Narrative:

The flight originated at otsego lake, mi. Several pilots from the group went to the airport to get a briefing, which indicated MVFR to IFR throughout the area with expectations of clearing to the west and north. Approximately 2 hours later the aircraft departed to fly VFR north to a private airstrip at hulbert, mi. Once airborne the ceiling was discovered to be approximately 500 ft AGL and the aircraft proceeded north over the I-75 expressway towards the straits of mackinaw. Approximately 20 NM north of glr the ceiling began to drop and the terrain rose. At a point where the ceiling became approximately 250 ft AGL, the decision was made to turn back towards glr to land and abandon the flight. Approximately 10 NM north of glr the ceiling met with terrain ahead of the route of flight and another 180 degrees back to the north was executed, a lake approximately 1 1/2 mi long was spotted and a landing was executed. Taxiing around the lake, no suitable spot was idented for beaching and the ceiling appeared to once again lift, so a takeoff was executed and another attempt to head south back to glr was initiated. Flight proceeded at approximately 350 ft AGL south along I-75 towards glr. Approximately 4 NM from glr the ceiling met with higher terrain, so another 180 degrees was executed back to the north. The aircraft was 'boxed in' in a valley approximately 4 mi ew of 8 mi ns which had a relatively flat valley floor and a couple of fairly flat fields of about 1 mi or more in width in all directions. One was selected as a landing point. The next approximately 1 hour was spent circling the selected emergency landing spot at about 150 ft AGL, while the pilot waited for the ceiling to lift. About 45 mins of fuel remained onboard, the pilot called the unicom at glr to report that there was an emergency and that the aircraft was about to land in a field about 6 NM nne of town and that emergency assistance and a truck for the airplane may be needed. A certified flight instructor got on the radio and said he had a person on the phone in the area being circled, that he knew those fields and strongly recommended not using them, as they are very rough. He suggested an emergency climb into IFR and a precision approach. The pilot informed him that he had over 700 hours and had about 20 hours under the hood and that the aircraft had a full IFR panel and an autoplt, but that fuel was now down to approximately 45 mins. The instructor said: 'set that autoplt for 250 degrees and establish a climb to 500 FPM.' the instructor kept telling the pilot things like: 'just keep scanning the airspeed, false horizon, directional gyroscope, turn coordinator and vsi,' 'keep it above 100 KTS on the airspeed,' 'make sure the wings are level and the ball centered.' he also asked for altitude reports until the aircraft broke out on top at about 5500 ft AGL. At that point, or maybe a few mins prior the instructor said to lean the mixture and set up economy cruise power. At this point the pilot was most concerned with the fuel situation. At this point the instructor advised that there were numerous large lakes along the rest of a route to tvc, so he recommended going to ZMP and gave the frequency. The controller had already been contacted by the instructor and seemed to know most of what was going on. Now that the pilot was VFR on top, he