Narrative:

My crew flew into rhinelander the previous afternoon. In the morning we had the first flight out. I went out to the airplane to perform the preflight checklists while the captain reviewed the release and ordered fuel. We planned a runway 27 departure. We had always used runway 9/27 in my experience at rhinelander since runway 15/33 is significantly shorter and imposed great weight limits. During the taxi, we communicated with local traffic on the CTAF frequency. We heard maintenance personnel report that they were crossing runway 9/27, but we heard no other traffic. We called ZMP for our clearance, and told them we planned a runway 27 departure. We departed the airport without incident. Later in the day, we flew back to rhinelander. En route, ZMP told us that runway 9/27 was notamed closed since the previous night. We then reviewed our first flight's release and found the NOTAM for the runway closure. We asked our station personnel to ask the airport manager about it, and he said it was closed while they worked on some lights, but the runway was now opened. We asked him to call ATC to cancel the NOTAM since it was still in the system, so that we could legally depart runway 9/27 on the outbound leg. However, the damage was still done on our morning takeoff. I blame myself for being complacent. I saw that my captain had reviewed our release, taking care to circle significant WX and NOTAMS at our destination, and I took for granted that all important information had been noted. In being busy with my first flight of the day checks, I did not review the release myself, so we did not have a second set of eyes reviewing it. Other factors include the maintenance personnel we spoke with over CTAF not mentioning the closure, center overlooking or not mentioning the closure when we called for our release, the airport manager not giving us a heads-up when the runway closed, the previous night's crew not mentioning the runway had been closed when they arrived, and our dispatcher not highlighting the NOTAM (since it was such a huge performance consideration as well). None of these others had the primary responsibility for our mistake, but any one of them could have 'broken the chain' of events. In addition, I guess my own complacency is the only thing I can control. Supplemental information from acn 480150: it is the opinion of the crew that a chaotic morning and lack of communication allowed the initial oversight. Members of the crew will be slowing down in an effort to be less complacent, not allowing many tasks and obstacles to mask the other important items.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER CREW DEPARTS A CLOSED RWY WHEN NOTAM IS NOT NOTED.

Narrative: MY CREW FLEW INTO RHINELANDER THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON. IN THE MORNING WE HAD THE FIRST FLT OUT. I WENT OUT TO THE AIRPLANE TO PERFORM THE PREFLT CHKLISTS WHILE THE CAPT REVIEWED THE RELEASE AND ORDERED FUEL. WE PLANNED A RWY 27 DEP. WE HAD ALWAYS USED RWY 9/27 IN MY EXPERIENCE AT RHINELANDER SINCE RWY 15/33 IS SIGNIFICANTLY SHORTER AND IMPOSED GREAT WT LIMITS. DURING THE TAXI, WE COMMUNICATED WITH LCL TFC ON THE CTAF FREQ. WE HEARD MAINT PERSONNEL RPT THAT THEY WERE XING RWY 9/27, BUT WE HEARD NO OTHER TFC. WE CALLED ZMP FOR OUR CLRNC, AND TOLD THEM WE PLANNED A RWY 27 DEP. WE DEPARTED THE ARPT WITHOUT INCIDENT. LATER IN THE DAY, WE FLEW BACK TO RHINELANDER. ENRTE, ZMP TOLD US THAT RWY 9/27 WAS NOTAMED CLOSED SINCE THE PREVIOUS NIGHT. WE THEN REVIEWED OUR FIRST FLT'S RELEASE AND FOUND THE NOTAM FOR THE RWY CLOSURE. WE ASKED OUR STATION PERSONNEL TO ASK THE ARPT MGR ABOUT IT, AND HE SAID IT WAS CLOSED WHILE THEY WORKED ON SOME LIGHTS, BUT THE RWY WAS NOW OPENED. WE ASKED HIM TO CALL ATC TO CANCEL THE NOTAM SINCE IT WAS STILL IN THE SYS, SO THAT WE COULD LEGALLY DEPART RWY 9/27 ON THE OUTBOUND LEG. HOWEVER, THE DAMAGE WAS STILL DONE ON OUR MORNING TKOF. I BLAME MYSELF FOR BEING COMPLACENT. I SAW THAT MY CAPT HAD REVIEWED OUR RELEASE, TAKING CARE TO CIRCLE SIGNIFICANT WX AND NOTAMS AT OUR DEST, AND I TOOK FOR GRANTED THAT ALL IMPORTANT INFO HAD BEEN NOTED. IN BEING BUSY WITH MY FIRST FLT OF THE DAY CHKS, I DID NOT REVIEW THE RELEASE MYSELF, SO WE DID NOT HAVE A SECOND SET OF EYES REVIEWING IT. OTHER FACTORS INCLUDE THE MAINT PERSONNEL WE SPOKE WITH OVER CTAF NOT MENTIONING THE CLOSURE, CTR OVERLOOKING OR NOT MENTIONING THE CLOSURE WHEN WE CALLED FOR OUR RELEASE, THE ARPT MGR NOT GIVING US A HEADS-UP WHEN THE RWY CLOSED, THE PREVIOUS NIGHT'S CREW NOT MENTIONING THE RWY HAD BEEN CLOSED WHEN THEY ARRIVED, AND OUR DISPATCHER NOT HIGHLIGHTING THE NOTAM (SINCE IT WAS SUCH A HUGE PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATION AS WELL). NONE OF THESE OTHERS HAD THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR OUR MISTAKE, BUT ANY ONE OF THEM COULD HAVE 'BROKEN THE CHAIN' OF EVENTS. IN ADDITION, I GUESS MY OWN COMPLACENCY IS THE ONLY THING I CAN CTL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 480150: IT IS THE OPINION OF THE CREW THAT A CHAOTIC MORNING AND LACK OF COM ALLOWED THE INITIAL OVERSIGHT. MEMBERS OF THE CREW WILL BE SLOWING DOWN IN AN EFFORT TO BE LESS COMPLACENT, NOT ALLOWING MANY TASKS AND OBSTACLES TO MASK THE OTHER IMPORTANT ITEMS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.