Narrative:

We arrived at hkg airport to fly a scheduled freight flight to nrt. 4 technical operations personnel were waiting for us with plans to deadhead. They advised us that the altimeters were non standard (DC9) and that they would produce an EP19 for this prior to anc. They also told us that there were numerous other 'differences with this airplane, they would tell us about these en route. Up to this point, this aircraft required special training (which two of us, first officer and so, didn't have). The aircraft was in hkg to eliminate these differences. This was to be the first revenue flight. In the cockpit we discovered the following difference: 1) different radar altimeters, 2) different autoplt, flight director annunciator panel, 3) a panel display with 2 red lights for the autoplt system, 4) a blocked off C autoplt, 5) a rollout light on the so annunciator panel. We then consulted the aom to determine the status and get information on the above system. We found that the manual still had the special 'green' pages used by the crews that were specially trained. We decided that either the manual was not up to date or else the crew operating still required differences training. At this point, we began a discussion of whether the aircraft was legal for flight, whether we were legal to fly it and whether it would constitute a safe operation. The captain and first officer indicated that they felt that flying the aircraft would be unsafe based on 2 of us not receiving the differences training, not finding adequate information on these system in the aom and not being given advanced warning of these differences. We decided that this was a 'rush job' on the company's part and that we were being asked to fly an airplane of which the conversion was not completed. We felt we were being pressured to conduct an operation that was both illegal and unsafe. At this point we decided to refuse to fly the aircraft. Supplemental information from acn 468796: we were asked to fly a cargo B747 that had been in maintenance for over 2 months for extensive modifications to get it to match the rest of the fleet. We asked if this aircraft now as similar to the rest of the fleet. The 'tech representative' laughed and said there were lots of differences but they'd 'tell us about them in the air.' they said there were no flare tones and asked if any of us had ever flown a DC9. We said no and they said this aircraft had DC9 radio altimeters because the radio altimeters used in other B747's wouldn't work in this aircraft because of the 3RD channel of the autoplt being disengaged. We as a crew were taken off our trip and returned to base for a Q&a session with the director of flying. We were not penalized in any way after our side of the story was heard but aircraft continues to fly as per above. Supplemental information from acn 468317: maintenance control, dispatch, engineering, technical operations were all pushing us to hurry and take off. The manuals were not corrected to reflect the new system (preflight data, circuit breaker location, general information) nor were the proper logbook pages installed (EP19 on radar altimeters, possibly other system). We needed the forms before takeoff, not 12 hours later (we were only scheduled to fly the aircraft to osaka anyhow). We made a logbook entry stating our concerns (to warn subsequent crews) and refused the aircraft stating 'unsafe operation.' approximately 4 hours later we left the airport and went to the hotel. We made numerous phone calls back to headquarters and our base, but with the time difference, no one was answering, so we left voice mail. We were rescheduled to fly by crew scheduling and left for dinner. Apparently that is when everyone arrived at work in united states of america and began looking for us. They did not know our orient crew scheduling had already assigned us a flight and they were infuriated that we were not in our rooms. Obviously the company needs better communication and availability if they plan on being a 'global carrier.' we were also told by our director of flight operations, that we would/could not be in trouble from the FAA for missing logbook/manual paperwork. This has never been my understanding.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747 FREIGHTER FLC REFUSES TO TAKE THEIR 'MODIFIED' ACFT ON ITS FIRST SCHEDULED CARGO RUN AFTER 2 MONTHS OF MAINT WORK BECAUSE OF NON STANDARD EQUIP CONFIGNS AND ACFT OPERATING MANUAL OMISSIONS AT VHHH, FO.

