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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 467207 |
Time | |
Date | 200003 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 0001 To 0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : suu.airport |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-11 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : atp pilot : commercial pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 10000 flight time type : 3000 |
ASRS Report | 467207 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 93 flight time total : 4150 flight time type : 1320 |
ASRS Report | 465856 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : far non adherence : company policies |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : multiple warnings other flight crewa other flight crewb other other : person 3+4 |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | other Other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Company |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
This was a misload. I was handed a verified weight and balance that was incorrect. Error was discovered before final door was shut. Aircraft was on a loading ramp. Engines were never started. 2 fly-away-kits that were supposed to be in forward belly were actually in aft belly, causing an out-of-limits center of gravity. Supplemental information from acn 465856: we were scheduled to fly a charter flight MD11 from travis AFB (suv) to anchorage, ak (anc) the night of mar/fri/00. The inbound aircraft was delayed. We eventually arrived at the aircraft approximately XA10 local time on mar/sat/00. I performed the external circuit preflight. When we approached the aircraft the freight was in the process of being off-loaded from the main cargo deck. It was noted that there was no nosewheel strap or weight to hold the nose down. The captain asked the load master about this and was told there were none available at the base and ensured us there would be no problem. We were expecting no freight in the upper cargo deck and very little in the forward belly. The preflight was normal. All doors were closed except for the main cargo door and left main cabin door (L1). We began the cockpit setup. All was normal until the main cargo door was closed. As it closed, numerous alerts came on. Neither of us had seen anything like this before. We called our maintenance personnel onboard. After removing power and resetting the aircraft they restored everything to normal operation. I went back to close the L1 door. When I got back in the cockpit all of the alerts had reappeared. We had maintenance come back on board. They tried removing power again but when it was reapplied the stick-shakers activated. It was then that someone said it appeared the aircraft thought it was airborne. This did account for the alerts. Then one of the support people helping with the launch said that the nose strut was extended too far. He had experience with military KC10's and said they couldn't launch one with that much strut exposed. I went down and confirmed this. We realized that the center of gravity was too far aft. It was discovered that there were containers in A7 and A6, the most aft belly position. The weight and balance showed an empty aircraft except for containers in F1 and F2, the most forward belly position, weighing approximately 6300 pounds. At this point the duty officer and flight safety were called. Photos were taken and ballast weight added to the main cargo deck to temporarily bring the center of gravity forward. The onboard weight and balance showed containers in A7 and A6 and none in the forward belly. Apparently these containers were to have been moved to the forward belly. The load master returned to the aircraft at this point. I heard no explanation as to why the containers had not been moved to the forward section. The captain directed him to re-weigh the containers and load them in the proper position. A new weight and balance form was brought to the aircraft and we then departed for anchorage uneventfully. Upon arrival at anchorage the captain submitted a flight safety report with the company.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MD11 IS LOADED INCORRECTLY CAUSING MULTIPLE WARNINGS NORMALLY ASSOCIATED WITH INFLT CONDITIONS. IT IS FOUND THAT THE ACFT HAD TIPPED AFT RESULTING IN NOSE STRUT EXTENSION TO THE POINT THE ACFT THOUGHT IT WAS IN THE AIR.