was able to determine the exact position of the airplane using the 2 navs and DME, as well as LORAN C. The controller offered either tvc or a diversion to acb. Fuel calculations indicated between 6 and 10 gals remained, which would mean there was probably at least 25 mins of fuel remaining at economy power settings. The pilot chose to continue on towards tvc, since he determined that most of the flight would be over large lakes and a water landing could be successfully made. Center had the pilot begin the descent through the clouds and advised that tvc was reporting 500-1000 ft ceiling and 10 mi visibility. A turn was given by center to 350 degrees and the pilot was told the tvc was something like 8 NM in that direction and that a descent was approved and to expect to break out at about 1700 ft MSL. The passenger was instructed to watch out the window and to calmly alert the pilot, as soon as he saw the ground. The ground was spotted at about 1300 ft MSL or ABOUT500 ft AGL. The pilot continued to descend until there was relatively good visibility, which was established as 3-7 mi in mist and scattered fog at about 300 ft AGL. By this point the pilot knew that he was over the extreme south end of west grand traverse bay, by reference to known landmarks. Once the aircraft made it to the south shore of the bay, ATC was advised that the pilot knew he could make it to the boardman lake, about 1/2 mi south of the bay, where there were calmer waters. Once over boardman lake, the pilot made visual contact with the airport. Staying with the center controller, who advised that the airport was all the pilot's to land on any runway, the pilot flew within easy landing distance of the crosswind runway to a point where there was ample landing distance on the upwind runway, on which a landing was successfully made. It was determined that approximately 3 gals of fuel remained in the tank, meaning that on touchdown, approximately 15-20 mins of fuel likely remained. Contributing factors to this incident were marginal WX, misplaced faith in WX forecast accuracy, the pilot not personally getting a WX briefing, but getting it second hand and the decision to go VFR when the conditions were very marginal and unstable. Corrective action should have been initiated sooner. Once the initial departure was made from otsego lake, the pilot should have probably landed at glr, as the conditions were very marginal at the time the airport was still in sight and a landing was possible, instead of assuming that conditions would improve to the north and with time. The next error in judgement was to take off from the lake approximately 20 NM to the north of glr, where a successful landing was made and to depart that area. The next error in judgement was to wait until the fuel was getting quite low before requesting help. These flawed decisions were partly due to overconfidence in the pilot's abilities and the WX reporting system and were further affected by ego, especially the delay in seeking help from outside sources. Positive human factors were that the pilot remained calm and proceeded in a rational manner and that the controller and instructor involved were all very professional and helpful. The successful completion of this flight can be mostly attributed to the valiant assistance of the flight instructor and the center controller.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A LAKE LA4-200 PVT PLT GETS INVOLVED WITH LOWERED CEILINGS AND IS GIVEN EMER ASSISTANCE BY A FLT INSTRUCTOR ON THE RADIO AND ZMP CTLR NEAR GLR, MI.

