVITY WORKING ON THE LINE FOR ABOUT 1 MONTH, AFTER MY ORIENTATION TRAINING, AND THEREFORE FELT I SHOULD ASK MORE EXPERIENCED MECHS FOR THEIR OPINION. THE 2 MORE EXPERIENCED MECHS CHANGED THE TIRE WHILE I CONTINUED WITH THE ASSIGNED MAINT I HAD BEEN WORKING ON THAT EVENING. WHEN WE COMPLETED ALL THE WORK AND WENT INTO THE OFFICE TO COMPLETE OUR PAPERWORK, ONE OF THE MECHS THAT HAD PERFORMED THE WORK WAS NOT AVAILABLE (I DON'T KNOW SPECIFICALLY WHERE HE WAS OR WHY). WHEN THE TIRE CHANGE WAS RECORDED IN THE NON ROUTINE ITEMS OF THE 'A' CHK, THE MECH THAT CHANGED THE TIRE SIGNED THE TIRE CHANGE COMPLETION. SINCE THE SECOND MECH THAT WORKED ON THE TIRE WAS NOT PRESENT, THE CREW CHIEF TOLD ME THAT I COULD SIGN THE CONFIRMATION. I CHALLENGED HIM AND STATED THAT I WASN'T QUALIFIED TO SIGN A CONFIRMATION AND HE SAID, 'ANYONE CAN SIGN THE CONFIRMATION.' I FELT THAT BEING I WAS TOLD TO SIGN IT BY MY CREW CHIEF THAT I WOULD BE JEOPARDIZING MY JOB BY CHALLENGING HIS AUTH, PARTICULARLY DURING MY PROBATION PERIOD. IN THE MONTHS SINCE THIS INCIDENT, I HAVE LEARNED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE TO REFUSE TO SIGN THE CONFIRMATION. I HAVE ALSO LEARNED THAT THE PERSON SIGNING THE CONFIRMATION CHK SHOULD BE PRESENT DURING THE MAINT WORK BEING PERFORMED TO ENSURE THAT ALL THE ACTIONS IN THE MAINT PROC ARE FOLLOWED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.