Narrative: THIS WAS A MISLOAD. I WAS HANDED A VERIFIED WT AND BAL THAT WAS INCORRECT. ERROR WAS DISCOVERED BEFORE FINAL DOOR WAS SHUT. ACFT WAS ON A LOADING RAMP. ENGS WERE NEVER STARTED. 2 FLY-AWAY-KITS THAT WERE SUPPOSED TO BE IN FORWARD BELLY WERE ACTUALLY IN AFT BELLY, CAUSING AN OUT-OF-LIMITS CTR OF GRAVITY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 465856: WE WERE SCHEDULED TO FLY A CHARTER FLT MD11 FROM TRAVIS AFB (SUV) TO ANCHORAGE, AK (ANC) THE NIGHT OF MAR/FRI/00. THE INBOUND ACFT WAS DELAYED. WE EVENTUALLY ARRIVED AT THE ACFT APPROX XA10 LCL TIME ON MAR/SAT/00. I PERFORMED THE EXTERNAL CIRCUIT PREFLT. WHEN WE APCHED THE ACFT THE FREIGHT WAS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING OFF-LOADED FROM THE MAIN CARGO DECK. IT WAS NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO NOSEWHEEL STRAP OR WT TO HOLD THE NOSE DOWN. THE CAPT ASKED THE LOAD MASTER ABOUT THIS AND WAS TOLD THERE WERE NONE AVAILABLE AT THE BASE AND ENSURED US THERE WOULD BE NO PROB. WE WERE EXPECTING NO FREIGHT IN THE UPPER CARGO DECK AND VERY LITTLE IN THE FORWARD BELLY. THE PREFLT WAS NORMAL. ALL DOORS WERE CLOSED EXCEPT FOR THE MAIN CARGO DOOR AND L MAIN CABIN DOOR (L1). WE BEGAN THE COCKPIT SETUP. ALL WAS NORMAL UNTIL THE MAIN CARGO DOOR WAS CLOSED. AS IT CLOSED, NUMEROUS ALERTS CAME ON. NEITHER OF US HAD SEEN ANYTHING LIKE THIS BEFORE. WE CALLED OUR MAINT PERSONNEL ONBOARD. AFTER REMOVING PWR AND RESETTING THE ACFT THEY RESTORED EVERYTHING TO NORMAL OP. I WENT BACK TO CLOSE THE L1 DOOR. WHEN I GOT BACK IN THE COCKPIT ALL OF THE ALERTS HAD REAPPEARED. WE HAD MAINT COME BACK ON BOARD. THEY TRIED REMOVING PWR AGAIN BUT WHEN IT WAS REAPPLIED THE STICK-SHAKERS ACTIVATED. IT WAS THEN THAT SOMEONE SAID IT APPEARED THE ACFT THOUGHT IT WAS AIRBORNE. THIS DID ACCOUNT FOR THE ALERTS. THEN ONE OF THE SUPPORT PEOPLE HELPING WITH THE LAUNCH SAID THAT THE NOSE STRUT WAS EXTENDED TOO FAR. HE HAD EXPERIENCE WITH MIL KC10'S AND SAID THEY COULDN'T LAUNCH ONE WITH THAT MUCH STRUT EXPOSED. I WENT DOWN AND CONFIRMED THIS. WE REALIZED THAT THE CTR OF GRAVITY WAS TOO FAR AFT. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THERE WERE CONTAINERS IN A7 AND A6, THE MOST AFT BELLY POS. THE WT AND BAL SHOWED AN EMPTY ACFT EXCEPT FOR CONTAINERS IN F1 AND F2, THE MOST FORWARD BELLY POS, WEIGHING APPROX 6300 LBS. AT THIS POINT THE DUTY OFFICER AND FLT SAFETY WERE CALLED. PHOTOS WERE TAKEN AND BALLAST WT ADDED TO THE MAIN CARGO DECK TO TEMPORARILY BRING THE CTR OF GRAVITY FORWARD. THE ONBOARD WT AND BAL SHOWED CONTAINERS IN A7 AND A6 AND NONE IN THE FORWARD BELLY. APPARENTLY THESE CONTAINERS WERE TO HAVE BEEN MOVED TO THE FORWARD BELLY. THE LOAD MASTER RETURNED TO THE ACFT AT THIS POINT. I HEARD NO EXPLANATION AS TO WHY THE CONTAINERS HAD NOT BEEN MOVED TO THE FORWARD SECTION. THE CAPT DIRECTED HIM TO RE-WEIGH THE CONTAINERS AND LOAD THEM IN THE PROPER POS. A NEW WT AND BAL FORM WAS BROUGHT TO THE ACFT AND WE THEN DEPARTED FOR ANCHORAGE UNEVENTFULLY. UPON ARR AT ANCHORAGE THE CAPT SUBMITTED A FLT SAFETY RPT WITH THE COMPANY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.