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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 479009 |
Time | |
Date | 200007 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | navaid : omn.vortac |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 12000 msl bound upper : 22000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zjx.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other vortac |
Flight Phase | descent : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | arrival star : bitho |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 6700 flight time type : 1600 |
ASRS Report | 479009 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : multi engine |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew other Other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance Airspace Structure Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Narrative:
We were initially issued a descent to cross the lamma intersection at 12000 ft and 250 KIAS (as per the bitho 7 arrival to mco). I initiated the descent at 320 KIAS and planned to slow once level at 12000 ft MSL. As we descended through approximately FL220, the controller instructed us to slow to 250 KIAS and still make the crossing at lamma at 12000 ft. This was going to make crossing lamma at 12000 ft a little tight so I fully extended the spoilers and programmed the digital flight guidance panel for a 250 KIAS descent. The autoplt pitched for approximately a 1000-1200 FPM descent and would fly 250 KIAS once we attained that speed. As the aircraft slowed through 260 KIAS, the controller asked what our speed was. My first officer responded, 'slowing through 260 KTS.' the controller immediately responded, 'xyz, I needed that speed right away, it wasn't at your discretion!' I responded that 'we started slowing right away but we can't go down and slow down at the same time.' he restated that we should have told him if it was going to be a problem. Well, it wasn't a problem, we just had to slow first and then descend per his instructions. There is no regulatory requirement, to my knowledge, as to how quickly we must slow the aircraft. If he needed the speed right away, the instructions should have been to slow to 250 KTS and then descend to make lamma at 250 KIAS. The above conversation degenerated on both ends. I did not enjoy being talked to like a student pilot and he was overwhelmed with traffic. We made lamma at 12000 ft with no problem and had no further cross words. This whole exchange resulted in distrs for my crew, the controller, and probably other aircraft on the frequency. I feel that had the instructions been more clear, the entire dispute could have been avoided.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A DSNDING MD80 FLC GETS INTO A VERBAL EXCHANGE WITH ZJX CTLR ABOUT SLOWING DOWN AND DSNDING WITH RESPECT TO PRIORITIES AND TECHNIQUE N OF OMN, FL.
Narrative: WE WERE INITIALLY ISSUED A DSCNT TO CROSS THE LAMMA INTXN AT 12000 FT AND 250 KIAS (AS PER THE BITHO 7 ARR TO MCO). I INITIATED THE DSCNT AT 320 KIAS AND PLANNED TO SLOW ONCE LEVEL AT 12000 FT MSL. AS WE DSNDED THROUGH APPROX FL220, THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO SLOW TO 250 KIAS AND STILL MAKE THE XING AT LAMMA AT 12000 FT. THIS WAS GOING TO MAKE XING LAMMA AT 12000 FT A LITTLE TIGHT SO I FULLY EXTENDED THE SPOILERS AND PROGRAMMED THE DIGITAL FLT GUIDANCE PANEL FOR A 250 KIAS DSCNT. THE AUTOPLT PITCHED FOR APPROX A 1000-1200 FPM DSCNT AND WOULD FLY 250 KIAS ONCE WE ATTAINED THAT SPD. AS THE ACFT SLOWED THROUGH 260 KIAS, THE CTLR ASKED WHAT OUR SPD WAS. MY FO RESPONDED, 'SLOWING THROUGH 260 KTS.' THE CTLR IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED, 'XYZ, I NEEDED THAT SPD RIGHT AWAY, IT WASN'T AT YOUR DISCRETION!' I RESPONDED THAT 'WE STARTED SLOWING RIGHT AWAY BUT WE CAN'T GO DOWN AND SLOW DOWN AT THE SAME TIME.' HE RESTATED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE TOLD HIM IF IT WAS GOING TO BE A PROB. WELL, IT WASN'T A PROB, WE JUST HAD TO SLOW FIRST AND THEN DSND PER HIS INSTRUCTIONS. THERE IS NO REGULATORY REQUIREMENT, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, AS TO HOW QUICKLY WE MUST SLOW THE ACFT. IF HE NEEDED THE SPD RIGHT AWAY, THE INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO SLOW TO 250 KTS AND THEN DSND TO MAKE LAMMA AT 250 KIAS. THE ABOVE CONVERSATION DEGENERATED ON BOTH ENDS. I DID NOT ENJOY BEING TALKED TO LIKE A STUDENT PLT AND HE WAS OVERWHELMED WITH TFC. WE MADE LAMMA AT 12000 FT WITH NO PROB AND HAD NO FURTHER CROSS WORDS. THIS WHOLE EXCHANGE RESULTED IN DISTRS FOR MY CREW, THE CTLR, AND PROBABLY OTHER ACFT ON THE FREQ. I FEEL THAT HAD THE INSTRUCTIONS BEEN MORE CLR, THE ENTIRE DISPUTE COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.