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Attributes | |
ACN | 465924 |
Time | |
Date | 200003 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : rctp.airport |
State Reference | FO |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B747-100 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : holding ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B747-400 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : position and hold ground : takeoff roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : cfi pilot : multi engine pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 8000 flight time type : 2800 |
ASRS Report | 465924 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical incursion : runway non adherence : published procedure non adherence : required legal separation |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : took evasive action flight crew : took precautionary avoidance action |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 0 vertical : 175 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance Airport Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Intra Facility Coordination Failure Operational Error |
Narrative:
We were operating a B747 from taipei to anchorage. We were parked in cargo bay. Runway 5L was in use for departures. We pushed back and we were then cleared by ground to taxiway N10 to hold short of runway 5L for an arriving aircraft. After the aircraft landed and cleared the runway, we were cleared by ground to 'taxi runway 5L to taxiway N8 to runway 5R to runway 5L.' I read this back verbatim to the ground controller and the captain repeated it before he started taxiing. As we entered the runway, we noticed another aircraft taxiing into position at taxiway N1. The captain asked me to verify with ground that the aircraft was holding position. When I queried ground, a different ground controller told us to hold our position. The captain had already stopped taxiing about 1/2 way onto the runway and at a 45 degree angle to the runway centerline. The captain then said to notify ground that we were on the runway. When I did this, ground control keyed the microphone, but we only heard shouting in the backgnd in the local language. I again notified them of our position with the same results. The aircraft at the other end of the runway was now starting to roll. I again notified ground that we were on the runway with no response. The departing aircraft (we believe it was a B747-400) rotated somewhere around taxiway N8 and went right over us at 150-200 ft. No comments were made by ground or us, as we were cleared to continue our taxi. I cannot see where we could've done anything different in our cockpit to avoid this situation. Runway incursions are a high emphasis item at our company Y. All 3 crew members were monitoring the radios, verifying clrncs, and clearing the area. 3 items come to mind that could've helped stop this chain of events. 1) when back-taxiing on an active runway, all aircraft should be on the tower (local) frequency. This is common practice in the united states, but not at foreign airports. 2) the departing aircraft should verify that the runway is clear prior to increasing to takeoff thrust. 3) company should be required to reactivate the logo lights on all their fleets. Although we had all of our lights on, we may have blended into the backgnd for the departing aircraft due to our angle on the runway and lack of any side lighting (with the exception of wing lights). We may have been virtually invisible to the tower controller since we were perpendicular to them. With no strobe lights to turn on and no logo lights, we are almost invisible from the sides and rear. With logo lights, a casual glance by the local controller may have alerted him/her right then. It might have reminded the ground controller that he had us taxiing on the runway. The other cockpit crew might have spotted us as they taxied into position. The other cockpit crew did a good job deciding not to reject their takeoff when (if) they saw us. If they had rejected near V1, it could have gotten really messy.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CARGO B747-100 IS STOPPED ON RCTP RWY 5L BY GND CTLR AND OBSERVES DEPARTING B747-400 ON TKOF ROLL. COCKPIT CALLS TO GND CTLR GO UNACKNOWLEDGED AS B747 CROSSES OVERHEAD LESS THAN 200 FT.
Narrative: WE WERE OPERATING A B747 FROM TAIPEI TO ANCHORAGE. WE WERE PARKED IN CARGO BAY. RWY 5L WAS IN USE FOR DEPS. WE PUSHED BACK AND WE WERE THEN CLRED BY GND TO TXWY N10 TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 5L FOR AN ARRIVING ACFT. AFTER THE ACFT LANDED AND CLRED THE RWY, WE WERE CLRED BY GND TO 'TAXI RWY 5L TO TXWY N8 TO RWY 5R TO RWY 5L.' I READ THIS BACK VERBATIM TO THE GND CTLR AND THE CAPT REPEATED IT BEFORE HE STARTED TAXIING. AS WE ENTERED THE RWY, WE NOTICED ANOTHER ACFT TAXIING INTO POS AT TXWY N1. THE CAPT ASKED ME TO VERIFY WITH GND THAT THE ACFT WAS HOLDING POS. WHEN I QUERIED GND, A DIFFERENT GND CTLR TOLD US TO HOLD OUR POS. THE CAPT HAD ALREADY STOPPED TAXIING ABOUT 1/2 WAY ONTO THE RWY AND AT A 45 DEG ANGLE TO THE RWY CTRLINE. THE CAPT THEN SAID TO NOTIFY GND THAT WE WERE ON THE RWY. WHEN I DID THIS, GND CTL KEYED THE MIKE, BUT WE ONLY HEARD SHOUTING IN THE BACKGND IN THE LCL LANGUAGE. I AGAIN NOTIFIED THEM OF OUR POS WITH THE SAME RESULTS. THE ACFT AT THE OTHER END OF THE RWY WAS NOW STARTING TO ROLL. I AGAIN NOTIFIED GND THAT WE WERE ON THE RWY WITH NO RESPONSE. THE DEPARTING ACFT (WE BELIEVE IT WAS A B747-400) ROTATED SOMEWHERE AROUND TXWY N8 AND WENT RIGHT OVER US AT 150-200 FT. NO COMMENTS WERE MADE BY GND OR US, AS WE WERE CLRED TO CONTINUE OUR TAXI. I CANNOT SEE WHERE WE COULD'VE DONE ANYTHING DIFFERENT IN OUR COCKPIT TO AVOID THIS SIT. RWY INCURSIONS ARE A HIGH EMPHASIS ITEM AT OUR COMPANY Y. ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS WERE MONITORING THE RADIOS, VERIFYING CLRNCS, AND CLRING THE AREA. 3 ITEMS COME TO MIND THAT COULD'VE HELPED STOP THIS CHAIN OF EVENTS. 1) WHEN BACK-TAXIING ON AN ACTIVE RWY, ALL ACFT SHOULD BE ON THE TWR (LCL) FREQ. THIS IS COMMON PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, BUT NOT AT FOREIGN ARPTS. 2) THE DEPARTING ACFT SHOULD VERIFY THAT THE RWY IS CLR PRIOR TO INCREASING TO TKOF THRUST. 3) COMPANY SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO REACTIVATE THE LOGO LIGHTS ON ALL THEIR FLEETS. ALTHOUGH WE HAD ALL OF OUR LIGHTS ON, WE MAY HAVE BLENDED INTO THE BACKGND FOR THE DEPARTING ACFT DUE TO OUR ANGLE ON THE RWY AND LACK OF ANY SIDE LIGHTING (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF WING LIGHTS). WE MAY HAVE BEEN VIRTUALLY INVISIBLE TO THE TWR CTLR SINCE WE WERE PERPENDICULAR TO THEM. WITH NO STROBE LIGHTS TO TURN ON AND NO LOGO LIGHTS, WE ARE ALMOST INVISIBLE FROM THE SIDES AND REAR. WITH LOGO LIGHTS, A CASUAL GLANCE BY THE LCL CTLR MAY HAVE ALERTED HIM/HER RIGHT THEN. IT MIGHT HAVE REMINDED THE GND CTLR THAT HE HAD US TAXIING ON THE RWY. THE OTHER COCKPIT CREW MIGHT HAVE SPOTTED US AS THEY TAXIED INTO POS. THE OTHER COCKPIT CREW DID A GOOD JOB DECIDING NOT TO REJECT THEIR TKOF WHEN (IF) THEY SAW US. IF THEY HAD REJECTED NEAR V1, IT COULD HAVE GOTTEN REALLY MESSY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.