Narrative: WE ARRIVED AT HKG ARPT TO FLY A SCHEDULED FREIGHT FLT TO NRT. 4 TECHNICAL OPS PERSONNEL WERE WAITING FOR US WITH PLANS TO DEADHEAD. THEY ADVISED US THAT THE ALTIMETERS WERE NON STANDARD (DC9) AND THAT THEY WOULD PRODUCE AN EP19 FOR THIS PRIOR TO ANC. THEY ALSO TOLD US THAT THERE WERE NUMEROUS OTHER 'DIFFERENCES WITH THIS AIRPLANE, THEY WOULD TELL US ABOUT THESE ENRTE. UP TO THIS POINT, THIS ACFT REQUIRED SPECIAL TRAINING (WHICH TWO OF US, FO AND SO, DIDN'T HAVE). THE ACFT WAS IN HKG TO ELIMINATE THESE DIFFERENCES. THIS WAS TO BE THE FIRST REVENUE FLT. IN THE COCKPIT WE DISCOVERED THE FOLLOWING DIFFERENCE: 1) DIFFERENT RADAR ALTIMETERS, 2) DIFFERENT AUTOPLT, FLT DIRECTOR ANNUNCIATOR PANEL, 3) A PANEL DISPLAY WITH 2 RED LIGHTS FOR THE AUTOPLT SYS, 4) A BLOCKED OFF C AUTOPLT, 5) A ROLLOUT LIGHT ON THE SO ANNUNCIATOR PANEL. WE THEN CONSULTED THE AOM TO DETERMINE THE STATUS AND GET INFO ON THE ABOVE SYS. WE FOUND THAT THE MANUAL STILL HAD THE SPECIAL 'GREEN' PAGES USED BY THE CREWS THAT WERE SPECIALLY TRAINED. WE DECIDED THAT EITHER THE MANUAL WAS NOT UP TO DATE OR ELSE THE CREW OPERATING STILL REQUIRED DIFFERENCES TRAINING. AT THIS POINT, WE BEGAN A DISCUSSION OF WHETHER THE ACFT WAS LEGAL FOR FLT, WHETHER WE WERE LEGAL TO FLY IT AND WHETHER IT WOULD CONSTITUTE A SAFE OP. THE CAPT AND FO INDICATED THAT THEY FELT THAT FLYING THE ACFT WOULD BE UNSAFE BASED ON 2 OF US NOT RECEIVING THE DIFFERENCES TRAINING, NOT FINDING ADEQUATE INFO ON THESE SYS IN THE AOM AND NOT BEING GIVEN ADVANCED WARNING OF THESE DIFFERENCES. WE DECIDED THAT THIS WAS A 'RUSH JOB' ON THE COMPANY'S PART AND THAT WE WERE BEING ASKED TO FLY AN AIRPLANE OF WHICH THE CONVERSION WAS NOT COMPLETED. WE FELT WE WERE BEING PRESSURED TO CONDUCT AN OP THAT WAS BOTH ILLEGAL AND UNSAFE. AT THIS POINT WE DECIDED TO REFUSE TO FLY THE ACFT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 468796: WE WERE ASKED TO FLY A CARGO B747 THAT HAD BEEN IN MAINT FOR OVER 2 MONTHS FOR EXTENSIVE MODIFICATIONS TO GET IT TO MATCH THE REST OF THE FLEET. WE ASKED IF THIS ACFT NOW AS SIMILAR TO THE REST OF THE FLEET. THE 'TECH REPRESENTATIVE' LAUGHED AND SAID THERE WERE LOTS OF DIFFERENCES BUT THEY'D 'TELL US ABOUT THEM IN THE AIR.' THEY SAID THERE WERE NO FLARE TONES AND ASKED IF ANY OF US HAD EVER FLOWN A DC9. WE SAID NO AND THEY SAID THIS ACFT HAD DC9 RADIO ALTIMETERS BECAUSE THE RADIO ALTIMETERS USED IN OTHER B747'S WOULDN'T WORK IN THIS ACFT BECAUSE OF THE 3RD CHANNEL OF THE AUTOPLT BEING DISENGAGED. WE AS A CREW WERE TAKEN OFF OUR TRIP AND RETURNED TO BASE FOR A Q&A SESSION WITH THE DIRECTOR OF FLYING. WE WERE NOT PENALIZED IN ANY WAY AFTER OUR SIDE OF THE STORY WAS HEARD BUT ACFT CONTINUES TO FLY AS PER ABOVE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 468317: MAINT CTL, DISPATCH, ENGINEERING, TECHNICAL OPS WERE ALL PUSHING US TO HURRY AND TAKE OFF. THE MANUALS WERE NOT CORRECTED TO REFLECT THE NEW SYS (PREFLT DATA, CIRCUIT BREAKER LOCATION, GENERAL INFO) NOR WERE THE PROPER LOGBOOK PAGES INSTALLED (EP19 ON RADAR ALTIMETERS, POSSIBLY OTHER SYS). WE NEEDED THE FORMS BEFORE TKOF, NOT 12 HRS LATER (WE WERE ONLY SCHEDULED TO FLY THE ACFT TO OSAKA ANYHOW). WE MADE A LOGBOOK ENTRY STATING OUR CONCERNS (TO WARN SUBSEQUENT CREWS) AND REFUSED THE ACFT STATING 'UNSAFE OP.' APPROX 4 HRS LATER WE LEFT THE ARPT AND WENT TO THE HOTEL. WE MADE NUMEROUS PHONE CALLS BACK TO HEADQUARTERS AND OUR BASE, BUT WITH THE TIME DIFFERENCE, NO ONE WAS ANSWERING, SO WE LEFT VOICE MAIL. WE WERE RESCHEDULED TO FLY BY CREW SCHEDULING AND LEFT FOR DINNER. APPARENTLY THAT IS WHEN EVERYONE ARRIVED AT WORK IN UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND BEGAN LOOKING FOR US. THEY DID NOT KNOW OUR ORIENT CREW SCHEDULING HAD ALREADY ASSIGNED US A FLT AND THEY WERE INFURIATED THAT WE WERE NOT IN OUR ROOMS. OBVIOUSLY THE COMPANY NEEDS BETTER COM AND AVAILABILITY IF THEY PLAN ON BEING A 'GLOBAL CARRIER.' WE WERE ALSO TOLD BY OUR DIRECTOR OF FLT OPS, THAT WE WOULD/COULD NOT BE IN TROUBLE FROM THE FAA FOR MISSING LOGBOOK/MANUAL PAPERWORK. THIS HAS NEVER BEEN MY UNDERSTANDING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.