Narrative: THE FLT ORIGINATED AT OTSEGO LAKE, MI. SEVERAL PLTS FROM THE GROUP WENT TO THE ARPT TO GET A BRIEFING, WHICH INDICATED MVFR TO IFR THROUGHOUT THE AREA WITH EXPECTATIONS OF CLRING TO THE W AND N. APPROX 2 HRS LATER THE ACFT DEPARTED TO FLY VFR N TO A PVT AIRSTRIP AT HULBERT, MI. ONCE AIRBORNE THE CEILING WAS DISCOVERED TO BE APPROX 500 FT AGL AND THE ACFT PROCEEDED N OVER THE I-75 EXPRESSWAY TOWARDS THE STRAITS OF MACKINAW. APPROX 20 NM N OF GLR THE CEILING BEGAN TO DROP AND THE TERRAIN ROSE. AT A POINT WHERE THE CEILING BECAME APPROX 250 FT AGL, THE DECISION WAS MADE TO TURN BACK TOWARDS GLR TO LAND AND ABANDON THE FLT. APPROX 10 NM N OF GLR THE CEILING MET WITH TERRAIN AHEAD OF THE RTE OF FLT AND ANOTHER 180 DEGS BACK TO THE N WAS EXECUTED, A LAKE APPROX 1 1/2 MI LONG WAS SPOTTED AND A LNDG WAS EXECUTED. TAXIING AROUND THE LAKE, NO SUITABLE SPOT WAS IDENTED FOR BEACHING AND THE CEILING APPEARED TO ONCE AGAIN LIFT, SO A TKOF WAS EXECUTED AND ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO HEAD S BACK TO GLR WAS INITIATED. FLT PROCEEDED AT APPROX 350 FT AGL S ALONG I-75 TOWARDS GLR. APPROX 4 NM FROM GLR THE CEILING MET WITH HIGHER TERRAIN, SO ANOTHER 180 DEGS WAS EXECUTED BACK TO THE N. THE ACFT WAS 'BOXED IN' IN A VALLEY APPROX 4 MI EW OF 8 MI NS WHICH HAD A RELATIVELY FLAT VALLEY FLOOR AND A COUPLE OF FAIRLY FLAT FIELDS OF ABOUT 1 MI OR MORE IN WIDTH IN ALL DIRECTIONS. ONE WAS SELECTED AS A LNDG POINT. THE NEXT APPROX 1 HR WAS SPENT CIRCLING THE SELECTED EMER LNDG SPOT AT ABOUT 150 FT AGL, WHILE THE PLT WAITED FOR THE CEILING TO LIFT. ABOUT 45 MINS OF FUEL REMAINED ONBOARD, THE PLT CALLED THE UNICOM AT GLR TO RPT THAT THERE WAS AN EMER AND THAT THE ACFT WAS ABOUT TO LAND IN A FIELD ABOUT 6 NM NNE OF TOWN AND THAT EMER ASSISTANCE AND A TRUCK FOR THE AIRPLANE MAY BE NEEDED. A CERTIFIED FLT INSTRUCTOR GOT ON THE RADIO AND SAID HE HAD A PERSON ON THE PHONE IN THE AREA BEING CIRCLED, THAT HE KNEW THOSE FIELDS AND STRONGLY RECOMMENDED NOT USING THEM, AS THEY ARE VERY ROUGH. HE SUGGESTED AN EMER CLB INTO IFR AND A PRECISION APCH. THE PLT INFORMED HIM THAT HE HAD OVER 700 HRS AND HAD ABOUT 20 HRS UNDER THE HOOD AND THAT THE ACFT HAD A FULL IFR PANEL AND AN AUTOPLT, BUT THAT FUEL WAS NOW DOWN TO APPROX 45 MINS. THE INSTRUCTOR SAID: 'SET THAT AUTOPLT FOR 250 DEGS AND ESTABLISH A CLB TO 500 FPM.' THE INSTRUCTOR KEPT TELLING THE PLT THINGS LIKE: 'JUST KEEP SCANNING THE AIRSPD, FALSE HORIZON, DIRECTIONAL GYROSCOPE, TURN COORDINATOR AND VSI,' 'KEEP IT ABOVE 100 KTS ON THE AIRSPD,' 'MAKE SURE THE WINGS ARE LEVEL AND THE BALL CTRED.' HE ALSO ASKED FOR ALT RPTS UNTIL THE ACFT BROKE OUT ON TOP AT ABOUT 5500 FT AGL. AT THAT POINT, OR MAYBE A FEW MINS PRIOR THE INSTRUCTOR SAID TO LEAN THE MIXTURE AND SET UP ECONOMY CRUISE PWR. AT THIS POINT THE PLT WAS MOST CONCERNED WITH THE FUEL SIT. AT THIS POINT THE INSTRUCTOR ADVISED THAT THERE WERE NUMEROUS LARGE LAKES ALONG THE REST OF A RTE TO TVC, SO HE RECOMMENDED GOING TO ZMP AND GAVE THE FREQ. THE CTLR HAD ALREADY BEEN CONTACTED BY THE INSTRUCTOR AND SEEMED TO KNOW MOST OF WHAT WAS GOING ON. NOW THAT THE PLT WAS VFR ON TOP, HE WAS ABLE TO DETERMINE THE EXACT POS OF