Narrative:

During an air carrier flight, I served as PF with a high minimums captain. Upon receiving the destination ATIS, we determined that the airport was reporting lower visibility and ceiling than we required to initiate the approach. We contacted our dispatch department who informed us we could initiate the approach with required visibility only and the ceiling requirement for high minimums, capts did not prevent initiating the approach. As we were being vectored for a hold, approach control advised us that the RVR had increased above our requirements and we requested and received vectors to the ILS final approach course. After a very hurried brief, we intercepted the final approach course and GS. As we had not contacted our operations ground facility, the PIC called them on communication #2 just as we passed through 1000 ft above minimums, and was not following the progress of my approach. Consequently, there was little or no communication between us as we descended to decision ht. Upon approaching decision ht, I did not hear the standard 'go around' or 'approach lights, continue' call and I looked outside the aircraft for any sign of the runway. A few seconds later I spotted the approach lights and finally the runway. However, due to the lack of communication, during the delay between approaching decision ht and spotting the runway, I as PF most likely descended below decision ht before having the approach lights in sight. While the captain was trying to advise our operations as per procedures, it was an inopportune time to do so.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB120 FO DSNDS BELOW THE AUTH DECISION HT WHILE ON AN ILS APCH WITH A 'RESTR CAPT' TO MCO, FL.

Narrative: DURING AN ACR FLT, I SERVED AS PF WITH A HIGH MINIMUMS CAPT. UPON RECEIVING THE DEST ATIS, WE DETERMINED THAT THE ARPT WAS RPTING LOWER VISIBILITY AND CEILING THAN WE REQUIRED TO INITIATE THE APCH. WE CONTACTED OUR DISPATCH DEPT WHO INFORMED US WE COULD INITIATE THE APCH WITH REQUIRED VISIBILITY ONLY AND THE CEILING REQUIREMENT FOR HIGH MINIMUMS, CAPTS DID NOT PREVENT INITIATING THE APCH. AS WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR A HOLD, APCH CTL ADVISED US THAT THE RVR HAD INCREASED ABOVE OUR REQUIREMENTS AND WE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED VECTORS TO THE ILS FINAL APCH COURSE. AFTER A VERY HURRIED BRIEF, WE INTERCEPTED THE FINAL APCH COURSE AND GS. AS WE HAD NOT CONTACTED OUR OPS GND FACILITY, THE PIC CALLED THEM ON COM #2 JUST AS WE PASSED THROUGH 1000 FT ABOVE MINIMUMS, AND WAS NOT FOLLOWING THE PROGRESS OF MY APCH. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE WAS LITTLE OR NO COM BTWN US AS WE DSNDED TO DECISION HT. UPON APCHING DECISION HT, I DID NOT HEAR THE STANDARD 'GAR' OR 'APCH LIGHTS, CONTINUE' CALL AND I LOOKED OUTSIDE THE ACFT FOR ANY SIGN OF THE RWY. A FEW SECONDS LATER I SPOTTED THE APCH LIGHTS AND FINALLY THE RWY. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE LACK OF COM, DURING THE DELAY BTWN APCHING DECISION HT AND SPOTTING THE RWY, I AS PF MOST LIKELY DSNDED BELOW DECISION HT BEFORE HAVING THE APCH LIGHTS IN SIGHT. WHILE THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO ADVISE OUR OPS AS PER PROCS, IT WAS AN INOPPORTUNE TIME TO DO SO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.