Narrative:

After touching down at bdr, the tower told me to stay on his frequency and turn left onto taxiway H. I then told him that I would like to return to the active for takeoff. He then instructed me to turn from taxiway H to taxiway a to return to runway 29. After turning onto taxiway a, I began to prepare for takeoff. It must be pointed out that I was not familiar with this airport. Confused about where I should be, I came to a full stop, and was about to contact the tower for clrer instructions. At that point, the tower instructed an aircraft on final to go around. He then informed me that I was beyond the taxiway threshold. Looking back, only then did I see the yellow hold lines, a full fuselage-length back. I immediately stated that I would taxi back beyond the lines promptly. (I also must point out that these hold lines consisted of old, faded paint upon highly weathered asphalt, ie, very easy to miss.) the tower then instructed me to hold my position, copy the tower phone number, call the tower when I reached my destination, and cleared me for takeoff. Later, when I called the tower, the controller told me that I had committed a runway incursion and that he intended to report me to the FAA. At this point I also must point out that at the time of the incident, although I was beyond the threshold markings and considered in the runway area, at no time was I actually on the runway itself. The plane on final was not in danger of collision, and could easily have landed without incident. On the phone, the controller actually apologized to me, stating that he was compelled to take action because of stringent enforcement from above and that he feared for his job. In other words, his action was based purely on protocol, not because of an emergency or hazardous situation. The other aircraft was flying VFR in VMC, practicing touch-and-goes. I believe that several factors contributed to this incident. First was that I was not familiar with the airport layout. As for signs, I cannot remember them. Usually for thresholds, I look for painted lines first, then signs secondary, ie, tail/ILS hold, displaced runway thresholds, etc. I cannot recall if there were signs or not. Finally, communications was a factor. I did not understand if 'taxi to runway 29' meant entering runway 29 for a 'back taxi' or not. Calling for a repeat of instructions and/or a progressive taxi was prudent, and I had intended to do so. However, I believed at that moment that I was still on a taxiway -- not the runway area. One last reason why I hadn't communicated sooner was that there was no ground control. The tower was controling everything and I was waiting for a break in communications with other aircraft. I had no intention of entering what I believed was the runway without concise clearance from the tower.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PVT PLT FLYING A C152 AT BDR RPTS FAILING TO HOLD SHORT OF AN ACTIVE RWY AFTER BECOMING CONFUSED ABOUT HIS TAXI CLRNC.

Narrative: AFTER TOUCHING DOWN AT BDR, THE TWR TOLD ME TO STAY ON HIS FREQ AND TURN L ONTO TXWY H. I THEN TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO THE ACTIVE FOR TKOF. HE THEN INSTRUCTED ME TO TURN FROM TXWY H TO TXWY A TO RETURN TO RWY 29. AFTER TURNING ONTO TXWY A, I BEGAN TO PREPARE FOR TKOF. IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THIS ARPT. CONFUSED ABOUT WHERE I SHOULD BE, I CAME TO A FULL STOP, AND WAS ABOUT TO CONTACT THE TWR FOR CLRER INSTRUCTIONS. AT THAT POINT, THE TWR INSTRUCTED AN ACFT ON FINAL TO GO AROUND. HE THEN INFORMED ME THAT I WAS BEYOND THE TXWY THRESHOLD. LOOKING BACK, ONLY THEN DID I SEE THE YELLOW HOLD LINES, A FULL FUSELAGE-LENGTH BACK. I IMMEDIATELY STATED THAT I WOULD TAXI BACK BEYOND THE LINES PROMPTLY. (I ALSO MUST POINT OUT THAT THESE HOLD LINES CONSISTED OF OLD, FADED PAINT UPON HIGHLY WEATHERED ASPHALT, IE, VERY EASY TO MISS.) THE TWR THEN INSTRUCTED ME TO HOLD MY POS, COPY THE TWR PHONE NUMBER, CALL THE TWR WHEN I REACHED MY DEST, AND CLRED ME FOR TKOF. LATER, WHEN I CALLED THE TWR, THE CTLR TOLD ME THAT I HAD COMMITTED A RWY INCURSION AND THAT HE INTENDED TO RPT ME TO THE FAA. AT THIS POINT I ALSO MUST POINT OUT THAT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, ALTHOUGH I WAS BEYOND THE THRESHOLD MARKINGS AND CONSIDERED IN THE RWY AREA, AT NO TIME WAS I ACTUALLY ON THE RWY ITSELF. THE PLANE ON FINAL WAS NOT IN DANGER OF COLLISION, AND COULD EASILY HAVE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. ON THE PHONE, THE CTLR ACTUALLY APOLOGIZED TO ME, STATING THAT HE WAS COMPELLED TO TAKE ACTION BECAUSE OF STRINGENT ENFORCEMENT FROM ABOVE AND THAT HE FEARED FOR HIS JOB. IN OTHER WORDS, HIS ACTION WAS BASED PURELY ON PROTOCOL, NOT BECAUSE OF AN EMER OR HAZARDOUS SIT. THE OTHER ACFT WAS FLYING VFR IN VMC, PRACTICING TOUCH-AND-GOES. I BELIEVE THAT SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. FIRST WAS THAT I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT LAYOUT. AS FOR SIGNS, I CANNOT REMEMBER THEM. USUALLY FOR THRESHOLDS, I LOOK FOR PAINTED LINES FIRST, THEN SIGNS SECONDARY, IE, TAIL/ILS HOLD, DISPLACED RWY THRESHOLDS, ETC. I CANNOT RECALL IF THERE WERE SIGNS OR NOT. FINALLY, COMS WAS A FACTOR. I DID NOT UNDERSTAND IF 'TAXI TO RWY 29' MEANT ENTERING RWY 29 FOR A 'BACK TAXI' OR NOT. CALLING FOR A REPEAT OF INSTRUCTIONS AND/OR A PROGRESSIVE TAXI WAS PRUDENT, AND I HAD INTENDED TO DO SO. HOWEVER, I BELIEVED AT THAT MOMENT THAT I WAS STILL ON A TXWY -- NOT THE RWY AREA. ONE LAST REASON WHY I HADN'T COMMUNICATED SOONER WAS THAT THERE WAS NO GND CTL. THE TWR WAS CTLING EVERYTHING AND I WAS WAITING FOR A BREAK IN COMS WITH OTHER ACFT. I HAD NO INTENTION OF ENTERING WHAT I BELIEVED WAS THE RWY WITHOUT CONCISE CLRNC FROM THE TWR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.