THE AIRPLANE USING THE 2 NAVS AND DME, AS WELL AS LORAN C. THE CTLR OFFERED EITHER TVC OR A DIVERSION TO ACB. FUEL CALCULATIONS INDICATED BTWN 6 AND 10 GALS REMAINED, WHICH WOULD MEAN THERE WAS PROBABLY AT LEAST 25 MINS OF FUEL REMAINING AT ECONOMY PWR SETTINGS. THE PLT CHOSE TO CONTINUE ON TOWARDS TVC, SINCE HE DETERMINED THAT MOST OF THE FLT WOULD BE OVER LARGE LAKES AND A WATER LNDG COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY MADE. CTR HAD THE PLT BEGIN THE DSCNT THROUGH THE CLOUDS AND ADVISED THAT TVC WAS RPTING 500-1000 FT CEILING AND 10 MI VISIBILITY. A TURN WAS GIVEN BY CTR TO 350 DEGS AND THE PLT WAS TOLD THE TVC WAS SOMETHING LIKE 8 NM IN THAT DIRECTION AND THAT A DSCNT WAS APPROVED AND TO EXPECT TO BREAK OUT AT ABOUT 1700 FT MSL. THE PAX WAS INSTRUCTED TO WATCH OUT THE WINDOW AND TO CALMLY ALERT THE PLT, AS SOON AS HE SAW THE GND. THE GND WAS SPOTTED AT ABOUT 1300 FT MSL OR ABOUT500 FT AGL. THE PLT CONTINUED TO DSND UNTIL THERE WAS RELATIVELY GOOD VISIBILITY, WHICH WAS ESTABLISHED AS 3-7 MI IN MIST AND SCATTERED FOG AT ABOUT 300 FT AGL. BY THIS POINT THE PLT KNEW THAT HE WAS OVER THE EXTREME S END OF W GRAND TRAVERSE BAY, BY REF TO KNOWN LANDMARKS. ONCE THE ACFT MADE IT TO THE S SHORE OF THE BAY, ATC WAS ADVISED THAT THE PLT KNEW HE COULD MAKE IT TO THE BOARDMAN LAKE, ABOUT 1/2 MI S OF THE BAY, WHERE THERE WERE CALMER WATERS. ONCE OVER BOARDMAN LAKE, THE PLT MADE VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE ARPT. STAYING WITH THE CTR CTLR, WHO ADVISED THAT THE ARPT WAS ALL THE PLT'S TO LAND ON ANY RWY, THE PLT FLEW WITHIN EASY LNDG DISTANCE OF THE XWIND RWY TO A POINT WHERE THERE WAS AMPLE LNDG DISTANCE ON THE UPWIND RWY, ON WHICH A LNDG WAS SUCCESSFULLY MADE. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT APPROX 3 GALS OF FUEL REMAINED IN THE TANK, MEANING THAT ON TOUCHDOWN, APPROX 15-20 MINS OF FUEL LIKELY REMAINED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT WERE MARGINAL WX, MISPLACED FAITH IN WX FORECAST ACCURACY, THE PLT NOT PERSONALLY GETTING A WX BRIEFING, BUT GETTING IT SECOND HAND AND THE DECISION TO GO VFR WHEN THE CONDITIONS WERE VERY MARGINAL AND UNSTABLE. CORRECTIVE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN INITIATED SOONER. ONCE THE INITIAL DEP WAS MADE FROM OTSEGO LAKE, THE PLT SHOULD HAVE PROBABLY LANDED AT GLR, AS THE CONDITIONS WERE VERY MARGINAL AT THE TIME THE ARPT WAS STILL IN SIGHT AND A LNDG WAS POSSIBLE, INSTEAD OF ASSUMING THAT CONDITIONS WOULD IMPROVE TO THE N AND WITH TIME. THE NEXT ERROR IN JUDGEMENT WAS TO TAKE OFF FROM THE LAKE APPROX 20 NM TO THE N OF GLR, WHERE A SUCCESSFUL LNDG WAS MADE AND TO DEPART THAT AREA. THE NEXT ERROR IN JUDGEMENT WAS TO WAIT UNTIL THE FUEL WAS GETTING QUITE LOW BEFORE REQUESTING HELP. THESE FLAWED DECISIONS WERE PARTLY DUE TO OVERCONFIDENCE IN THE PLT'S ABILITIES AND THE WX RPTING SYS AND WERE FURTHER AFFECTED BY EGO, ESPECIALLY THE DELAY IN SEEKING HELP FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES. POSITIVE HUMAN FACTORS WERE THAT THE PLT REMAINED CALM AND PROCEEDED IN A RATIONAL MANNER AND THAT THE CTLR AND INSTRUCTOR INVOLVED WERE ALL VERY PROFESSIONAL AND HELPFUL. THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THIS FLT CAN BE MOSTLY ATTRIBUTED TO THE VALIANT ASSISTANCE OF THE FLT INSTRUCTOR AND THE CTR CTLR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.