Narrative:

Cleared to cross kubic at 9000 ft (instead of the usual 8000 ft). I informed the captain of the restr and set the altitude alerter for 9000 ft. The captain made a PA announcement while he was descending, and when he was finished, I reminded him we needed to cross kubic at 250 KTS (since it's below 10000 ft) and asked if he was going to make it, because it looked close to me. He said yes, but delayed using the speed brakes for about 45 seconds. I took his word for it and looked down to get my approach chart. When I looked back up, we were leveling at 10000 ft to slow from 320 KTS to 250 KTS (which takes 5-7 mi in a DC9) and were 3 mi from kubic. Before I could call ATC, he called us, asked for our current altitude, and told us rather angrily that if we couldn't make the restr, we needed to inform him earlier so he could adjust his traffic for it. Factors involved: 1) the captain has poor CRM techniques, and failed to take more drastic measures when I questioned whether he would make the restr. 2) I should have been more direct, and said 'I don't think we're going to make the restr' or I should have called center and told him we would be unable to make the restr. 3) I should have better monitored the situation. 4) ZMA has a habit of 'dumping' aircraft from high altitudes to make very tight crossing restrs for high performance jet aircraft. In the future, I will better monitor the captain's fling and will tell ZMA 'we'll be unable to comply' if there's even a chance we won't make a crossing restr. Supplemental information from acn 476069: the approach-descent, arrival into fll is and has been a slam-dunk situation. The controller sounded very busy and possibly overloaded with traffic in his sector. Further evidence of this is the fact that we were cleared to cross kubic at 9000 ft rather than the usual 8000 ft published on the STAR. The first officer said '10 for 9.' the controller then said that we were over kubic at this time. The first officer then said that we still had 4 mi to go. At that point, the controller became irritated and chastised us. I have been flying this route off and on for 7 yrs and pilots continue to have problems with this STAR. Maybe the ATC procedures there should be re-evaluated to make the arrival into fll a smoother and safer one.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC9-30 FLC IS GIVEN A LATE CLRNC FOR AN ALT XING RESTR THAT TOOK A HIGHER RATE OF DSCNT THAN THE CAPT COULD PROVIDE, PROVIDING A SOURCE FOR THE RADAR CTLR'S ANGER TOWARDS THE FLC SE OF RSW, FL.

Narrative: CLRED TO CROSS KUBIC AT 9000 FT (INSTEAD OF THE USUAL 8000 FT). I INFORMED THE CAPT OF THE RESTR AND SET THE ALT ALERTER FOR 9000 FT. THE CAPT MADE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT WHILE HE WAS DSNDING, AND WHEN HE WAS FINISHED, I REMINDED HIM WE NEEDED TO CROSS KUBIC AT 250 KTS (SINCE IT'S BELOW 10000 FT) AND ASKED IF HE WAS GOING TO MAKE IT, BECAUSE IT LOOKED CLOSE TO ME. HE SAID YES, BUT DELAYED USING THE SPD BRAKES FOR ABOUT 45 SECONDS. I TOOK HIS WORD FOR IT AND LOOKED DOWN TO GET MY APCH CHART. WHEN I LOOKED BACK UP, WE WERE LEVELING AT 10000 FT TO SLOW FROM 320 KTS TO 250 KTS (WHICH TAKES 5-7 MI IN A DC9) AND WERE 3 MI FROM KUBIC. BEFORE I COULD CALL ATC, HE CALLED US, ASKED FOR OUR CURRENT ALT, AND TOLD US RATHER ANGRILY THAT IF WE COULDN'T MAKE THE RESTR, WE NEEDED TO INFORM HIM EARLIER SO HE COULD ADJUST HIS TFC FOR IT. FACTORS INVOLVED: 1) THE CAPT HAS POOR CRM TECHNIQUES, AND FAILED TO TAKE MORE DRASTIC MEASURES WHEN I QUESTIONED WHETHER HE WOULD MAKE THE RESTR. 2) I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE DIRECT, AND SAID 'I DON'T THINK WE'RE GOING TO MAKE THE RESTR' OR I SHOULD HAVE CALLED CTR AND TOLD HIM WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO MAKE THE RESTR. 3) I SHOULD HAVE BETTER MONITORED THE SIT. 4) ZMA HAS A HABIT OF 'DUMPING' ACFT FROM HIGH ALTS TO MAKE VERY TIGHT XING RESTRS FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE JET ACFT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL BETTER MONITOR THE CAPT'S FLING AND WILL TELL ZMA 'WE'LL BE UNABLE TO COMPLY' IF THERE'S EVEN A CHANCE WE WON'T MAKE A XING RESTR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 476069: THE APCH-DSCNT, ARR INTO FLL IS AND HAS BEEN A SLAM-DUNK SIT. THE CTLR SOUNDED VERY BUSY AND POSSIBLY OVERLOADED WITH TFC IN HIS SECTOR. FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THIS IS THE FACT THAT WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS KUBIC AT 9000 FT RATHER THAN THE USUAL 8000 FT PUBLISHED ON THE STAR. THE FO SAID '10 FOR 9.' THE CTLR THEN SAID THAT WE WERE OVER KUBIC AT THIS TIME. THE FO THEN SAID THAT WE STILL HAD 4 MI TO GO. AT THAT POINT, THE CTLR BECAME IRRITATED AND CHASTISED US. I HAVE BEEN FLYING THIS RTE OFF AND ON FOR 7 YRS AND PLTS CONTINUE TO HAVE PROBS WITH THIS STAR. MAYBE THE ATC PROCS THERE SHOULD BE RE-EVALUATED TO MAKE THE ARR INTO FLL A SMOOTHER AND SAFER ONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.