Narrative:

On jul/mon/00, I was assigned to work on a B747-400 aircraft. One of the jobs that I was involved with was the installation of the l-hand inboard flap outboard flap transmission. Another group of mechanics on another shift previously installed the transmission. The inspection and operational check could not be completed by the mechanics that installed the transmission because fuel work was being accomplished. After the fuel work was finished we proceeded with the inspection and operational check. During this check we found a problem with the upstop X dimension, further investigation revealed that the new yoke installed on the jack screw was clocked wrong. It was 180 degrees off. This condition was confirmed by the maintenance manual. At this point the inspector on the job said he would not buy the operational check and told us to make a write-up to fix the problem. That is what I did. I made a write-up that stated that the #3 transmission was unable to obtain the upstop X dimension of .540 to .900 account the jack screw was 180 degrees out of phase. At this time it was the end of my shift so I went home. On jul/tue/00, I arrived at work and found out the shift that installed the transmission had not fixed the problem with the installation of the transmission. Instead they had the write-up bought off by the shift supervisor and an inspection supervisor. Their position was that this upstop X dimension was not required, as they did not disturb that. This was very upsetting to my co-worker and me. Workload on this day made it impossible for us to try and fix the problem ourselves so we confronted the supervisor when he came in for his shift. We asked how they could just ignore our write-up and say it wasn't required when the maintenance manual clearly stated it was required. He told us that he really didn't understand the system that well and that he was going on what his mechanics told him. We tried to talk to the mechanics but got nowhere with our information. On jul/wed/00, I went to engineering with my problem and the airplane was going to be rechked in sydney, australia that night. I don't know the outcome of the check in sydney. I do know this was a safety of flight issue that I don't ever want to go through again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-400 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE L INBOARD TRAILING EDGE FLAP OUTBOARD TRANSMISSION YOKE INSTALLED INCORRECTLY.

Narrative: ON JUL/MON/00, I WAS ASSIGNED TO WORK ON A B747-400 ACFT. ONE OF THE JOBS THAT I WAS INVOLVED WITH WAS THE INSTALLATION OF THE L-HAND INBOARD FLAP OUTBOARD FLAP TRANSMISSION. ANOTHER GROUP OF MECHS ON ANOTHER SHIFT PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED THE TRANSMISSION. THE INSPECTION AND OPERATIONAL CHK COULD NOT BE COMPLETED BY THE MECHS THAT INSTALLED THE TRANSMISSION BECAUSE FUEL WORK WAS BEING ACCOMPLISHED. AFTER THE FUEL WORK WAS FINISHED WE PROCEEDED WITH THE INSPECTION AND OPERATIONAL CHK. DURING THIS CHK WE FOUND A PROB WITH THE UPSTOP X DIMENSION, FURTHER INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE NEW YOKE INSTALLED ON THE JACK SCREW WAS CLOCKED WRONG. IT WAS 180 DEGS OFF. THIS CONDITION WAS CONFIRMED BY THE MAINT MANUAL. AT THIS POINT THE INSPECTOR ON THE JOB SAID HE WOULD NOT BUY THE OPERATIONAL CHK AND TOLD US TO MAKE A WRITE-UP TO FIX THE PROB. THAT IS WHAT I DID. I MADE A WRITE-UP THAT STATED THAT THE #3 TRANSMISSION WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN THE UPSTOP X DIMENSION OF .540 TO .900 ACCOUNT THE JACK SCREW WAS 180 DEGS OUT OF PHASE. AT THIS TIME IT WAS THE END OF MY SHIFT SO I WENT HOME. ON JUL/TUE/00, I ARRIVED AT WORK AND FOUND OUT THE SHIFT THAT INSTALLED THE TRANSMISSION HAD NOT FIXED THE PROB WITH THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSMISSION. INSTEAD THEY HAD THE WRITE-UP BOUGHT OFF BY THE SHIFT SUPVR AND AN INSPECTION SUPVR. THEIR POS WAS THAT THIS UPSTOP X DIMENSION WAS NOT REQUIRED, AS THEY DID NOT DISTURB THAT. THIS WAS VERY UPSETTING TO MY CO-WORKER AND ME. WORKLOAD ON THIS DAY MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO TRY AND FIX THE PROB OURSELVES SO WE CONFRONTED THE SUPVR WHEN HE CAME IN FOR HIS SHIFT. WE ASKED HOW THEY COULD JUST IGNORE OUR WRITE-UP AND SAY IT WASN'T REQUIRED WHEN THE MAINT MANUAL CLRLY STATED IT WAS REQUIRED. HE TOLD US THAT HE REALLY DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE SYS THAT WELL AND THAT HE WAS GOING ON WHAT HIS MECHS TOLD HIM. WE TRIED TO TALK TO THE MECHS BUT GOT NOWHERE WITH OUR INFO. ON JUL/WED/00, I WENT TO ENGINEERING WITH MY PROB AND THE AIRPLANE WAS GOING TO BE RECHKED IN SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA THAT NIGHT. I DON'T KNOW THE OUTCOME OF THE CHK IN SYDNEY. I DO KNOW THIS WAS A SAFETY OF FLT ISSUE THAT I DON'T EVER WANT TO GO THROUGH AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.